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Summary 
1. Introduction 
Under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” (Article 3.1 of the 
UNFCCC) non-Annex I parties have so far been exempted from emission limitation or 
reduction commitments. However, the pressure is mounting on those countries, especially 
major emitting developing countries, to contribute actively to the mitigation of climate change. 
Participation by these developing countries in a future international climate regime is often 
called for, but it is usually unclear how and how much these countries should participate, 
what kind of support they need and in which sectors. This project aims to provide a more 
detailed view on six countries to understand how they could best make a contribution to the 
regime and how they could best be supported in limiting their greenhouse gas emissions. 
In this project “Proposals for contributions of emerging economies to the climate regime 
under the UNFCCC post 2012” for the German Environment Agency, Ecofys and the 
Wuppertal Institute analyse in detail the situation of the major emitting developing countries 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea. It includes an overview of 
emissions and economic development, provides estimates of the emission reduction 
potential up to 2020 in a consistent manner, examines already existing policies and 
measures to effectively limit greenhouse gas emissions, suggests how they could be 
complemented by further measures and, finally, makes recommendations on how efforts by 
these countries could be integrated into the international climate change agreement under 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
2. Methodology 
Elements of the work were reviewed by country experts of all six countries and were 
subsequently refined.  
Estimating reference emissions and mitigation potential 
The project included the development of a bottom-up spreadsheet calculation model to 
describe possible future emission trends and reduction options until 2020 consistently for 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea. We calculated four scenarios in a 
consistent manner for all countries: 
Business-as-usual: The business-as-usual (BAU) scenario follows production, energy 
consumption and energy efficiency trends that are based on moderate assumptions. Where 
available, these assumptions or related growth rates were taken from national studies. This 
was possible for Brazil, China and India (Centro Clima et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2006; TERI 
2006). For those countries or sectors where no detailed studies were available, patterns and 
growth rate trends were usually assumed to be similar to previous years. This scenario can 
be considered to lead to relatively high levels of emissions. 
No-regret: Pathways under the no-regret scenarios include GHG emission reduction options 
that can be achieved at negative or no direct costs. These would include, e.g. energy 
efficiency measures, where the economic gains from reduced energy use outweigh the 
investment costs for more efficient technology. Some would call this scenario also “economic 
potential at costs below 0€/tCO2eq”. We did not make a precise economic analysis of the 
costs of each measure but applied generic assumptions. Given the economic net benefit 
achievable, it should be in the interest of each country to realise this potential with its own 
resources. The international community could, however, support implementation both by 
technical contributions and by seed funding for, e.g. national revolving funds and for 
implementing policies and measures to overcome non-market barriers. 
Co-benefit: Pathways under the co-benefit scenario consider reduction options that are 
reasonable due to political aims other than greenhouse gas emission reduction. This 
includes also reductions at some costs. A typical measure would be the increased use of 
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renewable energy sources to increase energy security and to decrease dependency on 
import of fossil fuels or switching from diesel to gas in passenger transport for air quality 
reasons. It should be in the interest of each country to realise this potential with its own 
resources. However, the fact that it may entail some extra cost means that not only technical 
but also financial contributions from the international community would be helpful to achieve 
this scenario.  
Ambitious: The ambitious scenario includes reduction options, which can be implemented but 
at extra net costs, while maintaining the same service level. This scenario includes reduction 
options that are technically feasible and would accelerate the capital stock turnover, but they 
would not lead to stranded investments. We did not undertake a precise economic analysis 
but used the level of 100 USD/tCO2eq as a rough guide for the maximum extra net costs of 
options to include. However, depending on discount rates as well as other developments, 
costs can lie below this level. This potential can be realised if both the non-market barriers 
are removed and financial incentives are provided to cover the extra net costs. It could be 
achieved with additional contributions from the country itself or from the international 
community.  
The general methodology in the spreadsheet is a bottom-up approach. The tool, however, is 
limited to the availability of useful input data. With this tool, one is capable to compare 
emission reduction options across these developing countries in a comparable manner. This 
is a novelty since currently consistent studies are available only for broad global regions, 
which usually do not include these countries separately. Studies on individual countries are 
also available but these are not comparable between countries. The tool we developed 
allows this comparison. 
Analysis of national climate policies 
We developed a sourcebook for good practice climate policy instruments as a basis for the 
implementation of climate policies (see Appendix C). The sourcebook, assessments of 
country experts, and the circumstances of the respective country served as a basis for our 
suggestions on how to improve the existing mix of climate policies and measures. This study, 
however, merely provides a general framework. The concrete tailoring of policy packages 
including their evaluation and, if necessary, adaptation is a further task of the respective 
countries. It should also be noted that difficulties in gathering detailed information on current 
climate policy instruments in the selected countries did not allow a thorough in-depth 
analysis. 
For each of the sectors analysed, technology areas or subsectors with a significant potential 
for reduction of GHG emissions have been identified. For each of these areas and 
subsectors, a package of policies and measures was identified.  
Link to the international climate regime 
We also made suggestions for potential contributions to the climate regime by the six 
countries considered based on two main principles:  
• Ecological adequacy (contribution to stabilisation of GHG concentration): any post-2012 
regime should aim for containing global temperature increase at below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels. Meeting the 2°C limit requires that almost the full ambitious mitigation 
potential of the six countries considered in this project is mobilised in addition to a 
domestic emission reduction of at least 30% below 1990 levels by Annex I countries. 
• Differentiation according to national circumstances to implement the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities: the analysis is bases on the 
three principles of responsibility, capability and potential. 
As for the provision of international support, we proceed from the assumption that the no-
regret potential as a rule does not require permanent financial support from the international 
community. The analysis furthermore proceeds from the assumption that the co-benefit 
potential needs some financial support because it may not be realised by non-Annex I parties 
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despite the benefits and that countries will profit from non-financial support. It will finally 
proceed from the assumption that utilising the options identified under the ambitious 
mitigation scenario would crucially depend on international financial support in order to 
remove economic and other barriers as well as on other support. 
 
3. Current mechanisms to involve developing countries in the international regime 
Non-Annex I countries are in many ways already involved in mitigation and limitation 
activities within the Convention and the Protocol. These are financial mechanisms, 
technology transfer, and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  
The post-2012 negotiations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
The negotiations in the context of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are the main pillar of 
the global efforts to fight climate change. This regime provides not only the global framework 
for a host of other multi- and bilateral activities; it is furthermore the only forum that is all-
inclusive.  
Of the many possible types of commitments of developing countries in a future framework, 
the following options/combinations appear to be most promising: 
• Absolute emission targets 
• Dual targets/no-lose targets 
• Dynamic sectoral no-lose targets 
• Registry of sustainable development policies and measures 
 
4. Overview of scenarios 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the business-as-usual and the reduction scenarios for 
greenhouse gas emissions in Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea 
between 1990 and 2020. 
For the ambitious scenario the reduction potential is considerable and amounts to about 30% 
below BAU for all considered countries as a whole. This is made up of a potential of 14% 
below BAU for Brazil, 32% below BAU for China, 38% below BAU for India, 39% below BAU 
for Mexico, 35% below BAU for South Africa and 42% below BAU for South Korea. The 
following sections provide more detailed information and results per country. 
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Figure 1. Scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions in Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa 
and South Korea between 1990 and 2020. 
 
5. Brazil 
Overall, the strong position of renewable sources in Brazil’s energy mix leads to 
comparatively low emission intensity in electricity generation. Due to Brazil’s level of 
development and its fuel mix, per capita emissions are low compared to industrialised 
countries but high compared to other Latin American countries. Brazil’s emissions are likely 
to increase in the future due to development and a related increase of transport and energy 
demand per capita.  
Reference emissions and mitigation potential 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the reduction potential for Brazil is 3% (no-regret), 6% (co-benefit) 
and 14% (ambitious potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the 
transportation, power and industrial sector. The ambitious mitigation potential in the 
transportation sector is estimated at 164 MtCO2eq in 2020. In the power sector, there exists 
an ambitious potential of 120 MtCO2eq. The ambitious potential in the industrial sector is 
estimated at 59 MtCO2eq in 2020. The total ambitious mitigation potential in Brazil is 
estimated at 429 MtCO2eq in the year 2020. A detailed overview of the potential per sector 
and scenario can be found in Appendix B. 
Existing and possible further national climate policies 
Already today, Brazil has implemented and planned a number of climate change policies and 
measures. Further policies and measures could be e.g.: 
• Transport sector: energy taxation of fossil fuels, road fees, and congestion charges 
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• Power sector: renewable energy targets for heat and cold supply, an ecological finance 
reform and financial support for the installation of renewable energy sources (RES) 
• Industry sector: gradual phase-out of energy subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy efficiency and RES, enhanced financial support for the 
optimisation and installation of energy-efficient technologies linked to energy audits and 
management systems and minimum energy efficiency standards (for energy using 
equipment as well as included in building permits for new industrial production facilities). 
Options for a stronger involvement of Brazil in the international regime 
Responsibility: Brazil’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions excluding land 
use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) is below world average but above non-Annex I 
average. With LULUCF emissions it is likely to be higher, but sound historical estimates of 
emissions from the LULCUF sector are not available. 
Capability: Brazil’s per capita income is about world average. However, the regional and 
social income distribution is still very unequal. Its human development index is far above 
world average. It has in place many initiatives, laws and standards to reduce the emission 
intensity of electricity, transport and industry. But some institutional difficulties exist in terms 
of implementing policies. 
Potential: Despite the high share of renewable sources in electricity production, Brazil has a 
substantial mitigation potential. According to the figures from Phase II of the project, the no-
regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions below BAU levels amounts to 104 Mt, the co-
benefit potential to 187 Mt and the ambitious mitigation potential to 429 MtCO2eq. These 
would be equal to a 3%, 6% or 14% reduction compared to BAU levels respectively and a 
20%, 16% or 6% increase compared to 2005 emissions levels. 
Given the amount of global emission reductions required to keep temperature change below 
2°C and based on the above analysis, we suggest that it would be equitable and feasible for 
Brazil to commit to an absolute country-wide no-lose emission target.  
The target could either be set at a stringent level correlated to the ambitious potential as 
analysed in this project, but implementation be made contingent on the provision of financial 
and technical support from Annex I countries. The target would in this case amount to about 
2,555 MtCO2eq annual emissions in 2020, 14% below the BAU level. Alternatively, the target 
could be set at a less stringent level, for instance correlated to the co-benefit mitigation 
potential. This target would amount to about 2,796 MtCO2eq, 16% above 2005 levels. Brazil 
could then nevertheless implement ambitious policies and measures to overachieve the 
target and sell the resulting surplus on the carbon market. This alternative would require less 
direct financial and technical support from Annex I countries but more support through the 
carbon market and hence emission reduction targets for Annex I countries of 45% compared 
to 1990, as opposed to the -30% target as assumed in the option above. 
 
6. China 
Overall, China is classified as country with a medium human development. Its per capita 
income is on a developing country average level. The dominance of coal in China’s energy 
mix and the comparatively low energy efficiency leads to high emission intensity in electricity 
generation. The overall per capita emissions are still low. Nevertheless, its national 
emissions are high, also due to substantial exports. Although China’s energy intensity 
declined considerably during the last decades, its absolute energy demand strongly 
increased. This trend makes China a very important party in the future global climate regime.  
Reference emissions and mitigation potential 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the reduction potential for China is 8% (no-regret), 15% (co-benefit) 
and 32% (ambitious potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the power, 
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industrial and transportation sector. In the power sector, there exists an ambitious mitigation 
potential of 1322 MtCO2eq in 2020. The ambitious potential in the industry sector is 
estimated at 770 MtCO2eq. In the transportation sector, there is an ambitious potential of 
about 395 MtCO2eq. The total ambitious mitigation potential in China is estimated at 
2930 MtCO2eq in the year 2020. A detailed overview of the potential per sector and scenario 
can be found in Appendix B. 
Existing and possible further national climate policies 
Climate policy in China is mainly implemented and enforced at the regional level. The central 
government imposes standards that often have the form of directives and leaves their 
implementation and enforcement to the local governments. However, China implemented 
and is planning a number of climate change policies and measures. Further policies and 
measures could be e.g.: 
• Power sector: specific renewable energy targets for electricity, heat and cold supply, 
ecological finance reform and a gradual phase-out of energy subsidies backed by 
financial and technical support for energy efficiency and RES 
• Industry sector: gradual phase-out of energy subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-efficiency and RES, financial support for the optimisation 
and installation of energy efficient technologies linked to energy audits and management 
systems and the extension of the existing minimum energy efficiency standards 
• Transport sector: targets/quotas for biofuels, tax exemptions for sustainable biofuels 
and road fees 
Options for a stronger involvement of China in the international regime 
Responsibility: China’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions excluding 
LULUCF is at about non-Annex I average compared on a per capita basis. Its current per 
capita emissions are above non-Annex I average. In absolute terms considering all gases 
and sources, China’s emissions are almost equal or even higher than those of the USA, the 
formally largest emitter in the world, and emissions are rapidly increasing. 
Capability: Per capita income is slightly above developing country average and the human 
development index score is medium. Income is very unequally distributed amongst the 
population. 
Potential: The mitigation potential is very high. According to the figures from Phase II of the 
project, the no-regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions below BAU levels amounts to 
777 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 1,342 Mt and the ambitious mitigation potential to 
2,930 MtCO2eq. These would be equal to an 8%, 15% or 32% reduction compared to BAU 
levels respectively and a 36%, 27% or 1% increase compared to 2005 emissions levels.  
Given the amount of global emission reductions required to keep temperature change below 
2°C and based on the above analysis, we suggest that it would be equitable and feasible for 
China to commit to no-lose sectoral targets for the power production, iron/steel and cement 
sectors, where relatively good data are available. 
The target could either be set at a stringent level correlated to the ambitious mitigation 
potential but the implementation would be made contingent on the provision of financial and 
technical support from Annex I countries. The total target for the covered sectors would in 
this case amount to annual emissions of about 2,754 MtCO2eq in 2020, about 39% below the 
BAU level. Alternatively, the targets could be set at a lower level, for instance at the level 
indicated by the co-benefit mitigation potential. In this case the total target for all covered 
sectors would amount to 3,678 MtCO2eq, about 19% below BAU levels. China could then 
nevertheless implement ambitious policies and measures to overachieve the target and sell 
the resulting surplus on the carbon market. This alternative would require less direct financial 
and non-financial support from Annex I countries but more support through the carbon 
market and hence more stringent emission reduction targets for Annex I countries of 45% 
compared to 1990 as opposed to -30% as assumed for the option above. 
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In addition, China could commit to implementing a set of SD PAMs for the sectors not 
covered by the sectoral no-lose targets. The total package of sectoral no-lose targets and SD 
PAMs should aim at mobilising the full ambitious mitigation potential. However, the 
implementation of these policies and measures would be conditional on additional 
international funding to cover the higher costs compared to business-as-usual development. 
Due to missing capacity in these sectors, the emission reductions achieved through PAMs 
could probably only be roughly estimated. Therefore, no direct link is assumed between 
policies and the international carbon markets. 
 
7. India 
Overall, India is in a medium development state. GDP/cap and HDI are below development 
countries’ average and close to the average of low income countries (UNDP 2004). Its 
emissions are strongly increasing. The emissions per unit of GDP are comparatively high, 
the emissions per capita are low, also because still about half of the population is without 
reliable electricity access (World Bank 2006). Although India has a high share of carbon free 
energy sources, low conversion efficiency and an intensive use of coal lead to comparatively 
high specific emissions in energy production. However, India’s energy and carbon intensities 
declined after 1995 (Chandler et al. 2002). Similar to Brazil, the share of biomass for 
residential use is high but decreasing. 
Reference emissions and mitigation potential 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the reduction potential for India is 12% (no-regret), 22% (co-benefit) 
and 38% (mitigation potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious mitigation potential) are the 
power, industrial and transport sector. In the power sector, there exists an ambitious potential 
of 647 MtCO2eq. For the industrial sector, the ambitious potential is estimated at 
245 MtCO2eq. The ambitious potential in the transport sector is estimated at 231 MtCO2eq. 
The total ambitious mitigation potential in India is estimated at 1,336 MtCO2eq. A detailed 
overview of the potential per sector and scenario can be found in Appendix B. 
Existing and possible further national climate policies 
In addition to already existing policies and measures in India further options could be e.g.: 
• Power sector: renewable energy targets for heat and cold supply, gradual phase-out of 
energy subsidies backed by financial and technical support for energy-efficiency and 
RES and a domestic emission trading scheme 
• Industry sector: gradual phase-out of energy subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-efficiency and RES, financial support for the optimisation 
and installation of energy efficient technologies linked to energy audits and management 
systems and the extension of the energy efficiency accord 
• Transport sector: targets/quotas for sustainable biofuels, tax exemptions for sustainable 
biofuels and road fees 
Options for a stronger involvement of India in the international regime 
Responsibility: India’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions excluding 
LULUCF is below non-Annex I average compared on a per capita basis. Its current per 
capita emissions are well below non-Annex I average. In absolute terms, India’s emissions 
are substantial and increasing rapidly. 
Capability: Per capita income and the human development index score are below 
non-Annex I average. Income is very unequally distributed amongst the population. Policy 
implementation may be difficult. 
Potential: The mitigation potential is high due to low efficiency and strongly increasing 
emissions in absolute and relative terms. According to the figures from Phase II of the 
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project, the no-regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions below BAU levels amounts to 
416 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 775 Mt and the ambitious mitigation potential to 
1,336 MtCO2eq. These would be equal to a 12%, 22% or 38% reduction compared to BAU 
levels respectively and a 69%, 49% or 19% increase compared to 2005 emissions levels. 
Based on the above analysis, we suggest that it would be feasible and equitable for India to 
implement a set of SD PAMs. India would quantify the effect of the package of SD PAMs in 
advance. The total package should aim at mobilising the full ambitious mitigation potential. 
However, the implementation of these policies and measures would be conditional on 
additional international funding to cover the higher costs compared to business-as-usual 
development. Due to the lack of technical capacity, the emission reductions achieved 
through policies implemented in India can probably only be roughly estimated. Therefore, no 
direct link is assumed between policies and the international carbon markets. 
 
8. Mexico 
Overall, Mexico is classified as a country with a high human development index. Its GDP lies 
well above world average and middle income countries average. After the establishment of 
the UNFCCC it became member of the OECD and is therefore, similar to South Korea, 
non-Annex I but OECD country. The dominance of oil in Mexico’s energy mix leads to 
comparatively high emissions. Mexico’s per capita emissions in 2002 were considerable and 
even slightly higher than those of some low-emission Annex I countries, namely Lithuania, 
Turkey and Latvia. Over the last years Mexico’s emissions have been increasing. 
Reference emissions and mitigation potential 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the reduction potential for Mexico is 8% (no-regret), 16% (co-
benefit) and 39% (ambitious potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the power, 
transport and industrial sector. In the power sector, there exists an ambitious potential of 186 
MtCO2eq. For the transport sector, the ambitious potential is estimated at 111 MtCO2eq. The 
ambitious potential in the industrial sector is estimated at 41 MtCO2eq. The total ambitious 
mitigation potential in Mexico is estimated at 417 MtCO2eq. A detailed overview of the 
potential per sector and scenario can be found in Appendix B. 
Existing and possible further national climate policies 
Already today, Mexico has implemented and planned a number of climate change policies 
and measures. Further policies and measures could be e.g.: 
• Power sector: renewable energy targets for electricity, heat and cold supply, gradual 
phase-out of energy subsidies backed by financial and technical support for energy-
efficiency and RES and feed-in tariffs or electricity quotas (green certificates) for RES 
and CHP 
• Transport sector: targets/quotas for sustainable biofuels, tax exemptions for sustainable 
biofuels and road fees 
• Industry sector: gradual phase-out of energy subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-efficiency and RES, financial support for the optimisation 
and installation of energy efficient technologies linked to energy audits and management 
systems and minimum energy efficiency 
Options for a stronger involvement of Mexico in the international regime 
Responsibility: Mexico’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions excluding 
LULUCF is below world average but slightly above non-Annex I average.  
Capability: Mexico’s per capita income is slightly above world average. Its human 
development index is far above world average.  
 13
Potential: Mexico has a substantial mitigation potential. According to the figures from Phase 
II of the project, the no-regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions below BAU levels amounts 
to 82 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 173 Mt and the ambitious potential to 417 MtCO2eq. 
These would be equal to a 8%, 16% or 39% reduction compared to BAU levels respectively, 
and a +26%, +14% or -17% change compared to 2005 emissions levels. 
Given the amount of global emission reductions required to keep temperature change below 
2°C and based on the above analysis, we suggest that it would be equitable and feasible for 
Mexico to commit to an absolute country-wide no-lose emission target.  
The target could either be set at a stringent level correlated to the ambitious mitigation 
potential but implementation would have to be made contingent on the provision of financial 
and technical support from Annex I countries. The target would in this case amount to about 
638 MtCO2eq annual emissions in 2020, 39% below the BAU level and 17% below 2005 
emissions. Alternatively, the target could be set at a lower level, for instance at a level 
correlated to the co-benefit mitigation potential. This target would amount to 882 MtCO2eq, 
14% above 2005 levels. Mexico could then, nevertheless, implement ambitious policies and 
measures to overachieve the target and sell the resulting surplus on the carbon market. This 
alternative would require less direct financial and technical support from Annex I countries 
but more support through the carbon market and hence more stringent emission reduction 
targets for Annex I countries 45% compared to 1990 as opposed to 30% as assumed for the 
option above. 
 
9. South Africa 
Overall, the dominance of coal in South Africa’s energy mix leads to high emission intensity 
in electricity generation. This and the energy intensive industry result in very high emissions 
per GDP. Per capita emissions are lower than those of most Annex I countries but they are 
high for developing countries. South Africa’s emissions are likely to increase in the future due 
to development and a remaining high importance of coal as energy source. 
Reference emissions and mitigation potential 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the reduction potential South Africa is 9% (no-regret), 18% (co-
benefit) and 35% (ambitious potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the power, 
transport and industrial sector. In the power sector, there exists an ambitious potential of 67 
MtCO2eq. For the transport sector, the ambitious potential is estimated at 42 MtCO2eq. The 
ambitious potential in the industrial sector is estimated at 41 MtCO2eq. The total ambitious 
potential in South Africa is estimated at 212 MtCO2eq. A detailed overview of the potential 
per sector and scenario can be found in Appendix B. 
Existing and possible further national climate policies 
Already today, South Africa has implemented and planned a number of climate change 
policies and measures. Further policies and measures could be e.g.: 
• Power sector: renewable energy targets for heat and cold supply, gradual phase-out of 
energy subsidies backed by financial and technical support for energy efficiency and RES 
(e.g. backed by the ESKOM DSM scheme) and feed-in tariffs or electricity quotas (green 
certificates) for RES and CHP 
• Transport sector: targets/quotas for sustainable biofuels, tax exemptions for sustainable 
biofuels and road fees 
• Industry sector: gradual phase-out of energy subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy efficiency and RES, financial support for the optimisation and 
installation of energy-efficient technologies linked to energy audits and management 
systems and the extension of the energy efficiency accord 
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Options for a stronger involvement of South Africa in the international regime 
Responsibility: South Africa’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions excluding 
LULUCF is slightly above world average. LULUCF emissions do not play a major role. 
Capability: South Africa’s per capita income is above world average on a GDP PPP basis. 
But its human development index is just below average. This is an indication that the income 
is very unevenly distributed. 
Potential: South Africa disposes of a substantial mitigation potential. According to the figures 
from Phase II of the project, the no-regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions below BAU 
levels amounts to 57 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 110 Mt and the ambitious mitigation 
potential to 212 MtCO2eq. These would be equal to a 9%, 18% or 35% reduction compared 
to BAU levels respectively and a +19%, +7% or -15% change compared to 2005 emissions 
levels. 
Given the amount of global emission reductions required to keep temperature change below 
2°C and based on the above analysis, we suggest that it would be equitable and feasible for 
South Africa to commit to sectoral no-lose targets for the power production and industry 
sectors.  
The target could either be set at a stringent level correlated to the ambitious mitigation 
potential but implementation would have to be made contingent on the provision of financial 
and non-financial support from Annex I countries. The total target for both sectors would in 
this case amount to about 191 MtCO2eq annual emissions in 2020, about 36% below the 
BAU level. Alternatively, the targets could be set at a lower level, for instance correlated to 
the co-benefit mitigation potential. The total target for both sectors would in this case amount 
to about 256 MtCO2eq, about 14% below BAU levels. South Africa could then nevertheless 
implement ambitious policies and measures to overachieve the target and sell the resulting 
surplus on the carbon market. This alternative would require less direct financial and non-
financial support from Annex I countries but more support through the carbon market and 
hence more stringent emission reduction targets for Annex I countries of 45% compared 
1990 as opposed to 30% as assumed for the option above. 
In addition, South Africa could commit to implementing a set of SD PAMs for the sectors not 
covered by the sectoral no-lose targets. The total package of sectoral no-lose targets and SD 
PAMs should aim at mobilising the full ambitious mitigation potential. However, the 
implementation of these policies and measures would be conditional on additional 
international funding to cover the higher costs compared to business-as-usual development. 
Due to missing capacity in these sectors, the emission reductions achieved through PAMs 
could probably only be roughly estimated. Therefore, no direct link is assumed between 
policies and the international carbon markets.  
 
10. South Korea 
Overall, South Korea is in its state of development very similar to some Annex I countries. Its 
population was almost stable in the last decade. Its electricity mix includes a large share of 
nuclear energy, resulting in low emissions per kWh. South Korea’s industrial sector makes 
up a large share of its emissions, but it is one of the most efficient in the world. Transport and 
household emissions are high, agricultural emissions are not relevant.  
Reference emissions and mitigation potential 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the reduction potential South Korea is 13% (no-regret), 19% (co-
benefit) and 42% (ambitious potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the industrial, 
power and transport sector. In the industrial sector, there exists an ambitious potential of 212 
MtCO2eq in the year 2020. The ambitious potential in the power sector is estimated at 112 
MtCO2eq. In the transport sector, there is an ambitious potential of about 80 MtCO2eq. The 
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total ambitious potential in Korea is estimated at 443 MtCO2eq in the year 2020. A detailed 
overview of the potential per sector and scenario can be found in Appendix B. 
Existing and possible further national climate policies 
Already today, South Korea has implemented and planned a number of climate change 
policies and measures. Further policies and measures could be e.g.: 
• Industry sector: gradual phase-out of energy subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-efficiency and RES, financial support for the optimisation 
and installation of energy efficient technologies linked to energy audits and management 
systems, minimum energy efficiency standards (for energy using equipment as well as 
building permits for new industrial production facilities) and energy management systems 
• Power sector: renewable energy targets for heat and cold supply, ecological finance 
reform and feed-in tariffs or electricity quotas (green certificates) for RES and CHP 
• Transport sector: targets/quotas for biofuels, tax exemptions for sustainable biofuels 
and road fees 
Options for a stronger involvement of South Korea in the international regime 
Responsibility: South Korea’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions excluding 
LULUCF is at world average.  
Capability: South Korea’s per capita income is well above world average and closer to 
Annex I average. Its human development index is at Annex I average.  
Potential: Despite the high efficiency of the South Korean economy and the large share of 
nuclear power in electricity production, the mitigation potential is substantial. According to the 
figures from Phase II of the project, the no-regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions below 
BAU levels amounts to 133 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 200 Mt and the ambitious 
mitigation potential to 443 MtCO2eq. These would be equal to a 13%, 19% or 42% reduction 
compared to BAU levels respectively, and a +38%, +28% or -9% change compared to 1990 
emissions levels. 
Given the need for mobilising almost the full ambitious mitigation potential and based on the 
above analysis, we suggest that it would be equitable and feasible for South Korea to join 
Annex I and commit to an absolute and binding national emission limitation target. South 
Korea’s target could be set at about a level correlated to the ambitious emission reduction 
potential, i.e. at about 604 MtCO2eq annual emissions in 2020. This would be equal to a 42% 
reduction compared to 2020 BAU levels and a 9% decrease compared to 2005 levels. 
 
11. Resulting overall framework 
Table 1 includes a summary of the possible contributions from the countries covered above 
ordered by decreasing overall stringency. Based on their respectively high and low levels of 
economic development, we propose that it would be equitable for South Korea to join 
Annex I and for India to commit to implementing Sustainable Development Policies and 
Measures. We present two options for Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and China.  
In option A, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and China would commit to national or sectoral no-
lose targets to be set at the “ambitious level” but subject to financial support by Annex I 
countries outside of the carbon market. They could be accompanied by a 30% reduction 
below 1990 levels by 2020 for Annex I countries. 
An alternative framing (option B) could be envisaged that is equally stringent but is relying 
more on the carbon market as financing instrument and not on additional financial 
assistance. In this alternative framing Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and China would commit 
to no-lose targets in the same sectors at their co-benefit potential. To bring global emissions 
on a 2°C trajectory, the target for Annex I countries would then need to be 45% below 1990 
in 2020, not 30%. Annex I countries would provide technical assistance to remove non-
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market barriers, but not substantial additional resources outside of the carbon market to 
developing countries to directly reduce emissions. 
Table 1. Summary of illustrative example contributions for 2020 ordered by decreasing overall 
stringency 
Option A Option B Country Type Scope 
Emission 
level 
Financing Emission level Financing 
South 
Korea 
Absolute and 
binding national 
emission limitation 
target 
All sectors Well below 
BAU (e.g. 
40%) 
No additional 
financing 
Well below BAU 
(e.g. 40%) 
No additional 
financing 
Mexico Absolute no-lose 
emission target 
All sectors Well below 
BAU (e.g. 
40%) 
Conditional on 
financial support
Below BAU (co-
benefit potential, 
e.g. 15%) 
Technical 
assistance to 
reach co-benefit 
potential 
Brazil Absolute no-lose 
emission target 
All sectors Well below 
BAU (e.g. 
15%) 
Conditional on 
financial support
Below BAU (co-
benefit potential, 
e.g. 6%) 
Technical 
assistance to 
reach co-benefit 
potential 
Sectoral no-lose 
targets 
Power 
production and 
industry sector
Well below 
BAU (e.g. 
35%) 
Below BAU (co-
benefit potential, 
e.g. 18%) 
South 
Africa 
Sustainable 
development 
policies and 
measures 
Remaining 
sectors 
Not quantified 
Conditional on 
financial support Not quantified 
Technical 
assistance to 
reach co benefit 
potential 
Sectoral no-lose 
targets 
Power 
production, 
iron/steel and 
cement 
sectors 
Well below 
BAU  
(e.g. 30%) 
Below BAU (co-
benefit potential, 
e.g. 14%) 
China 
Sustainable 
development 
policies and 
measures  
Remaining 
sectors 
Not quantified 
Conditional on 
financial support
Not quantified 
Technical 
assistance to 
reach co benefit 
potential 
India Sustainable 
development 
policies and 
measures 
All sectors Well below 
BAU  
Conditional on 
financial support
Well below BAU  Conditional on 
financial support
 
We observe from the table a differentiation between the countries ranging from Annex I like 
commitments to moderate supported emission reductions. We also observe that the 
proposed reduction level varies between countries based on our analysis of mitigation 
potential.  
12. Consistency with 2°C limit 
Figure 2 below on the left hand side shows global greenhouse gas emissions up to 2020 
under the business-as-usual scenario split into Annex I and non-Annex I countries. The 
reduction potential identified here as “non-Annex I” includes only the potential identified in 
this report for the six countries for the ambitious scenario. Further mitigation potential in 
non-Annex I countries other than the six analysed here would be available in addition. 
However, the six countries cover more than 50% of the emissions of non-Annex I countries in 
2020. Annex I countries are assumed to reduce emissions 30% below the 1990 level. The 
right hand side of the picture shows possible post-2020 emission paths that aim at limiting 
global average temperature increase to 2°C. 
Keeping in mind the uncertainties of the calculations, we still conclude from the figure the 
encouraging finding that global emission growth from 2010 to 2020 can be halted by 
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implementing the ambitious scenario in the six non-Annex I countries. But after 2020, 
substantial further global reductions are necessary to stay below the 2°C limit.  
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Figure 2. Global greenhouse gas emissions including reduction scenarios for Annex I (-30% 
domestic reductions compared to 1990 by 2020) and non-Annex I (ambitious potential 
reductions for Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea between 1990 and 
2020). On the right hand side possible global reduction paths under all scenarios between 2020 
and 2050 are provided to stay below the 2° limit in the long term.  
 
13. Support for enhanced mitigation action 
Financial support for a switch to low- and no-carbon technologies is a key element to 
enhance the participation of non-Annex I countries in the climate regime. We identify the 
following areas.  
Policies and measures that require financial support (by country and by sector) 
Based on Part II, Part III identified additional domestic policies and measures in the three 
sectors with the highest emissions reduction potential of each country. It also suggested that 
the following policies and measures could strengthen the existing policies and measures but 
require financial support for realisation (see Table 2). Providing adequate financial support 
for the policies and measures will greatly enhance the chances of participation by the six 
countries in a future mitigation regime.  
Table 2. Additional policies and measures that require financial support for realisation 
 Sector Financial support 
Power Phase-out of direct and indirect energy subsidies or energy price control backed 
by financial support for improving energy end-use efficiency 
Installation of RES technologies 
Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants  
Brazil 
Transportation Switching from road-based to rail-or waterway based transportation in the 
transportation sector connected to an improved regulatory and financial 
framework which reduces risks and fosters investments 
Power 
 
Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants 
Installation of RES technologies  
China 
Industry Optimisation and installation of energy efficient technologies linked to energy 
audits and management systems 
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 Sector Financial support 
Power Phase-out of direct and indirect energy subsidies or energy price control backed 
by financial support for improving energy end-use efficiency 
Installation of RES technologies  
Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants  
India 
Industry Optimisation and installation of energy efficiency technologies linked to energy
audits and management systems  
Power  Phase-out of direct and indirect energy subsidies or energy price control backed 
by financial support for improving energy end-use efficiency 
Installation of RES technologies 
Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants 
Mexico 
Industry  Optimisation and installation of energy efficiency technologies linked to energy 
audits and management systems 
Power  Phase-out of direct and indirect energy subsidies or energy price control backed 
by financial support for improving energy end-use efficiency 
Installation of RES technologies 
Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants 
South Africa 
Industry  Optimisation and installation of energy efficiency technologies linked to energy 
audits and management systems 
Power Installation of RES technologies  South Korea 
Industry  Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants 
 
Existing instruments in the international climate regime to provide financial support  
Under the climate regime there are two main instruments, namely financial mechanisms and 
the CDM, to provide financial support for projects to reduce GHG emissions in developing 
countries. In order to examine the potential role of the two instruments for realising the 
potential identified in Part II and III, we compare the instruments in terms of the size of the 
funds, the donors, funded activities, requirements and procedure. This analysis illustrates the 
following points. 
• Resources currently provided by the financial mechanisms are too small compared to the 
UNFCCC secretariat’s estimate that additional investment and financial flows of 200-210 
billion USD will be required in 2030 for mitigation (UNFCCC 2007, pp. 100-102). The 
CDM has potential to make up for the gap.  
• The CDM also has other limits due to its tendency to focus on projects with large 
reduction potential. The financial mechanisms are thus more appropriate to address the 
needs of many non-Annex I Parties to provide financial resources for smaller projects. 
• The financial mechanisms are perhaps better equipped to mobilise resources for realising 
the co-benefit potential.  
• The implementation of non-financial support needs financial resources. Financial 
mechanisms may be utilised to provide financial resources for non-financial support 
measures. 
• Both the CDM and the financial mechanisms have one deficiency: in principle they do not 
provide resources to projects that realise no-regret potential. 
Based on the above analysis, we suggest to first restructure the financial mechanisms as 
explained below. Second, it is recommended to enhance bi-national, regional, and multi-
national cooperation in order to provide more public funds for no-regret potential and for non-
financial support and, third, to mobilise more private funds in order to realise no-regret and 
co-benefit potential.  
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Additional support options for enhanced mitigation action: non-financial support 
Apart from financial support, non-Annex I countries could also benefit greatly from non-
financial support. Exchange of knowledge and cooperation in research and development are 
potentially effective instruments of introducing and disseminating new technologies and 
political instruments. This form of technology cooperation has been employed outside of the 
climate regime. It has, however, not yet played an important role in the context of the FCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol. 
In general and for all countries, RD&D schemes are recommended for the accelerated 
development, technical improvement and market introduction of RES and CHP technologies 
for electricity, heat and cold, efficient fossil fuel power plants and in most countries for the 
analysis of CCS technologies. Other promising joint RD&D activities are schemes for energy 
efficient production technologies and methods and on sustainable transportation systems. 
All six countries analysed in this report would furthermore benefit from cooperation in 
standard setting and the creation of technology mandates. This form of international 
technology cooperation comprises the agreement of energy efficiency standards, mandates 
for technologies like renewable energy or the introduction of economic incentives for the 
deployment of certain technologies (e.g. subsidies for RES or tax incentives). There is 
furthermore substantial benefit in sharing the experiences of the EU and Germany in the 
establishment of an ETS or an ecological finance reform. 
A technology alliance with the emerging economies 
The challenge and the opportunity for an enhanced participation of non-Annex I countries lies 
in developing an integrated system for the development and deployment of innovative 
technologies. This should combine high efficiency with the capacity to gradually develop and 
improve. It should be designed in such a way as to allow the progressive integration of non-
Annex I countries in the mitigation effort in an international regime on climate change. 
An offer of integrated technology cooperation in the context of a new climate alliance could 
present a first step. It can combine the interest of the EU in integrating the larger economies 
of the non-Annex I countries in the mitigation effort within an international regime on climate 
change with the interest of the emerging economies in new and cleaner technologies. Some 
of the ideas by the G77/China should thus be taken up and combined with other elements 
presented in this report to a coherent and effective technology alliance. Such an offer should 
comprise cooperation in the research, development and deployment (RD&D) of low- and no-
carbon technologies, the elaboration of common standards and – as its core – a substantial 
commitment for financing the switch to low- and no-carbon technologies.  
The switch to low- and no-carbon technologies will require much higher financial volumes – 
estimates of the finances required range from Euro 20-30 billion in the Stern Review (Stern 
2006) to US$ 200-210 billion in 2030 according to the UNFCCC Secretariat (2007). In the 
short and medium term, such a fund will probably have to be financed with public money of 
Annex II countries. Taking part of the means generated by auctioning the emission rights 
under the EU ETS would already provide a considerable part of the means required. In 
addition to such a fund, the technology alliance could comprise an innovative feature 
employed by the Montreal Protocol in order to replace outdated technology – the Technology 
and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP).  
This new technology cooperation must be placed within the context of the carbon markets 
because these emerging markets are providing the background for all activities in the fight 
against climate change. In the North-South context the CDM is of particular importance. 
Certainly, the CDM cannot substitute the specialised means of cooperation in technology 
development and deployment and non-Annex I countries are emphasising that the CDM 
cannot be seen as an implementation of Article 4.5. It can, however, considerably improve 
the conditions for technological innovation and the deployment of innovative technologies in 
developing countries. 
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The offer of such a new technology alliance could provide a vital push for the post-2012 
negotiations. Greatly enhanced cooperation in technology development and deployment 
could easily be expanded to include technologies for adaptation to the inevitable 
consequences of climate change. This would provide a positive incentive for the poorer 
developing countries (not considered otherwise in this report) that are not expected to 
undertake mitigation activities but are looking for ways to improve their resilience to climate 
impacts. Such an offer would be an expression of the openness for new and creative ways to 
counteract the climate crisis. This challenge requires giving up traditional forms of diplomacy 
that are based on narrow notions of national interest. A true partnership with emerging 
economies from non-Annex I countries must be part of this new approach. 
 
14. Conclusions 
This report provides a detailed overview of the national circumstances, emission levels, 
mitigation potential and policies and measures, for the major developing countries Brazil, 
China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea. These countries are covering more than 
50% of non-Annex I parties’ emissions. The report further proposes enhanced mitigation 
activities for these countries and elements of international financial and non-financial support 
for realising these contributions. 
We draw the following conclusions from this work: 
• Climate change requires urgent action by developed countries to reduce their 
emissions and to support developing countries in slowing emissions growth and to 
eventually decrease their emissions. 
• The tool developed in this project allows comparing mitigation potential across major 
developing countries in a comparable manner for individual sectors, which is currently 
not possible. As in any model, the results depend on the input assumptions. 
However, this tool allows using the same input assumptions for all countries to 
compare the results.  
• The no-regret and co-benefit mitigation potential in the six developing countries is 
substantial according to our analysis. It is in the interest of these countries to achieve 
the reductions that are possible at no net costs (9% below reference) and reductions 
with a co-benefit other than climate (together 17% below reference). International 
support may be necessary to remove the barriers that currently prevent these 
reductions to occur. 
• Additional reduction potential is available that allows to put these countries on a path 
that is consistent with 2°C. Most countries, except South Korea, would need financial 
assistance to realise this mitigation potential. 
• Existing policy packages in the six countries can be individually supplemented by 
additional policies to realise the mitigation potential. The type and design of the 
policies largely depend on the current circumstances and emission profile of the 
country. 
Financial and non-financial support mechanisms - in addition to the carbon market - need to 
be implemented to support the decarbonisation of the six countries considered in this study. 
These efforts would greatly benefit from an integrated strategy of promoting a technology 
alliance with non-Annex I parties. 
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Zusammenfassung 
1. Einleitung 
Nach dem Prinzip der “gemeinsamen aber differenzierten Verantwortung“ (Art. 3.1, 
UNFCCC) wurden Nicht-Annex-I-Parteien bisher von Zielen zur Emissionslimitierung oder -
reduktion ausgeschlossen. Allerdings nimmt der Druck auf diese Länder, besonders auf 
schnell wachsende große Emittenten, zu, aktiv zur Minderung des Klimawandels 
beizutragen. Die Einbeziehung dieser Länder in ein zukünftiges Klimaregime wird besonders 
in Bezug auf Minderungsfragen stark gefordert, aber unklar ist, wie und welchen Anteil diese 
Länder dazu beitragen sollen und welche Unterstützung in welchen Sektoren notwendig ist.  
Das Ziel dieses Projektes ist es, einen detaillierten Einblick in die Situation von sechs 
wirtschaftlich weiter fortgeschrittenen Entwicklungsländern zu bekommen, zu verstehen wie 
sie in Fragen der Emissionsminderung am besten zu einem Klimaregime beitragen können 
und welche Unterstützung sie zur Limitierung ihrer Treibhausgase benötigen.  
In diesem Projekt „Proposals for contributions of emerging economies to the climate regime 
under the UNFCCC post 2012“ für das Umweltbundesamt (UBA) analysieren Ecofys und das 
Wuppertal Institut die Situation der Schwellenländer Brasilien, China, Indien, Mexiko, 
Südafrika und Südkorea. Der Bericht enthält einen Überblick über Treibhausgas-Emissionen 
und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung im Zeitraum zwischen 1990 und 2005, er stellt 
Abschätzungen für Emissionsminderungspotenziale bis zum Jahr 2020 in einer konsistenten 
Methode dar, er untersucht bereits existierende Politiken und Maßnahmen zur Limitierung 
von Treibhausgasemissionen, er enthält Anregungen mit welchen weiteren Maßnahmen 
diese ergänzt werden können und Vorschläge wie Bemühungen dieser Länder ins 
internationale Klimaregime unter den UNFCCC und dem Kyoto-Protokoll eingebunden 
werden können. 
 
2. Methode 
In diesen Bericht sind Elemente einer Überprüfung von Länderexperten aller sechs Länder 
eingegangen. 
Abschätzung von Referenzemissionen und Reduktionspotenzialen 
Das Projekt beinhaltet die Entwicklung eines „bottom-up“ Excel Modells um mögliche 
zukünftige Emissionstrends und Reduktionsoptionen bis zum Jahr 2020 für Brasilien, China, 
Indien, Mexiko, Südafrika und Südkorea darzustellen. Wir haben vier Szenarien mit einer 
konsistenten Methode für alle Länder berechnet: 
Business-as-usual: Das „business-as-usual“ (BAU) Szenario folgt Produktions-, 
Energieverbrauchs- und Energieeffizienztrends, die auf moderaten Annahmen beruhen. 
Diese Annahmen oder die damit verbundenen Wachstumsraten wurden so weit wie möglich 
Länderstudien entnommen. Dies war für Brasilien, China und Indien möglich (Centro Clima 
et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2006; TERI 2006). Für die Länder oder Sektoren für die keine 
detaillierten Studien verfügbare waren, haben wir die Wachstumsraten der vergangenen 
Jahre gleichbleibend fortgeschrieben. Dieses Szenario führt zu einem vergleichsweise hohen 
Emissionsniveau im Jahr 2020. 
No-regret: Das „no-regret“ Szenario beinhaltet Treibhausgasemissionsreduktionsoptionen 
die zu negativen oder keinen Kosten realisiert werden können. Diese beinhalten z.B. 
Energieeffizienzmaßnahmen bei denen die wirtschaftlichen Gewinne durch den reduzierten 
Energieverbrauch die Investitionskosten für eine effizientere Technologie ausgleichen. 
Dieses Szenario könnte auch als „ökonomisches Potenzial zu Kosten unter 0€/tCO2äquiv” 
betrachtet werden. Wir haben keine detaillierte ökonomische Analyse der Kosten der 
einzelnen Maßnahmen durchgeführt sondern verwenden allgemeine Annahmen. Unter der 
Annahme eines wirtschaftlichen Nettogewinns sollte es im Interesse jedes Landes liegen, 
dieses Potenzial mit seinen eigenen Mitteln zu realisieren. Trotzdem könnte die 
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internationale Gemeinschaft die Umsetzung mit technologischer und anfänglicher finanzieller 
Hilfe, z.B. für nationale Fonds und die Umsetzung von Politiken und Maßnahmen um 
Umsetzungsbarrieren die nicht vom Markt beeinflusst werden können zu überwinden, 
unterstützen. 
Co-benefit: Pfade unter dem „co-benefit“ Szenario beinhalten Reduzierungsoptionen, die aus 
einer anderen politischen Zielsetzung als der Treibhausgasreduktion sinnvoll sind. Dies 
umfassen auch Reduktionen zu geringen Kosten. Eine typische Maßnahme wäre die erhöhte 
Nutzung erneuerbarer Energien, um die Versorgungssicherheit zu gewährleisten und die 
Abhängigkeit vom Import fossiler Energieträger zu verringern. Eine andere Maßnahme wäre 
ein Treibstoffwechsel von Diesel zu Gas im öffentlichen Personenverkehr aus Gründen der 
verbesserten Luftqualität. Es sollte im Interesse jedes Landes liegen dieses Potenzial mit 
seinen eigenen Mitteln zu umzusetzen. Allerdings können einige Maßnahmen mit 
zusätzlichen Kosten verbunden sein. Daher wäre sowohl technologische als auch finanzielle 
Unterstützung hilfreich, um dieses Szenario zu realisieren. 
Ambitious: Das „ambitious“ Szenario beinhaltet Emissionsreduktionsoptionen, deren 
Umsetzung mit zusätzlichen Kosten verbunden ist um das gleiche Versorgungsniveau (z.B. 
bezogen auf die Energieversorgung) beizubehalten. Das Szenario berücksichtigt 
Reduktionsoptionen, die technisch machbar sind und den Umsatz des Kapitalstocks 
beschleunigen aber nicht zu überflüssigen Investitionen führen würden. Wir haben keine 
detaillierte ökonomische Analyse der Kosten der einzelnen Maßnahmen durchgeführt 
sondern nehmen eine obere Grenze von ca. 100 USD/tCO2äquiv, für Nettokosten die durch 
die berücksichtigten Maßnahmen zusätzlich anfallen, an. Da die Kosten von Annahmen zu 
Diskontierungsraten und anderen Entwicklungen abhängen, können die Kosten auch 
unterhalb dieses Betrages liegen. Das Potenzial kann realisiert werden, wenn die 
Umsetzungsbarrieren, die nicht vom Markt beeinflusst werden können beseitigt werden und 
finanzielle Anreize zur Deckung der zusätzlichen Kosten zur Verfügung stehen. Dies könnte 
mit zusätzlichen eigenen Beiträgen des jeweiligen Landes oder der internationale 
Gemeinschaft erreicht werden. 
Das entwickelte Excelmodell basiert auf einem „bottom-up“ Ansatz. Es wird daher durch die 
Verfügbarkeit brauchbarer Eingangsdaten begrenzt. Das Modell vergleicht 
Emissionsreduktionsoptionen der betrachteten sechs Länder mithilfe einer einheitlichen 
Methode. Dies ist ein neuer Beitrag zur derzeitigen Diskussion, da bestehende Studien mit 
einem ähnlichen Ansatz sich nur auf Weltregionen beziehen und diese Länder nicht 
individuell berücksichtigen. Länderstudien sind vielfach verfügbar, lassen sich aber 
untereinander oft nicht vergleichen. Das von uns entwickelte Excelmodell erlaubt einen 
solchen Vergleich. 
Analyse der nationalen Klimaschutzmaßnahmen 
Wir haben eine Sammlung aller sinnvollen Politikinstrumente („sourcebook for good 
practice“) als Basis für die Umsetzung der Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zusammengestellt (siehe 
Appendix C). Diese Sammlung, Einschätzungen der Länderexperten und die besonderen 
Umstände des jeweiligen Landes dienten als Grundlage für unsere Vorschläge, wie die 
jeweils bestehenden Politiken und Maßnahmen weiterentwickelt und verbessert werden 
könnten. Dennoch bietet diese Studie nur einen allgemeinen Rahmen. Daraus eine konkrete 
Maßanfertigung eines Pakets von Politikinstrumenten zu entwickeln, die eine Evaluation und 
wenn nötig eine Anpassung beinhaltet, ist eine Aufgabe, die am Besten vom jeweiligen Land 
selbst erfüllt werden kann. Als Nebenbemerkung ist zu erwähnen, dass Schwierigkeiten 
detaillierte Informationen über bereits bestehende Klimapolitikinstrumente in einzelnen 
Ländern zu erhalten eine gründliche Analyse teilweise verhindert haben.   
Für jeden der betrachteten Sektoren wurden Technologiefelder oder Untersektoren mit 
einem signifikanten Emissionsreduktionspotenzial ermittelt. Für jedes dieser Felder oder 
jeden Untersektor wurde eine Paket von Politiken und Maßnahmen identifiziert.  
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Verknüpfung mit dem internationalen Klimaregime 
Die Vorschläge für mögliche Beiträge der betrachteten sechs Länder zu einem Klimaregime 
basieren auf zwei Hauptprinzipien: 
• Ökologische Angemessenheit (Beitrag zur Stabilisierung der 
Treibhausgaskonzentration): Ein Klimaschutzregime nach dem Jahr 20121 sollte zum Ziel 
haben den globalen Temperaturanstieg unter 2°C im Vergleich zum vorindustriellen 
Niveau zu halten. Um die 2° Grenze einzuhalten, muss für die betrachteten sechs 
Länder, zusätzlich zu einer 30-prozentigen Reduktion der Annex-I-Staaten im Vergleich 
zum Emissionsniveau im Jahr 1990, nahezu das gesamt Reduktionspotenzial unter dem 
„ambitious“ Szenario umgesetzt werden. 
• Differenzierung entsprechend nationaler Umstände, um den Grundsatz der 
gemeinsamen aber differenzierten Verantwortung und die Berücksichtigung der 
jeweiligen Fähigkeiten umzusetzen: die Analyse basiert auf den drei Prinzipien 
Verantwortung, Möglichkeiten und Potenzial. 
Wir nehmen an, dass die Umsetzung des Reduktionspotenzials unter dem „no-regret“ 
Szenario grundsätzlich keiner permanenten finanziellen Unterstützung der internationalen 
Gemeinschaft bedarf. Darüber hinaus gehen wir davon aus, dass Nicht-Annex-I-Staaten das 
„co-benefit“ Potenzial trotz des damit verbundenen Nutzens nicht ohne zumindest teilweise 
finanzielle Unterstützung umsetzen können. Zudem profitieren diese Länder von nicht-
finanzieller Unterstützung. Die Nutzung der Reduktionsoptionen die im „ambitious“ Szenario 
berücksichtigt werden hängt dagegen ganz entscheidend von zusätzlicher internationaler 
finanzieller Unterstützung zur Beseitigung ökonomischer und andere Barrieren, sowie 
anderen Formen der Unterstützung ab. 
 
3. Bestehende Mechanismen zur Einbeziehung von Entwicklungsländern in das 
internationale Regime 
Nicht-Annex-I-Staaten sind in vielerlei Hinsicht bereits in Emissionsbegrenzungs- und 
Reduktionsaktivitäten innerhalb der Klimarahmenkonvention und dem Kyoto-Protokoll 
eingebunden. Diese sind vor allem Finanzmechanismen, Technologietransfer und der „Clean 
Development Mechanism“ (CDM). 
Die Post-20122 Verhandlungen unter der Klimarahmenkonvention und dem Kyoto-
Protokoll 
Die Verhandlungen im Rahmen der UNFCCC und dem Kyoto-Protokoll sind die Grundlage 
globaler Bemühungen zum Kampf gegen den Klimawandel. Dieses Regime bildet nicht nur 
den globalen Rahmen für andere multi- und bilaterale Aktivitäten, es ist darüber hinaus auch 
das einzige Forum das alle wichtigen Bereiche umfasst. 
Von den vielen verschiedenen Arten von Verpflichtungen für Entwicklungsländer in einem 
zukünftigen Klimaregime scheinen die folgenden Optionen und Kombinationen die 
vielversprechendsten zu sein: 
• absolute Emissionsreduktionsziele, 
• duale Ziele/„no-lose“ Ziele, 
• dynamische sektorale „no-lose“ Ziele,  
• Registrierung von Politiken und Maßnahmen zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung (SD PAMs). 
 
                                                
1 Im Folgenden als Post-2012-Klimaregime bezeichnet. 
2 Gemeint sind die Verhandlung zum Post-2012-Klimaregime. 
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4. Szenarienüberblick 
Abbildung 1 zeigt einen Überblick über das „business-as-usual“- und die 
Reduktionsszenarien für Treibhausgasemissionen in Brasilien, China, Indien, Mexiko, 
Südafrika und Südkorea zwischen den Jahren 1990 und 2020. 
Unter dem „ambitious“ Szenario ist das Reduktionspotenzial beträchtlich und beläuft sich für 
alle betrachteten Länder zusammen auf ungefähr 30% unterhalb der BAU-Entwicklung. Dies 
setzt sich aus Reduktionspotenzialen von 14% unter BAU für Brasilien, 32% unter BAU für 
China, 38% unter BAU für Indien, 39% unter BAU für Mexiko, 35% unter BAU für Südafrika 
und 42% unter BAU für Südkorea zusammen. Die folgenden Abschnitte liefern detaillierte 
Informationen und länderspezifische Ergebnisse. 
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Abbildung 1. Szenarien zu Treibhausgasemissionen in Brasilien, China, Indien, Mexiko, 
Südafrika und Südkorea im Zeitraum zwischen 1990 und 2020. 
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5. Brasilien 
Insgesamt führt die starke Position von erneuerbaren Energien in Brasiliens Energiemix zu 
vergleichsweise niedrigen Emissionsintensitäten in der Stromproduktion. Durch 
Entwicklungsstand und Energiemix sind die Pro-Kopf-Emissionen im Vergleich zu 
Industrieländern niedrig, aber hoch im Vergleich zu anderen lateinamerikanischen Ländern. 
Durch die weitere Entwicklung und ein damit verbundenes Wachstum des 
Transportaufkommens und der Pro-Kopf-Energienachfrage werden Brasiliens Emissionen in 
Zukunft wahrscheinlich zunehmen. 
Referenzemissionen und Reduktionspotenzial 
Wie in Abbildung 1 dargestellt beträgt Brasiliens Minderungspotenzial 3% („no-regret“), 6% 
(„co-benefit“) und 14% („ambitious“) unterhalb der BAU-Entwicklung. Die drei Sektoren mit 
den höchsten THG-Minderungspotenzialen zwischen den Jahren 2005 und 2020 
(„ambitious“) sind Transport, Energieproduktion und Industrie. Das Minderungspotenzial 
(„ambitious“) wird im Transportsektor auf 164 Mio. tCO2äquiv für das Jahr 2020 geschätzt. Im 
Energiesektor ist ein Potenzial („ambitious“) von 120 Mio. tCO2äquiv vorhanden. Im 
Industriesektor wird für das Jahr 2020 ein Potenzial („ambitious“) von 59 Mio. tCO2äquiv 
angenommen. Das gesamte Minderungspotenzial („ambitious“) in Brasilien wird auf 429 Mio. 
tCO2äquiv für das Jahr 2020 geschätzt. Ein detaillierter Überblick über die Potenziale je 
Sektor und Szenario ist in Appendix B enthalten. 
Bestehende und mögliche zukünftig nationale Klimaschutzmaßnahmen 
Bis heute hat Brasilien bereits eine Reihe von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen geplant und 
umgesetzt. Weitere Maßnahmen könnten z.B. sein: 
• Transportsektor: Energiebesteuerung fossiler Treibstoffe, Straßengebühren und City-
Maut 
• Energiesektor: Erneuerbare Energien-Ziele für Wärme- und Kälteversorgung, eine 
ökologische Finanzreform und finanzielle Unterstützung bei der Installation von 
erneuerbaren Energiequellen (RES) 
• Industriesektor: allmähliche Rücknahme von Energiesubventionen unterstützt durch 
finanzielle und technische Hilfen für Energieeffizienz und RES, verbesserte finanzielle 
Unterstützung zur Optimierung und Anwendung von energieeffizienten Technologien in 
Verbindung mit Energieaudits und -Managementsystemen sowie Mindest-
Energieeffizienzstandards (für energieverbrauchende Anlagen und integriert in 
Baugenehmigungen für neue Produktionsstätten) 
Optionen für eine stärkere Einbeziehung von Brasilien in das internationale Regime 
Verantwortung: Brasiliens Verantwortung für den Klimawandel gemessen an seinen 
Emissionen ohne Landnutzung, Landnutzungsänderung und Forstwirtschaft (LULUCF) liegt 
unter dem weltweiten Durchschnitt, allerdings über dem Durchschnitt für 
Nicht-Annex-I-Länder. Unter Berücksichtigung von LULUCF-Emissionen liegt sie 
wahrscheinlich höher, zuverlässige historische Schätzungen für den LULUCF-Sektor sind 
allerdings nicht verfügbar. 
Möglichkeiten: Brasiliens Pro-Kopf-Einkommen liegt in etwa im weltweiten Durchschnitt. 
Allerdings ist die regionale und soziale Einkommensverteilung immer noch sehr ungleich. 
Brasiliens „human development index“ (HDI) liegt weit über dem weltweiten Durchschnitt. Es 
gibt viele Initiativen, Gesetze und Standards zur Reduzierung der Emissionsintensität der 
Energieproduktion, des Transports und der Industrie. Allerdings gibt es einige institutionelle 
Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung der Maßnahmen. 
Potenzial: Trotz des hohen Anteils erneuerbarer Energien an der Stromproduktion besitzt 
Brasilien ein nennenswertes Minderungspotenzial. Nach Zahlen aus der Phase II des 
Projekts beträgt das „no-regret“ Potenzial zur Reduktion der Emissionen im Jahr 2020 unter 
das BAU-Szenario 104 Mio. t, das „co-benefit“ Potenzial beträgt 187 Mio. t und das 
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„ambitious“ Potenzial beträgt 429 Mio. tCO2äquiv. Diese entsprächen einer Reduzierung von 
3%, 6% bzw. 14% im Vergleich zum BAU-Szenario und einem Anstieg von 20%, 16% bzw. 
6% verglichen mit Emissionen im Jahr 2005. 
Angesichts der notwendigen Menge weltweiter Emissionsminderungen zur Einhaltung des 
2°C-Limits und der oben erfolgten Analyse erachten wir es für Brasilien als angemessen und 
vertretbar, sich zu einem absoluten, landesweiten „no-lose“ Emissionsziel zu verpflichten. 
Das Ziel könnte auf einem ambitionierten Niveau gemäß dem „ambitious“ Potenzial, wie in 
diesem Projekt analysiert, formuliert, aber in seiner Umsetzung abhängig von finanzieller und 
technischer Unterstützung der Annex-I-Staaten gemacht werden. Das Ziel würde sich in 
diesem Fall auf ca. 2.555 Mio. tCO2äquiv jährlicher Emissionen im Jahr 2020 belaufen, 14% 
unterhalb des BAU-Niveaus. Alternativ könnte das Ziel auch auf einem weniger ehrgeizigen 
Niveau angesetzt werden, z.B. entsprechend dem „co-benefit“ Minderungspotenzial. Dieses 
Ziel würde sich auf 2.796 Mio. tCO2äquiv belaufen, 16% über den Emissionen im Jahr 2005. 
Brasilien könnte dann trotzdem ehrgeizige Maßnahmen zur Übererfüllung des Ziels 
umsetzen und den resultierenden Überschuss auf dem Emissionshandelsmarkt verkaufen. 
Diese Alternative würde geringere finanzielle und technische Leistungen aus Annex-I-
Staaten erfordern, jedoch eine höhere Unterstützung durch den Emissionshandelsmarkt und 
damit Emissionsminderungsziele von 45% im Vergleich zum Jahr 1990 für Annex-I-Staaten, 
im Gegensatz zu dem in der obigen Option angenommenen -30%-Ziel. 
 
6. China 
China wird als ein Land mit einem durchschnittlichen „human development index“ (HDI) 
eingestuft. Das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen befindet sich auf durchschnittlichem 
Entwicklungslandniveau. Die Dominanz von Kohle in Chinas Energiemix und die 
vergleichsweise geringe Energieeffizienz führen zu einer hohen Emissionsintensität in der 
Stromerzeugung. Die Pro-Kopf-Emissionen sind noch gering. Dennoch sind Chinas nationale 
Emissionen hoch, unter anderem auf Grund von beträchtlichen Exporten. Während Chinas 
Energieintensität in den letzten Jahrzehnten gesunken ist, hat die Energienachfrage stark 
zugenommen. Dieser Trend hat zur Folge, dass Chinas Teilnahme an einem zukünftigen 
Klimaregime von hoher Bedeutung ist. 
Referenzemissionen und Reduktionspotenzial 
Wie in Abbildung 1 dargestellt, liegt Chinas THG-Minderungspotenzial bei 8% („no-regret“), 
15% („co-benefit“) and 32% („ambitious“) unterhalb des BAU Szenarios. Die Top-drei 
Sektoren mit dem höchsten THG-Minderungspotenzial zwischen den Jahren 2005 und 2020 
(„ambitious“) sind der Energie-, Industrie- und Transportsektor. Für das „ambitious“ Szenario 
liegt das Minderungspotenzial bei 1.322 Mio. tCO2äquiv im Jahr 2020 im Kraftwerkssektor, 
bei 770 Mio. tCO2äquiv im Industriesektor und bei 295 Mio. tCO2äquiv im Transportsektor. 
Das gesamte Minderungspotenzial („ambitious“) wird auf 2.930 Mio. tCO2äquiv geschätzt. 
Ein detaillierter Überblick über die Potenziale je Sektor und Szenario ist in Appendix B 
enthalten. 
Bestehende und mögliche zukünftig nationale Klimaschutzmaßnahmen 
Klimapolitik in China wird hauptsächlich auf regionaler Ebene entwickelt und umgesetzt. Von 
der zentralen Regierung werden Standards, oft in Form von Richtlinien, gesetzt. Die 
Implementierung und Durchführung ist den lokalen Regierungen überlassen. Jedoch hat 
China eine Anzahl von Klimapolitiken und -maßnahmen implementiert und plant weitere. 
Weitere Politiken könnten z.B. die folgenden umfassen: 
• Energiesektor: Ziele für den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien, erneuerbare Energien-Ziele 
für Wärme- und Kälteversorgung, ökologische Steuerreform, allmähliche Rücknahme von 
Energiesubventionen unterstützt durch finanzielle und technische Hilfen für 
Energieeffizienz und RES 
 27
• Industriesektor: allmähliche Rücknahme von Energiesubventionen unterstützt durch 
finanzielle und technische Hilfen für Energieeffizienz und RES, verbesserte finanzielle 
Unterstützung zur Optimierung und Anwendung von energieeffizienten Technologien in 
Verbindung mit Energieaudits und -Managementsystemen sowie Mindest-
Energieeffizienzstandards 
• Transportsektor: Zielvorgaben/Quoten für Biokraftstoffe, Steuerbefreiung für 
nachhaltige Biokraftstoffe und Straßengebühren 
Optionen für eine stärkere Einbeziehung von China in das internationale Regime 
Verantwortung: Auf einer Pro-Kopf-Basis liegt Chinas Verantwortung für den Klimawandel 
aufgrund seiner Emissionen (ohne LULUCF) im Mittelfeld der Nicht-Annex-I-Staaten. Die 
gegenwärtigen Pro-Kopf-Emissionen sind oberhalb des Nicht-Annex-I Staaten Durchschnitts. 
Die absoluten Emissionen aller Gase und Quellen Chinas sind ungefähr genau so hoch oder 
höher wie die Emissionen der USA, dem vormals weltweit größten Emittenten, und wachsen 
rasant.   
Möglichkeiten: Das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen befindet sich knapp oberhalb des Durchschnitts 
der Entwicklungsländer. China besitzt einen durchschnittlichen „human development index“. 
Jedoch ist das Einkommen innerhalb der Bevölkerung ungleich verteilt.    
Potenzial: Das THG-Minderungspotenzial ist sehr groß. Ausgehend von den Berechnungen 
der zweiten Phase dieses Projekts, beläuft sich das „no-regret“ Minderungspotenzial 
gegenüber dem BAU- Szenario auf 777 Mio. t, das „co-benefit“ Minderungspotenzial auf 
1.342 Mio. tCO2äquiv und das „ambitious“ Minderungspotenzial auf 2.930 Mio. tCO2äquiv. 
Dies würde einer Emissionsreduktion gegenüber dem BAU-Szenario von 8%,15% bzw. 32% 
und einer Erhöhung des Emissionsniveaus gegenüber 2005 von 36%, 27% bzw. 1% 
entsprechen.  
Angesichts der benötigten globalen Emissionsreduktionen um die Temperaturänderung 
unterhalb von 2°C zu halten und basierend auf der oben beschriebenen Analyse, halten wir 
es für angemessen und vertretbar, wenn China sich zu sektoralen „no-lose“ Zielen im 
Energiesektor, im Eisen- und Stahlsektor und im Zementsektor verpflichten würde. In diesen 
Sektoren ist die notwendige Datenlage recht gut. 
Das Ziel könnte auf einem ambitionierten Niveau gemäß dem „ambitious“ Potenzial, wie in 
diesem Projekt analysiert, formuliert, aber in seiner Umsetzung abhängig von finanzieller und 
technischer Unterstützung der Annex-I-Staaten gemacht werden. Das Ziel für die oben 
genannten Sektoren wäre in diesem Fall absolute jährliche Emissionen von 2.754 Mio. tCO2 
im Jahr 2020, was einer Reduktion um ungefähr 39% unterhalb der BAU-Entwicklung 
entspricht. Alternativ könnte das Ziel niedriger ausgestaltet werden, z.B. auf einem durch das 
„co-benefit„ Szenario“ angedeuteten Niveau. In diesem Fall würde sich das absolute Ziel für 
das Jahr 2020 für alle abgedeckten Sektoren auf 3.678 Mio. tCO2 belaufen, ungefähr 19% 
unterhalb der BAU-Entwicklung. China könnte dann trotzdem ehrgeizige 
Klimaschutzmaßnahmen umsetzen, die das Ziel übererfüllen, und den resultierenden 
Überschuss auf dem Emissionshandelsmarkt verkaufen. Diese Alternative würde weniger 
direkte finanzielle und nicht-finanzielle Unterstützung seitens der Annex-I-Staaten 
beanspruchen, dafür aber mehr Unterstützung seitens des Emissionshandelsmarktes und 
somit ehrgeizigere CO2 Emissionsziele für die Annex-I-Staaten erfordern. Die Emissionsziele 
der Annex-I-Staaten müssten sich daher in diesem Fall von -30% im Vergleich zum Jahr 
1990 auf -45% erhöhen. 
Außerdem könnte China sich dazu verpflichten eine Reihe von SD PAMs für Sektoren 
umzusetzen die nicht von dem oben genannten sektoralen „no-lose“ Ziel abgedeckt werden. 
Das Paket aus sektoralen „no-lose“ Zielen und SD PAMs sollte darauf abzielen, das gesamte 
„ambitious“ Minderungspotenzial zu mobilisieren. Indessen wäre die Durchführung dieser 
SD PAMs abhängig von zusätzlicher internationaler Unterstützung um die höheren Kosten, 
die im Vergleich zur BAU-Entwicklung entstehen, decken zu können. Aufgrund fehlender 
(institutioneller) Kapazitäten in den von SD PAMs abzudeckenden Sektoren, können die dort 
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erreichten Emissionsminderungen nur grob abgeschätzt werden. Daher wird keine direkte 
Verknüpfung zwischen diesen Politiken und dem internationalen Emissionshandelsmarkt 
angenommen.   
 
7. Indien 
Indien befindet sich auf einem durchschnittlichen Entwicklungsstand. Das Pro-Kopf-BIP und 
der HDI liegen unterhalb des Durchschnitts der Entwicklungsländer und in der Nähe vom 
Durchschnitt der einkommensschwachen Länder (UNDP 2004). Indiens Emissionen steigen 
stark an. Die Emissionen pro BIP-Einheit sind vergleichsweise hoch. Die Emissionen pro 
Kopf sind niedrig, unter anderem weil ungefähr die Hälfte der Bevölkerung noch keine 
zuverlässigen Elektrizitätsversorgung hat (World Bank 2006). Obwohl Indien einen großen 
Anteil an CO2-freien Energiequellen besitzt, führen geringe Umwandlungseffizienzen und 
eine intensive Nutzen von Kohle zu hohen spezifischen Emissionen in der Energieproduktion 
(Chandler et al. 2002). Ähnlich wie in Brasilien ist der Anteil an Biomasse am 
Energieverbrauch des Haushaltssektors hoch aber abnehmend. 
Referenzemissionen und Reduktionspotenzial 
Wie in Abbildung 1 dargestellt liegt Indiens Minderungspotenzial 12% („no-regret“), 22% („co-
benefit“) und 38% („ambitious“) unterhalb der BAU-Entwicklung. Die drei Sektoren mit dem 
größten THG-Minderungspotenzial zwischen den Jahren 2005 und 2020 („ambitious“) sind 
der Energie-, Industrie- und Transportsektor. Im Energiesektor liegt das „ambitious“ 
Minderungspotenzial bei ca. 245 Mio. tCO2äquiv, im Industriesektor bei 245 Mio. tCO2äquiv 
und im Transportsektor bei 231 Mio. tCO2äquiv. Das gesamte Minderungspotenzial 
(„ambitious“) beläuft sich auf ca. 1.336 Mio. tCO2äquiv. Ein detaillierter Überblick über die 
Potenziale je Sektor und Szenario ist in Appendix B enthalten. 
Bestehende und mögliche zukünftig nationale Klimaschutzmaßnahmen 
Bereits heute hat Indien eine Reihe von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen geplant und umgesetzt. 
Weitere Maßnahmen könnten z.B. sein: 
• Energiesektor: Erneuerbare Energien Ziel für die Wärme- und Kältebereitstellung, 
stufenweise Abschaffung von Energiesubventionen gefördert durch finanzielle und 
technische Unterstützung für Energieeffizienz und erneuerbare Energien, innerstaatliches 
Emissionshandelsystem 
• Industriesektor: stufenweise Abschaffung von Energiesubventionen unterstützt durch 
finanzielle und technische Unterstützung für Energieeffizienz und erneuerbare Energien, 
finanzielle Unterstützung für die Optimierung und Installation von energieeffizienten 
Technologien verbunden mit Energieaudits und -Managementsystemen sowie die 
Erweiterung des Energieeffizienzabkommen 
• Transportsektor: Zielvorgaben/Quoten für nachhaltige Biotreibstoffe, Steuerbefreiungen 
für nachhaltige Biotreibstoffe und Straßengebühren 
Optionen für eine stärkere Einbeziehung von Indien in das internationale Regime 
Verantwortung: Indiens Verantwortung für den Klimawandel aufgrund seiner historischen 
Pro-Kopf-Emissionen (ohne LULUCF) ist geringer als die des Durchschnitts der 
Nicht-Annex-I-Staaten. Indiens gegenwärtigen Pro-Kopf-Emissionen liegen ebenfalls 
unterhalb des Durchschnitts der Nicht-Annex-I-Länder. Die absoluten Emissionen Indiens 
sind aber beachtlich und wachsen rasant.  
Möglichkeiten: Das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen und der HDI liegen unter dem Nicht-Annex-I-
Durchschnitt. Das Einkommen ist innerhalb der Bevölkerung ungleich verteilt. Die 
tatsächliche Umsetzung von Politikmaßnahmen könnte sich schwierig gestalten.  
Potenzial: Das Minderungspotenzial ist aufgrund der geringen Energieeffizienz und den stark 
ansteigenden absoluten und relativen Emissionen hoch. Gemäß den Zahlen aus der Phase 
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II dieses Projektes liegt das „no-regret“ Potenzial für die Reduktion von Emissionen im Jahr 
2020 bei 416 Mio. t, das „co-benefit“ Potenzial bei 775 Mio. t und das „ambitious“ Potenzial 
bei 1.336 Mio. tCO2äquiv. Dies würde einer Reduktion gegenüber der BAU-Entwicklung von 
12%, 22% bzw. 38% und eine Erhöhung der Emissionen gegenüber dem Niveau des Jahres 
2005 von 69%, 49% bzw. 19% entsprechen. 
Basierend auf der oben beschriebenen Analyse halten wir es für angemessen und möglich, 
dass Indien eine Reihe von SD PAMs implementiert. Indien würde die Effekte von solchen 
SD PAMs im Voraus quantifizieren. Das komplette Paket sollte auf die Mobilisierung des 
gesamten „ambitious“ Potenzials abzielen. Allerdings wäre die Durchführung dieser Politiken 
und Maßnahmen abhängig von zusätzlicher internationaler Unterstützung, um die hohen 
Kosten, die im Vergleich zur BAU-Entwicklung entstehen, decken zu können. Aufgrund 
fehlender technischer Kapazitäten können die in Indien durch implementierte SD PAMs 
erreichten Emissionsreduktionen nur ungefähr abgeschätzt werden. Daher wird keine direkte 
Verknüpfung zwischen den Politiken und dem internationalen Emissionshandelsmarkt 
angenommen. 
 
8. Mexiko 
Insgesamt ist Mexiko ein Land mit einem hohen HDI. Das BIP liegt deutlich über dem 
weltweiten Durchschnitt und dem Durchschnitt von Ländern mittleren Einkommens. Es 
wurde erst nach Gründung der UNFCCC Mitglied der OECD und ist deshalb, ähnlich wie 
Südkorea, ein Nicht-Annex-I- aber dennoch OECD-Staat. Die Dominanz des Öls in Mexikos 
Energiemix führt zu vergleichsweise hohen Emissionen. Mexikos Pro-Kopf-Emissionen im 
Jahr 2002 waren erheblich und sogar geringfügig höher als jene einiger Annex-I-Staaten mit 
niedrigen Emissionen, z.B. Litauen, der Türkei oder Lettland. Im Laufe der letzten Jahre 
haben Mexikos Emissionen weiter zugenommen. 
Referenzemissionen und Reduktionspotenzial 
Wie in Abbildung 1 dargestellt beträgt das Reduktionspotenzial Mexikos 8% („no-regret“), 
16% („co-benefit“) und 39% („ambitious“) im Vergleich zur BAU-Entwicklung. Die drei 
Sektoren mit den höchsten THG-Minderungspotenzialen zwischen den Jahren 2005 und 
2020 („ambitious“) sind Transport, Energie und Industrie. Im Energiesektor existiert ein 
Potenzial („ambitious“) von 186 Mio. tCO2äquiv. Für den Transportsektor wird das Potenzial 
(„ambitious“) auf 111 Mio. tCO2äquiv geschätzt. Für das Potenzial („ambitious“) im 
Industriesektor werden 41 Mio. tCO2äquiv angenommen. Das gesamte Minderungspotenzial 
(„ambitious“) Mexikos wird auf 417 Mio. tCO2äquiv geschätzt. Ein detaillierter Überblick über 
die Potenziale je Sektor und Szenario ist in Appendix B enthalten. 
Bestehende und mögliche zukünftig nationale Klimaschutzmaßnahmen 
Bereits heute hat Mexiko eine Reihe von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen geplant und umgesetzt. 
Weitere Maßnahmen könnten z.B. sein: 
• Energiesektor: Erneuerbare Energien-Ziele für Strom-, Wärme- und Kälteversorgung, 
allmähliche Rücknahme von Energiesubventionen unterstützt durch finanzielle und 
technische Hilfen für Energieeffizienz und RES sowie Einspeisevergütungen oder 
Stromquoten (Grüne Zertifikate) für RES und KWK 
• Transportsektor: Ziele/Quoten für nachhaltige Biotreibstoffe, Steuererleichterungen für 
nachhaltige Biotreibstoffe sowie Straßengebühren 
• Industriesektor: allmähliche Rücknahme von Energiesubventionen unterstützt durch 
finanzielle und technische Hilfen für Energieeffizienz und RES, verbesserte finanzielle 
Unterstützung zur Optimierung und Anwendung von energieeffizienten Technologien in 
Verbindung mit Energieaudits und -Managementsystemen sowie Mindest-
Energieeffizienzstandards 
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Optionen für eine stärkere Einbeziehung von Mexiko in das internationale Regime 
Verantwortung: Mexikos Verantwortung für den Klimawandel liegt gemessen an seinen 
Emissionen ohne LULUCF unter dem weltweiten Durchschnitt, allerdings geringfügig über 
dem Durchschnitt für Nicht-Annex-I-Staaten. 
Möglichkeiten: Mexikos Pro-Kopf-Einkommen liegt geringfügig über dem weltweiten 
Durchschnitt. Sein HDI liegt weit über dem weltweiten Durchschnitt.  
Potenzial: Mexiko besitzt ein nennenswertes Minderungspotenzial. Nach Zahlen aus Phase 
II des Projekts beträgt das „no-regret“ Potenzial zur Reduktion der Emissionen im Jahr 2020 
unter das BAU-Szenario 82 Mio. t, das „co-benefit“ Potenzial beträgt 173 Mio. t und das 
„ambitious“ Potenzial beträgt 417 Mio. tCO2äquiv. Diese entsprächen einer Reduzierung von 
8%,1 6% bzw. 39% im Vergleich zur BAU-Entwicklung und einer Veränderung von +26%, 
+14% bzw. -17% verglichen mit den Emissionen im Jahr 2005. 
Angesichts der notwendigen Menge weltweiter Emissionsminderungen zur Einhaltung des 
2°C-Limits und der oben erfolgten Analyse halten wir es für Mexiko angemessen vertretbar, 
sich zu einem absoluten, landesweiten „no-lose“ Emissionsziel zu verpflichten. 
Das Ziel könnte auf einem ambitionierten Niveau gemäß dem „ambitious“ Potenzial 
formuliert, aber in seiner Umsetzung abhängig von finanzieller und technischer 
Unterstützung der Annex-I-Staaten gemacht werden. Das Ziel würde sich in diesem Fall auf 
ca. 638 Mio. tCO2äquiv jährlicher Emissionen im Jahr 2020 belaufen, 39% unterhalb des 
BAU-Niveaus und 17% niedriger als die 2005er Emissionen. Alternativ könnte das Ziel auch 
auf einem weniger ehrgeizigen Niveau angesetzt werden, z.B. entsprechend dem „co-
benefit“ Minderungspotenzial. Dieses Ziel würde sich auf 882 Mio. tCO2äquiv belaufen, 14% 
über den Emissionen im Jahr 2005. Mexiko könnte dann trotzdem ehrgeizige Maßnahmen 
zur Übererfüllung des Ziels umsetzen und den resultierenden Überschuss auf dem 
Emissionshandelsmarkt verkaufen. Diese Alternative würde geringere finanzielle und 
technische Leistungen aus Annex-I-Staaten benötigen, jedoch eine höhere Unterstützung 
durch den Emissionshandelsmarkt und damit Emissionsminderungsziele von 45% im 
Vergleich zum Jahr 1990 für Annex-I-Staaten, im Gegensatz zu dem in der obigen Option 
angenommenen -30%-Ziel. 
 
9. Südafrika 
Insgesamt führt die Dominanz von Kohle in Südafrikas Energiemix zu einer sehr hohen 
Emissionsintensität in der Stromproduktion. Dies und die energieintensive Industry führen zu 
sehr hohen Emissionen pro BIP-Einheit. Die Emissionen pro Kopf sind niedriger als die der 
meisten Annex-I-Staaten, verglichen mit anderen Entwicklungsländern sind sie allerdings 
hoch. Bedingt durch weitere Entwicklung und dem anhaltend hohen Stellenwert von Kohle 
als Energiequelle, werden Südafrikas Emissionen sehr wahrscheinlich in Zukunft weiter 
ansteigen. 
Referenzemissionen und Reduktionspotenzial 
Wie in Abbildung 1 dargestellt, beträgt das Minderungspotenzial von Südafrika 9% („no-
regret“), 18% („co-benefit“) und 35% („ambitious“) unterhalb der BAU-Entwicklung. Die drei 
Sektoren mit den höchsten THG-Minderungspotenzialen zwischen den Jahren 2005 und 
2020 („ambitious“) sind der Energiesektor, der Transportsektor und der Industriesektor. Das 
Minderungspotenzial („ambitious“) im Energiesektor wird auf 67 Mio. tCO2äquiv für das Jahr 
2020 geschätzt. Im Transportsektor ist ein Potenzial („ambitious“) von 42 Mio. tCO2äquiv 
vorhanden. Im Industriesektor wird für das Jahr 2020 ein Potenzial („ambitious“) von 41 Mio. 
tCO2äquiv angenommen. Das gesamte Minderungspotenzial unter dem „ambitious“ Szenario 
wird in Südafrika auf 212 Mio. tCO2äquiv für das Jahr 2020 geschätzt. Ein detaillierter 
Überblick über die Potenziale je Sektor und Szenario ist in Appendix B enthalten. 
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Bestehende und mögliche zukünftig nationale Klimaschutzmaßnahmen 
Südafrika hat bereits heute eine beträchtliche Anzahl an Politiken und Maßnahmen im 
Klimabereich geplant und umgesetzt. Weitere Instrumente könnten z.B. folgende sein: 
• Energiesektor: Erneuerbare Energien-Ziele für Wärme- und Kälteversorgung, 
schrittweise Ausstieg aus direkter und indirekter Subventionierung von Energie, 
unterstützt von finanzieller Hilfe zur Verbesserung der Energieeffizienz und RES (z.B. 
unterstütz durch das ESKOM System zur Steuerung der Nachfrage) und 
Einspeisevergütungen oder Elektrizitätsquoten (Grüne Zertifikate) für RES und KWK 
• Transportsektor: Ziele/Quoten für nachhaltige Biotreibstoffe, Steuerbefreiung für 
nachhaltige Biotreibstoffe, Straßengebühren 
• Industriesektor: allmähliche Rücknahme von Energiesubventionen unterstützt durch 
finanzielle und technische Hilfen für Energieeffizienz und RES, finanzielle Unterstützung 
zur Optimierung und Anwendung von energieeffizienten Technologien in Verbindung mit 
Energieaudits und -Managementsystemen sowie die Ausweitung der 
Energieeffizienzvereinbarung („energy efficiency accord“) 
Optionen für eine stärkere Einbeziehung von Südafrika in das internationale Regime 
Verantwortung: Aufgrund seiner Emissionen (ohne LULUCF) liegt Südafrikas Verantwortung 
am Klimawandel leicht über dem Weltdurchschnitt. LULUCF spielt in Südafrika keine große 
Rolle. 
Möglichkeiten: Südafrikas kaufkraftbereinigtes Pro-Kopf-Einkommen liegt über dem 
weltweiten Durchschnitt. Allerdings liegt der HDI liegt leicht unter dem Durchschnitt. Dies ist 
ein Indikator dafür, dass die regionale und soziale Einkommensverteilung sehr ungleich ist. 
Potenzial: Südafrika verfügt über eine beträchtliches Minderungspotenzial. Basierend auf 
den Daten aus Phase II des Projektes beträgt das „no-regret“ Potenzial zur Reduktion der 
Emissionen im Jahr 2020 unter die BAU-Entwicklung 57 Mio. t, das „co-benefit“ Potenzial 
beträgt 110 Mio. t und das „ambitious“ Potenzial beträgt 212 Mio. tCO2äquiv. Diese Zahlen 
entsprächen einer Reduzierung von 9%, 18% bzw. 35% im Vergleich zum BAU-Szenario 
und einer Änderung von +19%, +7% bzw. -15%% verglichen mit Emissionen im Jahr 2005. 
Angesichts der notwendigen Menge weltweiter Emissionsminderungen zur Erreichung des 
2°C-Limits und der oben erfolgten Analyse erachten wir es für Südafrika als angemessen 
und vertretbar, sich zu einem sektoralen „no-lose“ Ziel für den Energie- und den 
Industriesektor zu verpflichten. 
Das Ziel könnte auf einem ambitionierten Niveau gemäß dem „ambitious“ Potenzial, wie in 
diesem Projekt analysiert, formuliert, aber in seiner Umsetzung abhängig von finanzieller und 
technischer Unterstützung der Annex-I-Staaten gemacht werden. Das Ziel würde sich in 
diesem Fall für die beiden berücksichtigten Sektoren auf ca. 191 Mio. tCO2äquiv jährlicher 
Emissionen im Jahr 2020 belaufen, 36% unterhalb der BAU-Entwicklung. Alternativ könnte 
das Ziel auch auf einem weniger ehrgeizigen Niveau angesetzt werden, z.B. entsprechend 
dem „co-benefit“ Minderungspotenzial. Dieses Ziel würde sich auf 256 Mio. tCO2äquiv 
belaufen, 14% unter den Emissionen im Jahr 2005. Südafrika könnte dann trotzdem 
ehrgeizige Maßnahmen zur Übererfüllung seines Ziels umsetzen und den resultierenden 
Überschuss auf dem Emissionshandelsmarkt verkaufen. Diese Alternative würde geringere 
finanzielle und technische Leistungen aus Annex-I-Staaten erfordern, jedoch eine höhere 
Unterstützung durch den Emissionshandelsmarkt und damit Emissionsminderungsziele von 
45% im Vergleich zum Jahr 1990 für Annex-I-Staaten, im Gegensatz zu dem in der obigen 
Option angenommenen -30%-Ziel. 
Darüber hinaus könnte Südafrika sich zur Umsetzung einer Reihe von SD PAMs für 
Sektoren die nicht von dem oben genannten sektoralen „no-lose“ Ziel abgedeckt werden 
verpflichten. Das Paket aus sektoralen „no-lose“ Zielen und SD PAMs sollte darauf abzielen, 
das gesamte „ambitious“ Minderungspotenzial zu mobilisieren. Die Durchführung dieser SD 
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PAMs wäre abhängig von zusätzlicher internationaler Unterstützung um die höheren Kosten, 
die im Vergleich zur BAU-Entwicklung entstehen, decken zu können. Aufgrund fehlender 
Kapazitäten in den von SD PAMs abzudeckenden Sektoren können die dort erreichten 
Emissionsreduktionen nur grob abgeschätzt werden. Daher wird keine direkte Verknüpfung 
zwischen diesen Politiken und dem internationalen Emissionshandelsmarkt angenommen.   
 
10. Südkorea 
Insgesamt ist der Entwicklungsstand von Südkorea dem einiger Annex-I-Staaten sehr 
ähnlich. Seine Bevölkerungszahlen waren in den letzten Jahrzehnten nahezu stabil. Ein 
großer Anteil von Atomenergie im Strommix führt zu niedrigen Emissionen pro kWh. 
Südkoreas Industriesektor ist verantwortlich für einen großen Anteil der nationalen 
Emissionen, allerdings ist er im internationalen Vergleich bereits sehr effizient. Emissionen 
aus Transport und Haushalten sind hoch, während Emissionen aus dem Agrarsektor nicht 
relevant sind. 
Referenzemissionen und Reduktionspotenzial 
Wie in Abbildung 1 dargestellt, liegt Südkoreas THG-Minderungspotenzial bei 9% („no-
regret“), 15% („co-benefit“) and 31% („ambitious“) unterhalb der BAU-Entwicklung. Die drei 
Sektoren mit dem höchsten THG-Minderungspotenzial zwischen den Jahren 2005 und 2020 
(„ambitious“) sind der Industrie-, Energie- und Transportsektor. Für das „ambitious“ Szenario 
liegt das Minderungspotenzial im Industriesektor bei 212 Mio. tCO2äquiv im Jahr 2020, im 
Energiesektor bei 112 Mio. tCO2äquiv und im Transportsektor bei 80 Mio. tCO2äquiv. Das 
absolute Minderungspotenzial wird auf 443 Mio. tCO2äquiv geschätzt. Ein detaillierter 
Überblick über die Potenziale je Sektor und Szenario ist in Appendix B enthalten. 
Bestehende und mögliche zukünftig nationale Klimaschutzmaßnahmen 
• Industriesektor: schrittweise Rücknahme von Energiesubventionen unterstützt durch 
finanzielle und technische Hilfen für Energieeffizienz und RES, verbesserte finanzielle 
Unterstützung zur Optimierung und Anwendung von energieeffizienten Technologien in 
Verbindung mit Energieaudits und -Managementsystemen sowie Mindest-
Energieeffizienzstandards (für energieverbrauchende Anlagen und integriert in 
Baugenehmigungen für neue Produktionsstätten) 
• Energiesektor: Erneuerbare Energien-Ziele für Wärme- und Kälteversorgung, eine 
ökologische Finanzreform sowie Einspeisetarife oder Elektrizitätsquoten (Grüne 
Zertifikate) für RES und KWK 
• Transportsektor: Ziele/Quoten für nachhaltige Biotreibstoffe, Steuerbefreiungen für 
nachhaltigen Biotreibstoffe und Straßengebühren 
Optionen für eine stärkere Einbeziehung von Südkorea in das internationale Regime 
Verantwortung: Aufgrund seiner Emissionen (ohne LULUCF) liegt Südkoreas Verantwortung 
für den Klimawandel beim Weltdurchschnitt. 
Möglichkeiten: Südkoreas Einkommen pro Kopf liegt weit über dem Weltdurchschnitt und ist 
nahe am Annex-I-Durchschnitt. Sein HDI liegt beim Annex-I-Durchschnitt. 
Potenzial: Trotz der hohen Effizient der südkoreanischen Wirtschaft und einem hohen Anteil 
an Atomenergie in der Stromproduktion ist das Emissionsreduktionspotenzial beträchtlich. 
Ausgehend von den Berechnungen der zweiten Phase diese Projektes beträgt das „no-
regret“ Potenzial zur Reduktion der Emissionen im Jahr 2020 unter der BAU-Entwicklung 
133 Mio. t, das „co-benefit“ Potenzial beträgt 200 Mio. t und das „ambitious“ Potenzial beträgt 
443 Mio. tCO2äquiv. Diese entsprächen einer Reduzierung von 13%, 19% bzw. 42% im 
Vergleich zum BAU-Szenario und einer Veränderung von +38%, +28% bzw. -9% verglichen 
mit Emissionen im Jahr 2005. 
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Angesichts der nötigen globalen Emissionsreduktionen und basierend auf der oben 
beschriebenen Analyse erachten wir es als gerecht und vertretbar, wenn Südkorea dem 
Annex I der Klimarahmenkonvention beitreten würde. Im Rahmen dessen könnte es sich zu 
einem absoluten und bindenden nationalen Ziel zur Begrenzung seiner Emissionen 
verpflichten. Südkoreas Ziel könnte gemäß dem „ambitious“ Potenzial, wie in diesem Projekt 
analysiert, formuliert werden. Dies würde einem absoluten Emissionsziel von 604 Mio. 
tCO2äquiv in 2020 entsprechen. Das wäre gleichbedeutend mit einer Reduktion um 42% 
unter der BAU-Entwicklung im Jahr 2020 bzw. einer Reduktion um 9% im Vergleich zu den 
2005er Emissionen. 
 
11. Resultierendes umfassendes Rahmenwerk 
Tabelle 1 beinhaltet eine Zusammenfassung der möglichen Beiträge der sechs in diesem 
Bericht betrachteten Länder. Die Tabelle ist nach der Art der Ziele geordnet, die in der 
Tabelle nach unten hin weniger ehrgeizig werden. Basierend auf ihrem hohen bzw. niedrigen 
Niveau wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung erachten wir es für Südkorea als angemessen, dem 
Annex I der UNFCCC beizutreten. Aus unserer Sicht ist für Indien die Verpflichtung zur 
Umsetzung von SD PAMs ein angemessener Beitrag. Für Mexiko, Brasilien, Südafrika und 
China schlagen wir je zwei Optionen vor. 
Unter Option A würden sich Mexiko, Brasilien, Südafrika und China dazu verpflichten 
nationale oder sektorale „no-lose“ Ziele in Höhe des „ambitious“ 
Emissionsminderungspotenzials anzunehmen. Die Erreichung dieser Emissionsreduktionen 
wäre allerdings an finanzielle Unterstützung der Annex-I-Staaten außerhalb des 
Emissionshandelsmarktes gebunden. Sie könnte von einer Reduktion der Emissionen in 
Annex-I-Staaten um 30% bis zum Jahr 2020 im Vergleich zum Emissionsniveau im Jahr 
1990 begleitet werden. 
Die Option B führt zu vergleichbaren globalen Emissionsreduktionen, würde aber stärker auf 
den Emissionshandelsmarkt als Finanzierungsinstrument und weniger auf zusätzliche direkte 
Finanzierung aus Annex-I-Staaten vertrauen. Diese Option sieht vor, dass Mexiko, Brasilien, 
Südafrika und China sich in den oben genannten Sektoren zu „no-lose“ Zielen in der Höhe 
ihres „co-benefit“ Potenzials verpflichten. Um die globalen Emissionen auf einem Pfad zu 
halten der das 2°C Limit nicht überschreitet müssten sich Annex-I-Staaten statt zu einem 
30% Ziel zu einer Reduktion um 45% im Vergleich zum 1990 Emissionsniveau bis 2020 
verpflichten. Annex-I-Staaten würden technische Unterstützung zur Beseitigung von 
Umsetzungsbarrieren die nicht vom Markt gesteuert werden können, aber keine 
umfangreichen zusätzlichen Ressourcen außerhalb des Emissionshandelsmarktes 
bereitstellen, um die Entwicklungsländer bei der Umsetzung ihrer Beiträge zu unterstützen.  
Tabelle 1. Zusammenfassung der vorgeschlagenen Beitrage für das Jahr 2020, sortiert nach 
Art der Ziele 
Option A Option B Land Art Umfang 
Emissions-
niveau 
Finanzierung Emissions-
niveau 
Finanzierung 
Südkorea Absolutes und 
bindendes 
nationales 
Emissions-
minderungsziel 
Alle Sektoren Weit unter 
BAU (z.B. 
40%) 
Keine 
zusätzliche 
Finanzierung 
Weit unter BAU 
(z.B. 40%) 
Keine 
zusätzliche 
Finanzierung 
Mexiko Absolutes “no-
lose” 
Emissionsziel 
Alle Sektoren Weit unter 
BAU (z.B. 
40%) 
Abhängig von 
finanzieller 
Unterstützung  
Unter BAU („co-
benefit“ 
Potenzial, z. B. 
15%) 
Technische 
Unterstützung 
zur Erreichung 
des „co-benefit“ 
Potenzials 
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Option A Option B Land Art Umfang 
Emissions-
niveau 
Finanzierung Emissions-
niveau 
Finanzierung 
B 
rasilien 
Absolutes “no-
lose” 
Emissionsziel 
Alle Sektoren Weit unter 
BAU (z.B. 
40%) 
Abhängig von 
finanzieller 
Unterstützung 
Unter BAU („co-
benefit“ 
Potenzial, z. B. 
6%) 
Technische 
Unterstützung 
zur Erreichung 
des „co-benefit“ 
Potenzials 
Sektorales “no-
lose” 
Emissionsziel 
Energiesektor, 
Industriesektor
Weit unter 
BAU (z.B. 
35%) 
Unter BAU („co-
benefit“ 
Potenzial, z. B 
18%) 
Südafrika 
Politiken und 
Maßnahmen zur 
nachhaltigen 
Entwicklung 
Übrige 
Sektoren 
Nicht 
quantifiziert 
Abhängig von 
finanzieller 
Unterstützung Nicht 
quantifiziert 
Technische 
Unterstützung 
zur Erreichung 
des „co-benefit“ 
Potenzials 
Sektorales “no-
lose” 
Emissionsziel 
Energiesektor, 
Eisen und 
Stahl- sowie 
Zementsektor 
Weit unter 
BAU (z.B. 
30%) 
Unter BAU („co-
benefit“ 
Potenzial, z. B 
14%) 
China 
Politiken und 
Maßnahmen zur 
nachhaltigen 
Entwicklung 
Übrige 
Sektoren 
Nicht 
quantifiziert 
Abhängig von 
finanzieller 
Unterstützung Nicht 
quantifiziert 
Technische 
Unterstützung 
zur Erreichung 
des „co-benefit“ 
Potenzials 
Indien Politiken und 
Maßnahmen zur 
nachhaltigen 
Entwicklung 
Alle Sektoren Weit unter 
BAU 
Abhängig von 
finanzieller 
Unterstützung 
Weit unter BAU Abhängig von 
finanzieller 
Unterstützung 
 
Aus dieser Tabelle ist zu entnehmen, dass die Differenzierung der Länder von Zielen die mit 
Annex-I-Zielen vergleichbar sind bis hin zu moderaten und unterstützten 
Emissionsreduktionen reicht. Es ist ebenfalls erkennbar, dass vorgeschlagenen 
Reduzierungsniveaus zwischen den Ländern, basierend auf unserer Analyse der 
Reduktionspotenziale, variieren. 
 
12. Konsistenz mit dem 2°C Limit 
Die linke Seite in Abbildung 2 zeigt die globalen THG Emissionen unter dem BAU-Szenario 
bis zum Jahr 2020, aufgeteilt auf Annex-I- und Nicht-Annex-I-Staaten. Das identifizierte 
Reduktionspotenzial für die Nicht-Annex-I Staaten („non-Annex I“) enthält nur das in diesem 
Bericht analysierte „ambitious“ Potenzial für die sechs betrachteten Länder. 
Reduktionspotenziale in anderen Nicht-Annex-I-Staaten wären zusätzlich verfügbar. 
Allerdings sind nach unseren Abschätzungen die hier betrachteten sechs Länder schon für 
mehr als die Hälfte der Nicht-Annex-I THG Emissionen in 2020 verantwortlich. Wir nehmen 
an, dass Annex-I-Staaten ihre Emissionen bis zum Jahr 2020 auf 30% unter das Niveau des 
Jahres 1990 reduzieren. Die rechte Seite der Abbildung 2 zeigt mögliche Emissionspfade 
über das Jahr 2020 hinaus, die die Einhaltung des globalen 2°C Limits zum Ziel haben.  
Unter Berücksichtigung der Unsicherheiten der Berechnungen können wir daraus dennoch 
schließen, dass der globale Emissionsanstieg im Zeitraum von 2010 bis 2020 trotzdem 
gestoppt werden kann, wenn das gesamte „ambitious“ Reduktionspotenzial in den 
betrachteten sechs Ländern erschlossen wird. Ab dem Jahr 2020 sind darüber hinaus aber 
weitere umfangreiche Emissionsreduktionen notwendig um unter dem 2°C Limit zu bleiben. 
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Abbildung 2. Globale THG Emissionen die Reduktionsszenarien für Annex I (-30% 
innerstaatliche Reduktionen bis zum Jahr 2020 im Vergleich zu den 1990er Emissionen) und 
Nicht-Annex-I („non-Annex I“ Reduktionen in Höhe des „ambitous“ Potenzials für Brasilien, 
China, Indien, Mexiko, Südafrika und Südkorea im Zeitraum von 1990 bis 2020). Auf der rechten 
Seite sind mögliche globale Reduktionspfade für die Einhaltung des 2°C Limits im Zeitraum 
von 2020 bis 2050 für alle hier betrachteten Szenarien aufgetragen. 
 
13. Unterstützung für verbesserte Emissionsminderung 
Finanzielle Unterstützung für eine Umstellung auf kohlenstoffarme und –freie Technologien 
ist ein Schlüsselelement für die erweiterte Teilnahme der Nicht-Annex-I-Staaten am 
Klimaregime. In diesem Zusammenhang haben wir die folgenden Felder als wichtig 
identifiziert. 
Politikinstrumente (je Land und Sektor) die finanzieller Unterstützung bedürfen 
Basierend auf Teil II haben wir in Teil III des Projektes für jedes der sechs Länder 
zusätzliche nationale Politikinstrumente jeweils für die drei Sektoren mit den höchsten 
Reduktionspotenzialen identifiziert. Darüber hinaus schließen wir aus unserer Analyse, dass 
die folgenden Politikinstrumente die bereits bestehenden Politiken und Maßnahmen 
unterstützen können, aber für ihre Umsetzung auf finanzielle Hilfe angewiesen sind (siehe 
Tabelle 2). Die Bereitstellung adäquater finanzieller Unterstützung wird die Chancen für die 
aktive Beteiligung der sechs untersuchten Länder an einem zukünftigen Klimaregime 
erheblich erhöhen. 
Tabelle 2. Zusätzliche Politikinstrumente die für ihre Umsetzung finanzielle Unterstützung 
benötigen 
 Sektor Finanzielle Unterstützung 
Energie Ausstieg aus direkter und indirekter Subventionierung von Energie oder 
Energiepreiskontrollen, unterstützt von finanzieller Hilfe zur Verbesserung der
Energieeffizienz in der Endnutzung 
Installation von RES Technologien  
Unterstützung für Investitionen in die Verbesserung der Umwandlungseffizienz 
fossiler Kraftwerke 
Brasilien 
Transport Umstellung vom Transport auf der Straße zu Schienen- oder Schiffstransport, 
verknüpft mit einer Verbesserung des rechtlichen und finanziellen Rahmens um 
Risiken zu reduzieren und Investitionen zu fördern 
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 Sektor Finanzielle Unterstützung 
Energie  Unterstützung für Investitionen in die Verbesserung der Umwandlungseffizienz 
fossiler Kraftwerke Installation von RES Technologien  
 
China 
Industrie Optimierung und Installation von energieeffizienten Technologien, verbunden mit 
Energieaudits und -Managementsystemen 
Energie Ausstieg aus direkter und indirekter Subventionierung von Energie oder 
Energiepreiskontrollen, unterstützt von finanzieller Hilfe zur Verbesserung der
Energieeffizienz in der Endnutzung 
Installation von RES Technologien  
Unterstützung für Investitionen in die Verbesserung der Umwandlungseffizienz 
fossiler Kraftwerke 
Indien 
Industrie Optimierung und Installation von energieeffizienten Technologien, verbunden mit 
Energieaudits und -Managementsystemen 
Energie Ausstieg aus direkter und indirekter Subventionierung von Energie oder 
Energiepreiskontrollen, unterstützt von finanzieller Hilfe zur Verbesserung der
Energieeffizienz in der Endnutzung 
Installation von RES Technologien  
Unterstützung für Investitionen in die Verbesserung der Umwandlungseffizienz 
fossiler Kraftwerke 
Mexiko 
Industrie Optimierung und Installation von energieeffizienten Technologien, verbunden mit 
Energieaudits und -Managementsystemen 
Energie Ausstieg aus direkter und indirekter Subventionierung von Energie oder 
Energiepreiskontrollen, unterstützt von finanzieller Hilfe zur Verbesserung der
Energieeffizienz in der Endnutzung 
Unterstützung für Investitionen in die Verbesserung der Umwandlungseffizienz 
fossiler Kraftwerke 
Südafrika 
Industrie Optimierung und Installation von energieeffizienten Technologien, verbunden mit 
Energieaudits und -Managementsystemen 
Energie Installation von RES Technologien Südkorea 
Industrie Unterstützung für Investitionen in die Verbesserung der Umwandlungseffizienz 
fossiler Kraftwerke 
 
Bestehende Instrumente zur finanziellen Unterstützung im internationalen 
Klimaschutzregime 
Innerhalb des Klimaschutzregimes existieren zwei Hauptinstrumente zur finanziellen 
Unterstützung für THG Reduktionsprojekte in Entwicklungsländern: die Finanzmechanismen 
und der CDM. Um die mögliche Rolle dieser beiden Instrumente bei der Realisierung der in 
Teil II und III identifizierten Potenziale zu untersuchen vergleichen wir sie bezüglich ihrer 
Finanzkraft, der Art der Finanzgeber, der finanzierten Aktivitäten sowie ihrer Anforderungen 
und Verfahren. Diese Analyse veranschaulicht die folgenden Punkte: 
• Die bislang durch die Finanzmechanismen mobilisierten Ressourcen sind im 
Vergleich zu der Schätzung des UNFCCC Sekretariats, dass im Jahr 2030 
zusätzliche Investitionen und Finanzflüsse in Höhe von 200-210 Mrd. USD für 
Emissionsminderungsmaßnahmen gebraucht werden (UNFCCC 2007, S. 100-102), 
zu klein. Das Potenzial des CDM ist ausreichend um diese Lücke zu füllen. 
• Andere Beschränkungen zeigen sich beim CDM wegen der Tendenz hauptsächlich 
Projekte mit großem THG Reduktionspotenzial zu realisieren. Die 
Finanzmechanismen sind daher eher geeignet die Bedürfnisse vieler 
Nicht-Annex-I-Staaten zu decken, die finanzielle Ressourcen für kleinere Projekte 
benötigen. 
• Die Finanzmechanismen sind möglicherweise besser dafür geeignet Ressourcen 
bereitzustellen, die um Reduktionsoptionen des „co-benefit“ Potenzials zu realisieren. 
• Nichtmonetäre Unterstützungsmaßnahmen benötigen finanzielle Ressourcen. 
Finanzmechanismen können genutzt werden um diese bereitzustellen. 
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• Sowohl der CDM als auch die Finanzmechanismen weisen Defizite bei der 
Erschließung von „no-regret“ Potenzialen auf. 
Aufgrund dieser Analysen schlagen wir vor, zunächst die Finanzmechanismen, wie im 
Folgenden, beschrieben umzustrukturieren. Weiterhin sollte die internationale, 
zwischenstaatliche und regionale Kooperation gestärkt werden um mehr öffentliche Mittel für 
„no-regret“ Projekte und nichtmonetäre Unterstützung bereitzustellen. Darüber hinaus sollte 
die Rolle von privatem Kapital bei der Realisierung von „no-regret“ und „co-benefit“ 
Potenzialen gestärkt werden. 
Zusätzlicher Hilfe für verbesserte Aktivitäten in der Treibhausgasminderung: 
nichtmonetäre Unterstützung 
Abgesehen von finanzieller Hilfe könnten Nicht-Annex-I-Länder auch sehr von 
nichtmonetärer Unterstützung profitieren. Wissensaustausch und Zusammenarbeit in 
Forschung und Entwicklung sind möglicherweise wirkungsvolle Instrumente um neue 
Technologien und politische Instrumente einzuführen und zu verbreiten. Diese Art von 
technologischer Zusammenarbeit wird außerhalb des Klimaschutzregimes vielfach 
praktiziert, hat aber bisher im Zusammenhang mit dem UNFCCC und dem Kyoto-Protokoll 
noch keine wichtige Rolle gespielt.  
Grundsätzlich sollten Fördermaßnahmen im Bereich von Forschung und Entwicklung für die 
beschleunigte Entwicklung, technische Verbesserung und Markteinführung erneuerbarer 
Energien und Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung für Elektrizität, Heizung und Kühlung, effizienter 
Kraftwerke mit fossilen Brennstoffen und in den meisten Ländern zur Erforschung von CCS-
Technologie eingesetzt werden. Andere vielversprechende Möglichkeiten der 
Zusammenarbeit in Forschung und Entwicklung sind Maßnahmen für energieeffiziente 
Produktionstechnologien und -methoden und nachhaltige Transportsysteme. 
Die im vorliegenden Bericht untersuchten sechs Länder können von Zusammenarbeit in der 
Entwicklung von Standards und technischen Vorschriften profitieren. Diese Art 
internationaler Technologieallianz umfasst Beschlüsse über Standards in der 
Energieeffizienz, technische Vorschriften für erneuerbare Energiequellen und wirtschaftliche 
Anreize für den Einsatz bestimmter Technologien (z.B. Subventionen oder steuerliche 
Vorteile für erneuerbare Energiequellen). Weiterhin gäbe es große Vorteile die Erfahrungen 
Deutschlands und der EU im Aufbau eines Emissionshandelssystems oder ökologischer 
Finanzreformen zu nutzen. 
Eine Technologieallianz mit Schwellenländern 
In der Schaffung eines integrierten Systems für die Entwicklung und den Einsatz innovativer 
Technologien liegen die Herausforderung und die Chance einer verstärkten Teilnahme von 
Nicht-Annex-I-Ländern am internationalen Klimaregime. Dies sollte eine hohe Effizienz mit 
der Möglichkeit verbinden, sich Schritt für Schritt zu entwickeln, um die zukünftige Integration 
von Nicht-Annex-I-Ländern bei der Eindämmung und Vermeidung von 
Treibhausgasemissionen in einem künftigen Klimaregime zu ermöglichen.  
Das Angebot über eine integrierte Technologieallianz im Rahmen einer neuen Klimaallianz 
könnte einen ersten Schritt in diese Richtung darstellen. Dadurch würde das Interesse der 
EU an der Einbindung der wirtschaftlich großen Nicht-Annex-I-Länder bei der Eindämmung 
und Vermeidung von Treibhausgasemissionen mit den Interessen der aufstrebenden 
Wirtschaftsnationen an neuen und sauberen Technologien in Einklang gebracht werden. 
Einige der Ideen der G77/China sollten daher in die Diskussion aufgenommen und mit 
anderen in diesem Bericht vorgestellten Elementen zu einem schlüssigen und effektiven 
Technologiebündnis zusammengebracht werden. Ein solches Angebot sollte 
Zusammenarbeit in der Forschung, Entwicklung und dem Einsatz von kohlenstoffarmen oder 
-freien Technologien, Erarbeitung gleicher Standards und – als zentrales Feld – eine in ihrer 
Höhe bedeutende Verpflichtung zur Finanzierung der Umstellung auf kohlenstoffarme und -
freie Technologien enthalten. 
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Eine solche Umstellung wird einen deutlich höheren Kapitaleinsatz erfordern – Schätzungen 
gehen von 20-30 Mrd. USD im Stern Review (Stern 2006) bis zu 200-210 Mrd. USD im Jahr 
2030 gemäß UNFCCC Sekretariat (2007). Kurz- und mittelfristig muss solch ein Fonds 
wahrscheinlich mit öffentlichen Geldern der Annex-II-Länder ausgestattet werden. 
Einnahmen aus der Versteigerung der Emissionsrechte im EU Emissionshandelssystem 
könnten schon einen Teil des benötigten Kapitals ausmachen. Abgesehen von einem 
solchen Fonds sollte das Technologiebündnis einen innovativen Bestandteil des Montreal-
Protokolls enthalten – den „Technology and Economic Assessment Panel“ (TEAP) zur 
Ersetzung veralteter Technologien. 
Diese Technologieallianz muss im Zusammenhang mit dem Emissionsrechtehandel gesehen 
werden, da dieser Markt das Fundament für alle Aktivitäten im Kampf gegen den 
Klimawandel bildet. Im Nord-Süd-Kontext ist der CDM von besonderer Bedeutung. Natürlich 
kann der CDM nicht die besonderen Maßnahmen der Zusammenarbeit bei der Entwicklung 
und dem Einsatz von Technologien in Nicht-Annex-I-Ländern ersetzen. Diese Länder 
betonen auch, dass der CDM nicht als Weg der Implementierung von Artikel 4.5 FCCC 
gesehen werden kann. Allerdings können die Bedingungen für technologische Innovation 
und den Einsatz von innovativen Technologien durch den CDM deutlich verbessert werden. 
Solch ein Technologiebündnis anzubieten könnte die Verhandlungen für ein Post 2012-
Klimaregime entscheidend voranbringen. Deutlich verstärkte Zusammenarbeit bei der 
Entwicklung und dem Einsatz von Technologien kann auf einfache Weise so angepasst 
werden, dass auch Technologien für die Anpassung an die unvermeidbaren Folgen des 
Klimawandels enthalten wären. Dies wäre ein Anreiz für die schwächeren, in diesem Bericht 
nicht betrachteten Entwicklungsländer, ihre Anpassungsfähigkeiten gegenüber den 
Einflüssen des Klimawandels zu stärken, obwohl von ihnen keine 
Treibhausgasminderungsaktivitäten erwartet werden. Ein Angebot dieser Art wäre ein 
Ausdruck der Offenheit für neue und kreative Antworten auf die Klimakrise. Für diese 
Herausforderung ist es nötig, traditionelle Ansätze der Diplomatie, die auf eng definierte 
nationale Interessen ausgerichtet sind, aufzugeben. Eine echte Partnerschaft mit den neuen 
Akteuren unter den Nicht-Annex-I-Ländern muss ein Teil dieses Ansatzes sein. 
Schlussfolgerungen 
Dieser Bericht enthält einen detaillierten Überblick über nationale Umstände, 
Emissionstrends, Reduktionspotenziale und Politikinstrumente für die großen Emittenten 
unter den Entwicklungsländern: Brasilien, China, Indien, Mexiko, Südafrika und Südkorea. 
Auf diese Länder entfallen ca. 50% der Treibhausgasemissionen der Nicht-Annex-I-Länder. 
Darüber hinaus enthält dieser Bericht Vorschläge zur verstärkten Einbeziehung dieser 
Länder in eine zukünftiges Klimaregime sowie Elemente internationaler finanzieller und 
nichtmonetärer Unterstützung für diese Länder.  
Wir ziehen die folgenden Schlussfolgerungen aus dieser Arbeit 
• Der Klimawandel erfordert schnelles Handeln der Industriestaaten, um ihre THG 
Emissionen zu reduzieren und Entwicklungsländer zu unterstützen, ihr 
THG-Emissionswachstum zu bremsen oder ihre Emissionen sogar zu reduzieren. 
• Das im Rahmen dieses Projektes entwickelte Excel Modell ermöglicht es, die 
Emissionsminderungspotenziale auf Sektorbasis zwischen den Ländern mit einer 
einheitlichen Methode zu vergleichen. Dies war bisher nicht möglich. Wie in jedem Modell 
werden die Ergebnisse maßgeblich von den Eingangsdaten beeinflusst. Dieses Modell 
ermöglicht es vergleichbare Eingangsannahmen für alle Länder zu treffen, um 
vergleichbare Ergebnisse zu erhalten. 
• Das „no-regret“ und „co-benefit“ Reduktionspotenzial in den betrachteten sechs 
Entwicklungsländern ist nach unseren Analysen beträchtlich. Es ist im Interesse dieser 
Länder solche Reduktionspotenziale, die keine zusätzlichen Nettokosten verursachen 
(9% „no-regret“ Reduktion unter BAU) oder die mit positiven Nebeneffekten außerhalb 
des Klimaschutzes zusammenhängen (insgesamt 17% „co-benefit“ Reduktion unter 
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BAU), umzusetzen. Internationale Unterstützung ist notwendig, um Hindernisse zu 
beseitigen, die derzeit dazu führen, dass diese Potenziale nicht ausgeschöpft werden. 
• In den untersuchten sechs Ländern ist ein zusätzliches Reduktionspotenzial verfügbar, 
das einen ausschlaggebenden Einfluss auf die Einhaltung des globalen 2°C Limits hat. 
Allerdings sind außer Südkorea alle der betrachteten Länder auf finanzielle 
Unterstützung angewiesen, um das jeweilige Potenzial auszuschöpfen. 
• Bestehende Politikinstrumente in den betrachteten Ländern können individuell durch 
weitere Politiken und Maßnahmen ergänzt werden um das Reduktionspotenzial zu 
realisieren. Die Art und die Ausgestaltung der Politiken und Maßnahmen sind stark von 
den derzeitigen landesspezifischen Umständen und Emissionsprofilen abhängig. 
In Ergänzung zum Emissionshandelsmarkt werden finanzielle und nichtmonetäre 
Unterstützungsmechanismen benötigt, um die Kohlenstoffintensität der hier betrachteten 
Länder zu reduzieren. Diese Anstrengungen würden sehr von einer integrierten Strategie 
zum Vorantreiben eines Technologiebündnisses zwischen Annex-I- und 
Nicht-Annex-I-Staaten profitieren. 
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1. Introduction 
Further action is needed that goes far beyond what has been agreed so far under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol to 
“prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”, the ultimate 
objective of the UNFCCC. It is out of question that developed countries (Annex I countries) 
will have to take a leading role. They will have to commit to substantial emission reductions 
and financing commitments due to their historical responsibility and their financial capability. 
However, the stabilisation of the climate system will require global emissions to peak within 
the next decade and decline well below current levels by the middle of the century. It is 
hence a global issue and, thus, depends on the participation of as many countries as 
possible.  
Several countries, including the European Community, and many environmental NGOs have 
agreed that global average temperature increase should be limited to 2°C above pre-
industrial levels to avoid such dangerous interference. The risk that a stable greenhouse gas 
concentration of e.g. 450 ppmv CO2eq would result in global average temperature above 2°C 
in the long term is around 50%. At 400 ppmv CO2eq, the risk is 30% (Meinshausen 2005). 
Consequently, global emissions have to peak in the next 15 years and decline well below the 
1990 level in 2050 and further thereafter.  
Under the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” one of the guiding 
principles stipulated in Article 3.1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), non-Annex I parties have so far been exempted from emission limitation 
or reduction commitments. Not least since the fourth assessment report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC-AR4), however, the pressure is mounting 
on these countries to contribute actively to the mitigation of climate change. This conflict 
between non-Annex I and Annex I parties has become more intense since the initiation of the 
post 2012 negotiations in 2005 in Montreal. While Annex I parties argued that strengthened 
action by the major developing countries is a precondition for taking on any new 
commitments under Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol (KP), non-Annex I parties insisted that 
Annex I parties take the lead by determining their further commitments in the Ad-hoc working 
group under the Kyoto Protocol and to transfer technology and financial resources necessary 
for controlling their GHGs (Sterk et al. 2007b). Therefore, innovative ideas are needed for the 
next phase of the negotiations in order to break the deadlock and enhance the participation 
of the emerging economies in the climate regime. 
Developing countries have a lower historical responsibility for climate change but are already 
or will become important emitters. A less carbon intensive development will have positive 
effects on these countries’ sustainable development and on the global climate system. On 
the one hand, climate change action will contribute directly to achieving sustainable 
development objectives, such as energy security, sustainable economic development, 
technology innovation, job creation, local environmental protection and enhancement of 
capacity to adapt to climate change impacts. On the other hand, especially developing 
countries will benefit from a more stable global climate because they are the most vulnerable 
to climate change effects. 
In this project “Proposals for contributions of emerging economies to the climate regime 
under the UNFCCC post 2012” for the German Environment Agency, Ecofys and the 
Wuppertal Institute analyse in detail the situation of the major emitting developing countries 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea. It includes an overview of 
emissions and economic development, provides estimates of emission reduction potential in 
a consistent manner, lists policies and measures to effectively limit greenhouse gas 
emissions, suggests how these measures could be complemented and finally, makes 
recommendations on how efforts by these countries could be integrated into the international 
climate change agreement under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
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We first describe the methodology of the project (Chapter 2), then our findings per country 
(Chapters 3 to 9). After the country analyses we provide an overview of a possible future 
overall framework (Chapter 10) and test the consistency with a 2°C limit (Chapter 11). We 
close with an overview of support options for enhanced mitigation of developing countries 
(Chapter 12) as well as a synthesis and general conclusions from this work (Chapter 13). 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Project setup  
The project was implemented by Ecofys and the Wuppertal Institute. Elements of the work 
were reviewed by country experts and were subsequently refined. Experts that had agreed to 
provide input included:  
• Dr. Vivek Kumar (India) – The Energy and Resources Institute, Teri  
• Prof Emilio Lèbre La Rovere (Brazil) – Universidade Federal Do Rio de Janeiro 
• Prof Jiahua Pan (China) – Chinese Academy of Social Science 
• Stanford Mwakasonda (South Africa) – Energy Research Centre, University of Cape 
Town 
• Odón de Buen (Mexico) – Energía, Tecnología y Educación SC, Mexico D.F.; 
• Prof. Dr. Sung-Jin Leem (South Korea) – Director of Environmental and Energy 
Institute, Jeonju University (no feedback has been received from Prof. Dr. Sung-Jin 
Leem). 
The project was completed in 4 phases. In the first phase, we provided a literature review of 
the issues at hand: An overview of which types of commitments have been proposed for 
emerging developing countries in the literature, a first overview of policies implemented by 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea that have an effect on 
greenhouse gas emissions, and an overview of the literature that calculates emission 
reduction potential and reduction costs. 
In a second phase, we developed a bottom-up spreadsheet calculation model to describe 
past and possible future emission trends and reduction options in a consistent format for 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea (see section 2.2).    
In the third phase, we outlined and analysed the existing mix of climate policy instruments 
and measures (based on phase I and a review by experts from the different countries) in the 
sectors with the highest GHG emission reduction potential of the respective country (based 
on the findings from phase II) (see section 2.3). 
In the fourth phase, we transferred the findings of phases II and III into the international 
arena. To this end, we suggested potential contributions to the mitigation of climate change 
by the six countries and outlined financial and non-financial support necessary to enhance 
the efforts of the emerging economies in limiting and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
based on the options and potential identified in phase II and the measures identified in phase 
III. The analysis concentrates on support in the context of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol (see section 2.4). 
 
2.2 Estimating reference emissions and mitigation potential 
Phase II of the project includes the development of a bottom-up spreadsheet calculation 
model to describe possible future emission trends and reduction options consistently for 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea until 2020. The aim of the tool is 
to describe the future emission trends and emission reduction options in a consistent manner 
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for all six countries. This is a novelty since currently consistent studies are available only for 
broad global regions, which usually do not include these countries separately. Studies on 
individual countries are also available but these are not comparable between countries. The 
developed tool allows this comparison. This section describes the methodology used. 
 
2.2.1 Scenario descriptions 
We calculated four scenarios in a consistent manner for all countries: 
Business-as-usual 
The business-as-usual (BAU) scenario follows production, energy consumption and energy 
efficiency trends that are based on moderate assumptions. Where available, these 
assumptions or related growth rates were taken from national studies. This was possible for 
Brazil, China and India (Centro Clima et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2006; TERI 2006). These 
studies include recent national policies up to the year 2000/2001. Later polices are not 
considered because often their level of implementation and the resulting impacts are still 
unclear. For those countries or sectors where no detailed studies were available, patterns 
and growth rate trends were usually assumed to be similar to previous years. These do not 
include special additional policies. Consequently this scenario can be considered to lead to 
relatively high levels of emissions. 
No-regret 
Pathways under the no-regret scenarios include GHG emission reduction options that can be 
achieved at negative or no direct costs. These would include, e.g. energy efficiency 
measures, where the economic gains from reduced energy use outweigh the investment 
costs for more efficient technology. Some would call this scenario also “economic potential at 
costs below 0€/tCO2eq”. We did not make a precise economic analysis of the costs of each 
measure but applied generic assumptions. Given the economic net benefit achievable, it 
should be in the interest of each country to realise this potential with its own resources. The 
international community could, however, support implementation both by technical 
contributions and by seed funding for, e.g. national revolving funds and for implementing 
policies and measures to overcome non-market barriers. 
Co-benefit 
Pathways under the co-benefit scenarios consider reduction options that are reasonable due 
to political aims other than greenhouse gas emission reduction. This includes also reductions 
at some costs. A typical measure would be the increased use of renewable energy sources 
to increase energy security and to decrease dependency on import of fossil fuels or switching 
from diesel to gas in passenger transport for air quality reasons. Recent policies agreed in 
the countries such as energy efficiency or renewable targets are included in this scenario 
assuming that they are fully implemented. But the scenario also includes further measures 
that could be implemented. It should be in the interest of each country to realise this potential 
with its own resources. However, the fact that it may entail some extra cost means that not 
only technical but also financial contributions from the international community would be 
helpful to achieve this scenario.  
Ambitious  
The ambitious scenario includes reduction options, which can be implemented but at extra 
net costs, while maintaining the same service level. This scenario includes reduction options 
that are technically feasible and would accelerate the capital stock turnover, but they would 
not lead to stranded investments. We did not undertake a precise economic analysis but 
used the level of 100 USD/tCO2eq as a rough guide for the maximum extra net costs of 
options to include. However, depending on discount rates as well as other developments, 
costs can lie below this level. This potential can be realised if both the non-market barriers 
are removed and financial incentives are provided to cover the extra net costs. It could be 
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achieved with additional contributions from the country itself or from the international 
community.  
 
2.2.2 Calculation of scenarios 
The aim of the modelling under this project is to show the emission development and the 
reduction potential of the major developing countries in a consistent and comparable 
manner.  
The general methodology is a bottom-up approach: For each sector, production and 
performance parameters are collected (e.g. tonnes of cement produced and energy 
efficiency of cement production). From these figures, energy demand as well as energy and 
process related emissions are calculated (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Simplified methodology to develop future emission pathways. 
 
The model distinguishes among five main sectors. For each sector several parameters are 
used as inputs. Table 3 provides a rough overview of the most important input parameters 
that we considered per sector. The following sections explain the methodology per sector in 
more detail. 
The approach works well for the energy and industry sectors, due to relatively good data 
availability, to a certain extent also for agriculture and waste. For households and services, 
only limited performance data are available. Except for South Korea, the data availability for 
transport is weak as well. For Land-use change and forestry (LUCF), we used only historical 
emission data and assumed constant emissions into the future.  
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Table 3. Different sectors and the related sector performance input parameters. 
Sector
General For all sectors:
GDP
Population 
Emission factors
overview of primary 
energy consumption
overview of emissions on 
sector basis
overview of all scenarios
Power production 
sector
Electricity, CHP, heat 
generation
Other energy industry Distribution losses Production, net imports, 
international marine 
bunkers, stock changes
Demand in other 
sectors + Distribution 
losses
Demand in other 
sectors
Historic development 
related to actual power 
production
Demand in other sectors
Industry sector Iron + steel Cement Pulp + paper Rest of industry
Steel production
Iron production
Cement production
Clink er production
Pulp production
Paper production
GDP
historic growth rate
Domestic sectors Households Commercial + services
Population growth
Number of households
Households/ population 
connected to the 
electricity grid 
Population growth
Labour force
Agriculture + w aste Agriculture Waste Rest (fishing + non-
specified other sectors)
Non-energy use Land-use change and 
forestry
Population growth
Use of fertiliser 
Increase in crop 
Manure management 
Methane enteric 
fermentation 
N2O Manure 
N2O soil fertiliser, soil 
livestock  and soil crop 
related
Population growth
Recovered methane 
% landfilled 
Waste generation per 
capita 
Methane conversion 
fraction
Population growth
historic growth
increase due to average 
historic growth rate
constant emissions 
according to last availab le 
historic year
Transport sector Aviation Road transport Rail Domestic navigation
development related to 
GDP growth
development related to 
GDP growth
development related to 
GDP growth or constant
development related to 
GDP growth or constant
Subsectors (sector performance input parameters )
 
Table 4 below includes the most important historical and scenario parameters for all 
countries and sectors. The parameters chosen for future developments are based on 
national studies where available, e.g. Winkler et al. (2005a), Centro Clima et al. (2006), Chen 
et al. (2006), TERI (2006) and others. Due to poor data availability, the classification of the 
scenarios is not as clear for the transport sector as for the other sectors. 
The table includes red figures. These are not consistent with what we would expect the data 
for these countries to look like (e.g. very low Energy Efficiency Index). Data shortcomings 
can be found especially in the transport sector. But also in the industry sector (e.g. South 
Africa: too low energy consumption values for pulp and paper production; South Korea: too 
low energy consumption values for iron and steel production) still some gaps exist that we 
had to fill with imperfect data. The reviews by country experts did not help to fill all data gaps. 
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Table 4. Selected historical and scenario parameters for all countries and sectors 
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2.2.2.1 Power production sector 
The power production sector includes total primary energy supply, including all final energy 
supply as well as distribution and conversion losses. Historic values are mainly based on IEA 
(2005a).  
Future demand for power production is a result of  
- electricity and fuel demand as given as input from the demand sectors, industry, 
domestic, agriculture and waste as well as transport; 
- the share of own use in other energy industry, including all energy transformation 
except power production, i.e. mainly coal transformation and petroleum refineries; 
- distribution losses; 
- conversion efficiency of electricity; 
- imports and stock changes. 
When no country specific data were available, we extrapolated historical trends. 
Future emissions from this sector are determined by the overall primary energy supply as 
given above as well as by the fuel mix. The emission factors for all sectors are taken from 
IPCC (2006). 
For all countries we assume a constant share of fuels in electricity production under BAU 
until 2020, except for Mexico, where a significant shift toward gas is assumed, and Brazil, 
where the additional hydropower capacity is minimal, which will lead to an increasing share 
of fossil fuels. For the co-benefit scenario we usually assume 10% renewables in addition to 
hydropower, for the ambitious scenario 20%, except for Brazil, where the biomass potential 
is assumed to be 10% under the no regret and co-benefit and 30% under the ambitious 
scenario. 
In all countries the efficiency of thermal power plants increases slightly under business-as-
usual and reaches the current best value under the ambitious scenario. 
Distribution losses, significant in Mexico, India and Brazil (according to the IEA dataset used) 
are constant under BAU, reduced slightly under no regret and co-benefit and reduced 
significantly under the ambitious scenario.  
 
2.2.2.2 Industry sector 
In the industry sector all manufacturing industry is included. Subsectors are iron and steel, 
cement, pulp and paper, and the rest of industry. Historic physical production values for iron, 
steel, cement, clinker, pulp and paper are taken from different country specific sources. The 
rest of industry is not based on physical production. Energy demand values are mainly based 
on IEA (2005a). Emissions are mainly derived from energy consumption. Process emissions 
and non-CO2 emissions are based on production values and USEPA (2006a). 
Future development of energy demand in this sector is based on physical production trends 
for iron and steel, cement, pulp and paper, taken from country studies or trend interpolations 
mainly, combined with trends for specific energy consumption. For the rest of industry, 
energy demand is based on trend interpolations of historic years. Future emissions are then 
for all subsectors based on the fuel mix of all energy sources except electricity. Process and 
non-CO2 emissions are based on production and on USEPA (2006a) scenarios. Emissions 
for electricity generation are allocated to the power production sector. 
For iron and steel we assumed that 10% of the energy input can be taken from renewables 
and waste already under the no-regret scenario in 2020, except for Brazil where it is currently 
already at 40%.  
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One option to reduce emissions in cement production is to decrease the percentage of the 
energy intensive product clinker in the cement. We assume that this ration declines to 65% in 
2020 already as no regret option due to decreasing energy costs. Renewable and waste 
fuels are assumed to be 30% in 2020 as no regret option, as these fuels are usually available 
at lower costs than fossil fuels.  
For pulp and paper we assumed 5% of the fuels from renewable sources as no regret 
potential in 2020. These can be taken from the waste products from pulp and paper making. 
For the ambitious scenario we assumed 20% renewables, except for Brazil, where the 
current share of 66% is kept constant.  
In the remaining industries we assumed a share of renewable fuels in 2020 of 5% under no 
regret and co-benefit and 20% as ambitious, except where the current level is already higher 
(e.g. Brazil 33%). 
For all sectors energy efficiency increases faster for countries with less efficient processes 
(often e.g. India) and slower for already efficient countries (often e.g. South Korea). 
 
2.2.2.3 Domestic sector 
The domestic sector includes private households as well as the commercial and public 
services sectors. Historic energy demand values are mainly based on IEA (2005a). Important 
input parameters are population and number of households as well as active labour force. 
Data on floor space and detailed use of electricity according to appliances would have been 
more accurate indicators but were not available for most countries.  
Future energy demand for households was modelled based on the trends of number of 
households with connection to the electricity grid, final energy demand per household and 
electricity use per household connected to the grid or per person with grid access. These 
were taken from country studies (see spreadsheets) or own estimates. Future energy 
demand for commercial and public services was modelled based on the number of people 
employed as well as on final energy and electricity use per employee. Future emissions for 
both subsectors are then based on the fuel mix of all energy sources except electricity. 
Emissions for electricity generation are allocated to the power production sector. 
The reduction potential in this sector was difficult to estimate due to the lack of detailed data. 
Efficiency of appliances or heating demand per square meter are not available. These 
indicators could have been used to estimate the mitigation potential. We therefore only 
assumed that electricity consumption per capita in Korea does not increase under the 
ambitious scenario. All other values are the same across all scenarios. 
 
2.2.2.4 Agriculture and waste sector 
The agriculture and waste sector includes, besides these two subsectors, also LUCF as a 
memo item, unspecified others, e.g. fishing, and non-energy use of fossil fuels. Historic 
energy demand is based on IEA (2005a). Energy related emissions are derived from fuel 
use, non-CO2 emissions are mainly based on USEPA (2006a). 
Future fuel demand for agriculture, the non-specified rest and non-energy use is based on 
population growth, demand in the last available year or population growth and trend 
interpolations for previous years, respectively. Energy related emissions from agriculture and 
non-specified others are based on this fuel use. Non-energy related historical emissions and 
future scenarios in the agriculture sector (usually the larger part) are based on USEPA 
(2006a). Influencing factors include the change in livestock, use of fertilisers, manure 
management and others.  
Future emissions resulting from waste management depend mainly on population growth, 
recovered methane, composition and share of landfilled waste as well as waste generation 
per capita. We assumed that under the co benefit scenario 10% of the CH4 from landfills is 
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recovered as this has other side benefits to local pollution. The ambitious scenario assumes 
50% recovery. 
LUCF emissions are kept constant for all years. LUCF is included to provide completeness, 
but due to a lack of consistent and reliable data it is not analysed in detail. Emissions from 
non-energy use are included in the industry sector. 
 
2.2.2.5 Transport sector 
The transport sector includes national and international aviation, road transport of persons 
and freight, rail transport and domestic navigation. Historic energy consumption is based on 
IEA (2005a). 
Future sector performance is mainly based on fuel demand trends related to GDP growth, 
efficiency gains and shifts among means of transportation. We choose this comparatively 
simple methodology based on expert judgements because more precise parameters like 
modal split, kilometres per person or tonne and number of cars were not available for most 
countries. Only for South Korea the data availability was better.  
Emissions in the transport sector are derived from fuel use. As the share of non-CO2 
emissions is very small it is included in the industry sector. 
 
2.3 Analysis of national climate policies 
A literature review and assessments of country experts served as a starting point for 
identifying the existing mix of major climate policy instruments for the six countries. However, 
the list of existing policies should not be regarded as complete. It makes an attempt to 
provide an overview of the main climate policy instruments in the selected sectors with the 
highest GHG emissions. Results of phase II of the project were used in order to identify the 
three sectors with the highest GHG emissions in the respective country. Furthermore, we 
developed a generic country-independent sourcebook for good practice climate policy 
instruments as a basis of which climate policies could be implemented. The sourcebook is 
further described in Appendix C. 
The sourcebook, assessments of country experts, and the circumstances of the respective 
country served as a basis for our suggestions on how to improve the existing mix of climate 
policies and measures. However, it should be noted that difficulties in gathering detailed 
information on climate policy instruments in the selected countries did not allow a more in-
depth analyses of the countries. Therefore, this study merely provided a general framework. 
The concrete tailoring of policy packages including their evaluation and, if necessary, 
adaptation is a further task of the respective countries. 
To be effective, climate policy strategies must take into account the complex interplay of 
barriers, which usually requires a package of well-designed and mutually supportive policy 
instruments. It will be necessary to package different policies and measures into target 
group- and sector-specific market transformation programmes adequately addressing the 
different actors in a certain sector or sub-sector on a specific field of action (e.g. renewable 
energy for electricity production, energy end-use efficiency in buildings, etc.). These 
packages together will strengthen incentives and overcome barriers for all actors in the 
particular field. For the sectoral policy sourcebook, the policies and measures are grouped 
into a number of categories in order to provide a more systematic overview of the range of 
instruments. 
In general, we distinguish between five groups of policies and measures. These policy 
instruments target different types of GHG reduction potential such as the no-regret potential 
(individual benefits outweigh individual costs of GHG reduction options), the co-benefits 
potential (societal benefits approximately equal societal costs) and the ambitious potential 
(societal costs are bigger than societal benefits). The following policies can significantly 
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contribute to exploiting the achievable GHG reduction potential by addressing various 
barriers through giving economic incentives, reducing transaction efforts for market actors, or 
setting standards: 
A) General economic and fiscal policies and measures have an impact on GHG emission 
reductions by providing for the right price signals in the markets and economic sectors by 
altering price ratios: energy/CO2 taxation, emissions trading, sustainable subsidy reform. 
Through internalising external costs or benefits and making them visible to the different 
actors, the no-regret and co-benefits potential for GHG reductions are targeted. In particular, 
part of the co-benefit potential becomes no-regret potential: better price signals lead to 
higher individual benefits. Only if market actors expect further increases in energy or GHG 
(certificate) prices, such policies may also lead to early adoption of parts of the ambitious 
potential. These policies and measures are often cross-cutting to the sectoral approach but 
sometimes also sector-specific. 
B) Targeted economic and fiscal policies and measures support the search for, or 
implementation of sector- and technology-specific potential, such as subsidies for energy 
analyses (energy audits) or investment, feed-in tariffs for electricity from renewable energy 
sources or from cogeneration of heat and power, or certificate schemes for energy savings or 
electricity from renewable energy sources. Besides the no-regret potential, these policy 
instruments aim at the co-benefits and ambitious potential for GHG reduction options since 
they directly aim at specific fields of application, sectors or technologies.  
They either overcome barriers related to lack of information that impede the utilisation even 
of the cost-effective no-regret potential, or (partly) compensate investors for costs resulting 
from the GHG reduction activity. Such costs can be search costs (in the cases of no-regret 
and co-benefits potential) or investment costs. The latter can be too high from the individual 
perspective but attractive from the societal perspective, i.e. in cases of a co-benefits 
potential; the justification for targeted financial support in such cases is to make it attractive 
for individuals to pursue co-benefit potential that has a net benefit for society. However, 
experience shows that financial support for investments often has the biggest effect through 
creating awareness of the existence and the (net) benefits of GHG mitigation options, rather 
than through investors making a detailed calculation of their costs and benefits. 
In a case of the ambitious potential, investment costs would even be too high from the 
societal perspective in the short run. In such cases, targeted investment support may still be 
justified to address the ambitious potential, if in the long run the potential is expected to 
become cost-effective due to technology learning curves.  
C) Standards and voluntary agreements make specific technologies or measures 
mandatory or the default for actors and transform markets by taking certain products off the 
market. Depending on their strength, these policies bear the potential for a full exploitation of 
the co-benefits and ambitious potential. In many cases, however, considerations regarding 
the ability of suppliers to adapt their product ranges or the cost-effectiveness for investors 
limit these policies to the no-regret or co-benefits potential. They reduce transaction costs 
and information barriers. However, such policies can only be introduced for technologies that 
are easy to standardise.   
Standards and voluntary agreements can also create obligations to improve or exchange 
existing production processes or technologies, apart from the market-based incentives or 
disincentives provided by the economic and fiscal measures. Regulations on the use of 
planning procedures, e.g. in the transport sector, are also included here. Such obligations 
and regulations intend to widen the technology focus of public and market actors and, 
thereby, both to overcome information barriers and to create a level playing field. They, too, 
are instruments to improve the utilisation of no-regret and co-benefits potential. Voluntary 
agreements are best to use when the number of market actors is relatively small, while legal 
standards are more widely applicable. 
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The following policies are more of a supportive character and should be combined with 
targeted policies and measures (i.e., categories B) and C)) in order to realise significant GHG 
reductions: 
D) Information, know-how transfer and education improve the knowledge basis of actors, 
thereby reducing transaction costs and increasing availability and uptake of climate-friendly 
technologies and solutions. This category also includes the necessary institutions for the 
know-how transfer as well as specific services that are provided for emission reduction, such 
as energy analyses (audits) and specialised consultancy, which can play an important role in 
increasing knowledge and capacity of actors and sectors.  
All in all, this category of policies and measures mainly targets a better exploitation of 
no-regrets and, partly, co-benefit potential. Reduced transaction costs may also increase the 
size of both types of potential relative to the overall (ambitious mitigation) potential. 
E) Research and technology transfer in order to develop new technologies for GHG 
mitigation and to make these technologies available. This can also be supported by demand 
pull through public or private targeted procurement, or through co-operative procurement.  
These types of policies will thus increase the size of the overall GHG mitigation potential, and 
will convert part of the ambitious potential into co-benefit or even no-regret potential. 
For each of the sectors analysed, technology areas or subsectors with a significant potential 
for reduction of GHG emissions have been identified, based on results from Part II of the 
project and existing literature (e.g. Deutscher Bundestag 2002; IPCC 2007a). For each of 
these areas and subsectors, a package of policies and measures from the above five 
categories that can be considered good practice was identified. This is based, again, on the 
literature as well as on the Wuppertal Institute’s expertise. Usually, one to three policy 
instruments in the package are considered to be principal instruments. These are often 
targeted policies and measures from categories B) or C) that have shown to be effective in 
practice either in OECD countries or in emerging economies, but also often include a 
sustainable reform of energy subsidies that still exist in some emerging economies. 
 
2.4 Link to the international climate regime  
In the fourth phase, we transferred the findings of phases II and III into the international 
arena. We suggest potential contributions by the six countries to the mitigation of climate 
change and outline financial and non-financial ways of supporting the emerging economies in 
their efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, based on the options and potential 
identified in phase II and the measures identified in phase III. The analysis concentrates on 
support in the context of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
The suggestions for potential contributions to the climate regime by the six countries 
considered are based on two main principles: 
- ecological adequacy (contribution to stabilisation of GHG concentration)  
- differentiation according to national circumstances to implement the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities 
As for ecological adequacy (stabilisation of GHG concentration), the starting point for the 
analysis is that any post-2012 regime should aim for containing global temperature increase 
at below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.  
As shown in section 11, meeting the 2°C target requires that almost the full ambitious 
mitigation potential of all six countries considered in this project is mobilised in addition to a 
domestic emission reduction of at least 30% below 1990 levels by Annex I countries. The 
following therefore outlines options for varying combinations of non-Annex I contributions and 
Annex I support that could be used to mobilise the ambitious mitigation potential. 
As for differentiation, the analysis followed the staged South-North-Dialogue proposal (Ott et 
al. 2004). It bases the differentiation between countries on three principles: responsibility, 
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capability and potential. Ott et al. apply a comprehensive set of indicators to link types of 
contributions to different groups of countries (Table 5). The contributions include mitigation of 
emissions as well as providing or receiving funding.  
The South-North-Proposal assigns indicators to each of the principles. Responsibility is 
linked to the cumulative emissions per capita. The capability to mitigate depends on the 
development level of a country. This is expressed by the human development index 
surveyed by the UNDP and the per capita income. The potential to mitigate can be linked to 
GHG emissions per GDP and per capita and emission growth. For this report, those proxy 
indicators can be replaced by the results from Part II of the project. 
Table 5. Indicators to differentiate between countries as used in the South-North-Dialogue (Ott 
et al. 2004) 
Responsibility Capability  Potential 
Cumulative CO2/cap GDP/cap 
HDI 
Results from Part II of this 
project (Chapters 4 to 9) 
As a further, more qualitative, criterion for differentiating between countries, the analysis also 
considers whether countries dispose of the technical capacity necessary to quantify 
emissions and reductions and to report their emissions and policies and measures 
implemented to limit/reduce emissions. 
As for the provision of international support, we proceeded from the assumption that the no-
regret potential as a rule does not require permanent financial support from the international 
community. However, countries may well be eligible for other support to remove non-
economic barriers, and potentially seed funding for, e.g. national revolving funds and for 
implementing policies and measures to overcome non-market barriers. The analysis 
furthermore proceeded from the assumption that co-benefit potential needs some financial 
support because it may not be realised despite the benefits and that countries will profit from 
non-financial support. It finally proceeded from the assumption that utilising the options 
identified under the ambitious potential scenario would crucially depend on international 
financial support in order to remove economic and other barriers as well as on other support. 
3. Current mechanisms of engagement of developing 
countries in the international regime 
3.1 Introduction  
Non-Annex I countries are in many ways already involved in mitigation and limitation 
activities. This section provides a short overview regarding the activities within the 
Convention and the Protocol, namely Financial Mechanisms, Technology Transfer, and 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), with a view to exploring ways to enhance non-Annex 
I parties’ participation. The section illustrates the complexity of the current setting and the 
necessity to develop ways to facilitate the required resources in a streamlined manner within 
the FCCC and the KP, but also in relation to official development aid. 
 
3.1.1 Financial mechanisms 
The Convention and the Protocol mandate Annex II parties to provide financial resources to 
cover implementation of general commitments, reporting, adaptation costs and technology 
transfer (Articles 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 11 of the Convention, Article 11 of the Protocol). The 
Financial Mechanisms under the UNFCCC have encountered various difficulties, among 
others their complexity in operation and lack of sufficient resources. This has led to 
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widespread dissatisfaction on the part of non-Annex I countries, which increasingly demand 
more substantial offers from Annex I countries. 
The complexity in operation mainly results from the fact that the Convention entrusts the day-
to-day operation of the mechanisms to the Global Environment Facility (GEF), while the COP 
decides on the policies, programme priorities and eligibility requirements for the financial 
mechanisms. This arrangement is meant to ensure that non-Annex I parties have some 
control over the GEF, in order to reflect their interests (cf. Matz 2002, p. 483). The COP has 
thus continuously adopted guidance for the GEF. They are difficult to track down, however, 
and often too general, which makes it difficult for the GEF to operationalise them (Yamin and 
Depledge 2004, p. 285).  
Furthermore, the calculation of “incremental costs“ increases the complexity. For the 
UNFCCC, the GEF has defined incremental costs as the difference between the full costs of 
the measures taken and the sum of the costs of the least expensive way to deliver an 
equivalent economic benefit plus the short-term benefits to the local economy (baseline) that 
would result from the proposed measure (GEF 1993, p. 31). Therefore, the full costs are 
covered in the case of projects to develop GHG inventories and national communications. In 
other cases, defining the baseline is very difficult and subjective. This results in delays in the 
submission and approval of GEF projects (Yamin and Depledge 2004, p. 281). The decision 
adopted in Nairobi provides guidance to the GEF to simplify its procedures and improve the 
efficiency of the process through which non-Annex I parties receive funding for projects 
(3/CP.12).  
The above mentioned arrangement also makes it difficult to ensure adequacy and 
predictability of resources, partly because the resources are provided from the money 
pledged by donor countries for all GEF related funds (cf. Yamin and Depledge 2004, p. 283). 
In the fourth replenishment, 3,130 million USD were donated and 1,000 million USD were 
allocated to climate change (GEF 2006, p.3). 
In order to secure budgets for specific objectives, in addition to the above mentioned 
financial mechanisms the Marrakech Accords established three special funds for transfers to 
developing countries, namely the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), and the Special 
Climate Change Fund (SCCF) under the FCCC, and the Adaptation Fund (AF) under the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
Concerning the lack of sufficient resources, a technical paper by the secretariat has reviewed 
existing and projected investment flows and financing relevant to the development of an effective 
and appropriate international response to climate change. It concluded with the necessity to 
increase financial flows from 379.5 billion. The need for adaptation is estimated at „several tens of 
billion dollars“. (UNFCCC 2007, p. 91, 125). 
In order to address the outstanding issues concerning the financial mechanisms, the fourth 
review process is currently being undertaken. Regarding the adequacy and predictability of 
resources, the SBI 28 will consider the submissions by parties on the report prepared by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat in collaboration with the GEF Secretariat and recommend a draft 
decision for adoption by COP14 (FCCC/SBI/2007/L.34/Add.1). Concerning the lack of 
sufficient resources, the decision further requests the GEF to simplify and streamline the 
application of the incremental cost principle, and to improve access to GEF funds for those 
countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. 
 
3.1.2 Technology transfer 
Annex II parties are required to take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, 
as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-
how to other Parties, particularly to developing countries to enable them to implement the 
provisions of the Convention (Article 4.5 of the Convention, Article 10 c of the Protocol). At 
COP7, Parties adopted decision 5/CP7 to guide the discussions regarding technology 
transfer and development. It provides a framework for actions to enhance the implementation 
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of Article 4.5, covering five themes: technology needs assessments, technology information, 
enabling environments, capacity building, and mechanisms for technology transfer. 
Based on this decision, the secretariat has developed a web-based technology information 
system (TT:CLEAR) that includes an inventory of environmentally friendly technologies and 
projects, and its technology web page. The decision further established an Expert Group on 
Technology Transfer (EGTT), nominated by the Parties. The Expert Group comprises 20 
experts, it facilitates and advances technology transfer activities and makes 
recommendations to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA). Although the current climate regime sees some development in technology needs 
assessment, identification of barriers and capacity building, it has not succeeded in 
developing mechanisms to effectively enhance technology development and deployment.  
The challenge, therefore, is to develop an appropriate framework to address the identified 
barriers, including intellectual property issues, and to create a flow of sufficient finance for 
R&D, in particular energy-related R&D. According to the secretariat paper on investment and 
financial flows, additional global investment and financial flows of 200-210 billion USD will be 
necessary in 2030 in order to return global GHG emissions to around 26 GtCO2 – and almost 
half of the amount in developing countries (UNFCCC 2007, pp. 100-102). At present, 
however, government spending on energy related R&D is stagnating (UNFCCC 2007, p. 9) 
and private sector spending has sharply fallen (Margolis and Kammen 1999). 
In Bali, developing countries introduced the agenda item of Technology Transfer into the SBI 
in addition to the SBSTA and proposed to establish a new technology fund under the 
Convention. The EU and the UG proposed a program or facility under the GEF instead. 
Parties could reach a compromise on establishing a strategic programme under the GEF to 
scale up the level of investment for technology transfer.  
 
3.1.3 The Clean Development Mechanism 
Currently, the Clean Development Mechanism is the only means under the Kyoto Protocol by 
which developing countries are directly involved in mitigation activities. Having started with 
many delays, the CDM is now fully functional and expanding rapidly. The current pipeline of 
projects that have been registered or are at the validation stage expects cumulative emission 
reductions of 2.4 GtCO2eq by 2012 (Fenhann and Lema 2008). 
However, the CDM is fraught with many concerns. One important concern is that projects are 
overwhelmingly concentrated in very few countries. The four leading countries, India, Brazil, 
China and Mexico, together account for no less than three quarters of all projects in the 
pipeline. Many developing countries have so far been almost completely bypassed (Fenhann 
and Lema 2008). 
Even more importantly, the additionality of many projects has recently been severely called 
into question.  
For example, a survey by Axel Michaelowa, a member of the CDM Registration and 
Issuance Team, and Pallov Purohit of 52 CDM projects registered in India by May 2006 
found significant deficiencies as regards the demonstration of additionality by the project 
developers and the evaluation of the projects by the validators (Michaelowa and Purohit 
2007). Lambert Schneider, a member of the CDM Methodologies Panel, recently estimated 
that additionality is unlikely or questionable for 40% of the projects registered so far 
(Schneider 2007) . Given the currently expected volume of 2.4 billion CERs by 2012, the 
CDM could thus severely undermine the environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Other key concerns relate to the lack of sustainable development benefits of many projects 
and the limited incentives for sectoral transformation provided by the project-based 
approach. Post-2012 discussions therefore currently revolve around the concept of a sectoral 
CDM, in the hope that a sectoral approach would help to resolve the additionality problem 
 60
and provide incentives for emission reductions on the scale required to tackle the climate 
challenge. 
 
3.2 The post-2012 negotiations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol 
The negotiations in the context of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are the main pillar of 
the global efforts to fight climate change. This regime provides not only the global framework 
for a host of other multi- and bilateral activities; it is furthermore the only forum that is 
all-inclusive. This presents enormous challenges regarding the complexity and manageability 
of the negotiations, but it also presents unique opportunities for a truly global agreement to 
result from the process. 
The post-2012 negotiations currently run along several tracks. First, the parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2005 established an Ad-hoc Working Group on further commitments for Annex I 
Parties pursuant to Article 3.9 KP. Second (AWG-Article 3.9), parties to the FCCC have 
launched a ‘dialogue’ under the Framework Convention in the hope of integrating large 
developing countries and the United States in constructive discussions on the future of the 
climate regime (see Wittneben et al. 2006). In 2006 in Nairobi, two new items relevant to the 
post-2012 regime, namely a review of the Kyoto Protocol under its Article 9 and the Russian 
proposal on voluntary commitments for developing countries, were put on the agenda (see 
Sterk et al. 2007b, p. 140). At the most recent conference in Bali, the ‘dialogue’ was 
transformed into full-fledged negotiations under an “Ad-hoc working group on Long-Term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention” (AWG-Long Term). 
One of the main challenges in the run-up to Copenhagen 2009 will be to, first, keep track of 
the various negotiation threads, second, make sure they do not contradict each other and, 
third, finally bring all these threads together in order to adopt a coherent and effective post-
2012 agreement. This analysis will not formally differentiate the proposals according to the 
various fora, since this would lead to a rather intractable and confusing structure. Instead, it 
will explore the substantive issues and identify the kind of international cooperation that 
might be helpful. 
Since the proposals are meant to support the diplomatic efforts of the post-2012 negotiations 
in and after COP 13 in Bali, they have been structured according to the main issues. To be 
adequate for meeting the ultimate objective of the Climate Convention to “prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Article 2 UNFCCC), the post-2012 
framework will need to be considerably more multidimensional than the Kyoto Protocol in its 
current form (Brouns et al. 2005). The negotiators have recognised this challenge. Recently, 
several attempts have been undertaken to lay out the possible elements for a post 2012 
package, including the ministerial “Midnight Sun Dialogue” (Riksgränsen 2007, p. 4) and the 
“Global Leadership for Climate Action” (Club de Madrid and United Nations Foundation 2007, 
p. 2). They are inter alia, stressing the role of the following issues:  
- Enhanced mitigation action by developing countries;  
- Financial support (through developing and strengthening carbon markets and 
improving financial mechanisms);  
- Non-financial support (technology development, diffusion and commercialisation, 
capacity-building, awareness and education). 
These elements are crucial to enhance mitigation actions by developing countries and more 
ambitious reduction targets for all developed countries. This is because developing countries 
would not take on any commitments without more financial resources and technologies; and, 
on the other hand, developed countries would not have any incentive to provide financial 
resources without serious commitments of some kind by developing countries. 
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Of the many possible types of mitigation commitments of developing countries in a future 
framework, the following options/combinations appear to be most promising: 
Absolute emission targets: The target approach with legally binding, absolute emission 
reductions from a certain base-year used in the Kyoto Protocol has its advantages and 
disadvantages. On the negative side, it does not provide any support on how to reach these 
targets and needs to be supplemented with concrete measures. It also presumes the ability 
to gather and process large amounts of data – difficult for most countries except the most 
advanced. On the positive side, it provides for a high degree of stringency and certainty while 
at the same time leaving enough room for individual countries to choose the policies they 
think fit best to their particular circumstances, making the approach highly efficient. 
Absolute emission targets of the kind employed by the Kyoto Protocol for Annex B countries 
could also be a suitable commitment by the most advanced developing countries. These 
countries have the capability to act due to a comparatively high per capita income. At the 
same time they have high emissions and the necessary infrastructure to implement and 
monitor this kind of target, including inventories. 
Dual targets/no-lose targets: One way to render targets more suitable for less advanced 
developing countries is presented by so-called “dual targets”: Under this approach, a country 
would have two quantitative targets. If the lower target (meaning higher reductions) is 
reached, the country is in compliance and can sell the excess allowances on the carbon 
market. If the higher target is achieved (meaning lower reductions), this country would still be 
presumed to be in compliance but could not take part in emissions trading. Only if the higher 
target is exceeded the country would be in non-compliance. A variant of this proposal is 
called “no-lose” target: There is only one target and if this is reached, the country may take 
part in emissions trading. If the target is missed, nothing happens – a country can gain, but 
not lose under this approach (Philibert 2000). 
Dynamic sectoral no-lose targets: Dynamic sectoral no-lose targets could be suitable 
options for advanced developing countries. These countries have higher per capita income 
than the average group of non-Annex I countries. Their emissions are increasing 
considerably and different sectors might have the necessary prerequisites for no-lose 
targets. The difference to the no-lose targets described above lies in the fact that they, first, 
cover only certain sectors of a countries’ economy and, second, that they are “relative” 
targets, indexed to the production in the sector. For the electricity sector, for example, they 
could be expressed in terms of gCO2/kWh. 
Each country would first have to make a sound analysis of the emissions, efficiencies and 
future trajectories in the respective sectors. It would first quantify emissions under a 
reference scenario. It would then quantify the future emissions taking into account the 
policies that are already in place given domestic initiatives and international support. From 
that level a further reduction is made as the domestic contribution of each country. These 
emission levels could be the “no-lose” target. Any reductions below this level could be sold 
on the international market.  
For the sectors under the no-lose target, each country would not longer be eligible to 
implement CDM projects. In fact, the sectoral no-lose targets can be seen as sector-wide 
CDM projects. The no-lose target includes a domestic contribution and not all reductions 
below the baseline can be credited, but sector-wide implementation would lower transaction 
costs substantially and would attract a much higher investments and therefore can be more 
beneficial than only participating in CDM. 
It is up to each government how companies can benefit from the sales. E.g. each electricity 
producer could receive allowances if the installations emit below the dynamic target 
measured in kgCO2/kWh. Another option would be to implement a national emission trading 
system. 
Registry of sustainable development policies and measures: For the majority of 
developing countries, quantitative emission targets are not an option. An alternative 
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approach concentrates instead on specific policy objectives like a certain share of renewable 
energy or energy efficiency improvements. This type of target would take the development 
objectives of developing countries as a start and couple these with measures that achieve 
lower emissions than would be achieved under a business-as-usual case (Winkler et al. 
2002). If industrialised countries support these “Sustainable Development Policies and 
Measures” (SD PAMs) financially, this option is especially interesting for countries with a 
lower level of economic development. 
The registry of SD PAMs might be suitable for medium developing countries, such as India, 
with rapidly increasing emissions and low capability. However, it should be noted that the SD 
PAMs approach also requires a certain level of infrastructure. For example, more frequent 
submission of national communications is necessary to evaluate whether the registered SD 
PAMs are implemented. 
4. Brazil 
This and the following sections include the results of this project for Brazil, China, India, 
Mexico, South Africa and South Korea. 
 
4.1 Brazil in comparison to other countries  
Table 6 provides a range of energy and emission indicators. The right column shows in 
“performance meters” how Brazil performs compared to other countries. The data shows that 
Brazil ranks very high among developing countries with respect to its state of development. 
Its GDP per capita is above that of most developing countries and is at around world 
average. Brazil’s emissions per capita are around world average and increasing. Emissions 
from electricity generation and transport are relatively low due to the extensive use of 
hydropower in electricity generation and biofuels in the transport sector. On the other hand, 
emissions from agriculture and industry are relatively high.  
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Table 6. Energy and emission indicators for Brazil 
 Indicator Value Meter 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 
Cumulative emissions 1900 to 2004 per 
capita per year 1.7 tCO2eq/cap./y   
    
GDP per capita (2004) 8,100 US $ PPP 2000/cap. 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 
Human development index 2002 0.775 (medium) 
    
Past emission trend from 1990 to 2004 +35%  
Emissions per capita (2003) 5.2 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions per GDP (2004) 636 tCO2eq/MUS$ (2000) 
Emissions per kWh electricity (2003) 78 gCO2/kWh 
Energy efficiency in industry Low/medium  
Emissions in transport per capita 
(2003) 0.74 tCO2eq/cap 
Emissions in households and services 
per capita (2003) 0.20 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in agriculture per capita 
(2000) 3.22 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in waste per capita (2000) 0.24 tCO2eq/cap.  
P
ot
en
tia
l 
Emissions in land use change and 
forestry per capita (2000) 8.06 tCO2eq/cap. 
For detailed explanation of the meters and data sources see Appendix A. 
 
Figure 4 shows the shares of Brazil’s primary energy supply until 2003. Oil supplies 
constitute nearly half of Brazil’s primary energy demand (44%). About one quarter is supplied 
from biomass (26%). The share of residential use of biomass is very high but decreasing. 
Also hydropower is an important source for primary energy supply (14%), followed by coal 
(7%), gas (7%) and nuclear power (2%). 
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Primary energy supply
Share in 2003
Biomass/waste 26.3%
Solar/wind/other 0.0%
Geothermal
Hydro 13.8%
Nuclear 1.8%
Gas 6.7%
Oil 44.4%
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Figure 4. Brazil’s primary energy supply between 1990 and 2003 (IEA 2005b) 
Overall, the strong position of renewable sources in Brazil’s energy mix leads to 
comparatively low emission intensity in electricity generation. Due to Brazil’s level of 
development and its fuel mix, per capita emissions are low compared to industrialised 
countries but high compared to other Latin American countries.  
 
4.2 Reference emissions and mitigation potential 
Figure 5 below shows Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions under the business-as-usual 
scenario and all three reduction scenarios as calculated in this report. The scenario 
parameters are based on national studies as far as possible. Major sources for future data in 
Brazil are Centro Clima et al. (2006), USEPA (2006b) and trend extrapolation of official 
national and IEA statistics (IEA 2005a).  
As illustrated in Figure 5, the reduction potential for Brazil is 3% (no-regret), 6% (co-benefit) 
and 14% (ambitious potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the (1) 
transportation, (2) power and (3) industrial sector. The ambitious mitigation potential in the 
transportation sector is estimated at 164 MtCO2eq in 2020. In the power sector, there exists 
an ambitious potential of 120 MtCO2eq. The ambitious potential in the industrial sector is 
estimated at 59 MtCO2eq in 2020. The total ambitious mitigation potential in Brazil is 
estimated at 429 MtCO2eq in the year 2020. A detailed overview of the potential per sector 
and scenario can be found in Appendix B. 
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Figure 5. Scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions in Brazil between 1990 and 2020. 
 
Figure 6 shows Brazil’s total reduction potential on the sector level under the ambitious 
potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual scenario and the remaining emissions 
according to sectors.  
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Figure 6. Brazil’s emissions under the business-as-usual and the ambitious potential scenario 
on a sector basis between 1990 and 2020. Striped areas show the sectoral emission reduction 
potential under the ambitious potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual scenario. 
(Emissions from LUCF kept constant after 2003 due to data availability) 
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Most important findings for Brazil: 
- Brazil’s emissions are projected to increase constantly by about 1.2% per year 
between 2000 and 2020 due to development and a related increase of transport and 
energy demand per capita under the business-as-usual scenario. However, this trend 
could be changed considerably depending upon the policies and measures 
implemented to curb deforestation in the Amazon region, as the bulk of Brazilian 
GHG emissions comes from LUCF. This issue is mainly one of governance, as it 
relates to the capacity of enforcing already existing laws and regulations, and it is not 
easily translated into mitigation costs. 
- In 2000, most emissions resulted from LUCF and agriculture (85%), followed by the 
transport and the industry sectors (6-7% each). Under the business-as-usual 
scenario, this trend is assumed to be similar, but strongly influenced by the outcome 
of governance issues on LUCF emissions, as mentioned above. 
- Since power generation is largely based on hydropower, the emission reduction 
potential of current installations is limited. However, new capacity may be build based 
on fossil fuels. A crucial issue is the availability of financial resources to meet the 
large investment requirements associated with hydropower and sugar cane bagasse-
fired generation capacity. Potential for further hydropower is however decreasing. 
Distribution losses can be significantly reduced and efficiency improvements in the 
fossil fuel power plants are available. 
- The industry sector already uses a high share of renewable energy sources such as 
charcoal (if the wood is taken from the rain forest it is not considered renewable) and 
sugar cane bagasse. There is potential for energy efficiency improvements in many 
industrial branches, one fifth of which can be achieved at no costs. 
- Some limited reduction potential is available in the agricultural sector, e.g. through 
optimised use of fertilisers. 
- The transport sector offers big opportunities for mitigation. There is potential for 
significantly increasing the production and use of biofuels such as ethanol from sugar 
cane and biodiesel from vegetal oils. Energy efficiency improvements in vehicles 
(cars, trucks, buses) may play an important role. The building of energy efficient 
transport infrastructure both for passengers and freight (railways, waterways, mass 
public transportation) would be crucial to avoid the lock-in effect on GHG emissions 
from perpetuating the current overwhelming reliance on road and individual transport. 
- Under the no-regret potential scenario reductions of 3% below BAU (20% above 2005 
emissions) might be possible. Under the co-benefit potential scenario reductions of 
6% below BAU (16% above 2005 emissions) could be feasible. Under the ambitious 
potential scenario reductions of 14% below BAU (6% above 2005 emissions) might 
be possible. 
 
4.3 Existing and possible further national climate policies 
4.3.1 Overview of existing climate policies and measures 
This section gives a general overview of existing climate policies and measures in Brazil. For 
this purpose, we distinguish between policies and measures targeting energy efficiency 
improvements, renewable energy, and other relevant sources of GHG emissions. 
If not stated otherwise, the source for this section is Brazil’s first national communication 
(MCT 2004). Moreover, comments by a country expert for Brazil (Emilio Lèbre La Rovere) 
were also used for this section. 
Brazilian climate policy mainly focuses on the transport sector (substitution of petrol by 
bioethanol), the industry sector (energy efficiency improvements, substitution of fossil fuels 
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by charcoal and other biomass, promotion of natural gas) and power from renewable energy 
sources. Low-income households receive subsidised electricity tariffs. However, Brazil is 
lacking an adequate regulatory and financial framework that would reduce risks and allow 
accelerated investments in climate change mitigation options. 
A number of policies and measures targeting energy efficiency and demand-side 
management have been implemented in Brazil. The framework is set by the national 
electricity saving programme (PROCEL), which aims at increasing energy efficiency in the 
production and use of electricity. PROCEL’s target was to reduce electricity consumption and 
supply-side losses by about 8.4 terawatt-hours per year by 2003, equivalent to 2.5 percent of 
Brazil’s power consumption. The program has met these targets. Focus areas are energy 
labelling, minimum energy efficiency standards, energy audits, information campaigns, 
energy efficiency in public and residential buildings, demand-side management programmes 
by electric utilities, as well as technical and financial support for energy saving measures. 
Another important programme is the national programme for the rational use of fuel 
(CONPET). This programme targets fuel efficiency in different sectors through information 
measures such as labelling, energy audits or training activities. Furthermore, there are policy 
instruments such as tax incentives to purchase less powerful cars.  
Renewable energy is promoted through the programmes PROINFA and PROALCOOL. The 
programme PROINFA aims at increasing the electricity generating capacity from “new” RES 
by additional 3300 MW through guaranteed direct sales contracts by the year 2008. The 
main driver behind this target is to offset seasonality of the current hydro powered electricity 
supplies. Brazil has the long-term goal to increase the share of “new” RES to 15% of the 
primary energy supply until 2020. PROALCOOL aims at substituting petrol by bioethanol in 
the transportation sector. The programme is a very successful climate policy instrument in 
Brazil. Today, Brazil is a leading country in the production of bioethanol and has relatively 
low emissions in the transport sector. The success has been achieved by subsidising 
sugarcane and ethanol production, a lower price for bioethanol compared to petrol set by the 
government and a large research programme.  
Only a small number of climate policies and measures targeting other relevant sources of 
GHG emissions are in place in Brazil. These instruments include programmes to monitor 
and decrease the deforestation of rainforests, strategies focusing on utilising landfill gas or 
emission standards for vehicles and air quality in general (e.g. the national programme on air 
quality, PRONAR). 
 
4.3.2 Suggestions for additional climate policy instruments and 
measures 
The following section analyses the existing climate policies and measures for sectors with 
the highest GHG emissions reduction potential in Brazil. Based on the sourcebook, we 
provide suggestions for improving the existing mix of climate policy instruments and 
measures with additional policies and measures in order to exploit the full GHG emissions 
reduction potential. The three sectors with the highest GHG emissions reduction potential 
between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the (1) transportation, (2) power and (3) 
industrial sector. 
Climate policy measures and instruments for which the country needs predominantly 
financial assistance from Annex I countries are highlighted in italics in the following tables. 
Such instruments are mainly investment support or RD&D schemes. Section 2.3 presents 
more generally which category of policy instruments is considered appropriate for addressing 
the no-regret, co-benefits, and ambitious potential, respectively. 
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4.3.2.1 Transport 
This section makes suggestions for improving the existing mix of climate policy instruments 
in the transportation sector.  
Table 7: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving the 
existing policy mix in the transportation sector (Climate policy measures and instruments for 
which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy   
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Energy taxation on fossil fuels 
• Phase-out of subsidies and tax 
exemptions for vehicle fuels 
• Domestic emission trading scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• National alcohol programme 
(Proalcool) 
• Tax incentives for less powerful 
vehicles 
 
 
• Road fees, congestion charges 
• CO2 differentiated vehicle taxation 
• Depreciation rules favouring 
energy efficient vehicles 
• Financial support for switching from 
road-based to rail- or waterway 
based transportation 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Programme for air pollution from 
automotive vehicles (PROCONVE) 
 
• Average specific emissions target 
for new vehicles regarding GHG 
emissions 
• Dynamic MEPS for vehicle 
components 
• Tighter speed limits 
• Spatial planning favouring non-
motorised and public transport 
• Integrated transport planning 
Information and know-
how transfer 
• Driver training programmes for 
truck drivers 
 
• Vehicle labelling 
• Driver training programmes for car 
and bus drivers 
• Promotion of public transport 
Research and technology 
transfer  
• National alcohol programme 
(Proalcool)  
• Research on sustainable 
transportation systems 
 
The existing mix of climate policy instruments and measures in the Brazilian transportation 
sector consists of several instruments. They include mainly targeted economic and fiscal 
policies (e.g. financial support for bioethanol production, tax incentives for less powerful 
cars), regulations (e.g. emission standards) and research activities (research on using 
bioethanol from sugarcane as a fuel). 
The ambitious potential of about 164 MtCO2eq in 2020 in the transportation sector can be 
realised by introducing a number of additional climate policies and measures. Section 2.3 
presents more generally which category of policy instruments is considered appropriate for 
addressing the no-regret, co-benefits, and ambitious potential, respectively. 
Potential additional cross-cutting policy instruments are a phase out of subsidies and the 
introduction of energy taxation on fossil fuels as well as a domestic emission trading scheme 
in the transport sector (connected to setting an average specific emission target, cf. below).  
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Aiming at different fields of application (individual motor car transport, air transport, public 
transport and freight transport), additional policy instruments could support the realisation of 
the ambitious potential. For targeting vehicles, several policy instruments are available. Such 
policy instruments could be targeted economic and fiscal policies and measures like for 
example road charges, a CO2-differentiated vehicle taxation or favourable depreciation rules 
for efficient vehicles. Regulations could consist of setting average specific emission targets 
for new vehicles, dynamic minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) for vehicle 
components, tighter speed limits, or integrated transport planning. Additional climate policy 
instruments of the category information and know how transfer could be vehicle labelling, 
driver training programmes for car and bus drivers or promotion of public transport. A shift 
from road-based to rail- or waterway-based transport can be induced by direct financial 
support such as tax reductions or subsidies. However, a functioning regulatory and financial 
framework is needed, which reduces risks and fosters investments in such infrastructure. 
 
4.3.2.2 Power 
This section outlines existing climate policies and measures in the power sector. Suggestions 
for improving the existing climate policy mix are made in order to exploit the GHG emissions 
reduction potential.  
Table 8: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving the 
existing policy mix in the power and heat sector (Climate policy measures and instruments for 
which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • Goal of a power generating 
capacity from RES of 3300 MW 
until 2008, long-term goal of a 15% 
RES share of the primary energy 
supply until 2020 
• Renewable energy targets for heat 
and cold supply 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Ecological finance reform 
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
• Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-
efficiency and RES 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• PROINFA: Guaranteed sales 
contracts for electricity from 
renewable energy sources 
• PROCEL: Financial incentives for 
reducing supply side losses 
• Financial support for the installation 
of RES technologies for cold and 
heat 
• Investment support for 
improvements in the conversion 
efficiency of fossil fuel power plants 
(linked to MEPS, see below) 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
 • Favourable regulations on grid 
access and power purchase 
agreements for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Create target for reduction of 
annual energy consumption from 
DSM by utilities of 1% per year 
(compared against the baseline)  
• Accelerated building permission 
procedures for RES and CHP 
plants 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
• Building codes with stringent 
energy efficiency levels and a 
mandatory share of RES for heat 
and cold 
• Dynamic minimum conversion 
efficiency standards, regularly 
updated 
• “CCS-ready” obligation for new-
built power plants 
Information and know-
how transfer 
 • Network of local actors 
• Demonstration and training on RES 
technologies targeting contractors, 
retails sales staff, architects and 
engineers 
Research and technology 
transfer  
• Research on utilising landfill gas • RD&D schemes for accelerated 
development, technical 
improvement and market 
introduction of RES technologies 
for electricity, heat and cold, 
efficient fossil fuel power plants, 
and for analysis of CCS 
• Public and co-operative 
procurement of RES technologies 
 
A number of additional climate policies and measures are suggested for strengthening the 
existing mix in the power sector in order to exploit the ambitious potential of 120 MtCO2eq in 
the year 2020. 
The framework for realising further emission reduction potential in the power sector could be 
set by an ecological finance reform, a domestic emissions trading scheme and a gradual 
phase out of fossil fuel subsidies, backed by technical and financial support for RES 
technologies and energy efficiency. This could contribute to levelling the playing field for RES 
and energy efficiency technologies. 
The existing programme targeting RES technologies (PROINFA) provides a good starting 
point for increasing the share of renewable electricity in Brazil. However, strengthening the 
existing RES programme with additional policy instruments such as favourable regulations 
on grid access and power purchase or accelerated building permission procedures for RES 
and CHP plants, information measures such as networks of local actors or demonstration 
and training on RES technologies for relevant actors could improve the effectiveness of the 
existing policy instruments in this field. Furthermore, research in RES technologies and 
public and co-operative procurement schemes for such technologies could also be feasible 
policy instruments. 
RES technologies for heat and cold could contribute to reducing fossil fuel and electricity 
consumption for these fields of application. Based on a target for heat and cold from RES, 
additional policy instruments like direct investment support, building codes with stringent 
energy efficiency levels and a mandatory share of RES for heating and cooling, or training 
activities for relevant actors would help to realise the emission reduction potential in this field. 
Additional policies and measures for promoting efficient fossil fuel power plants could be 
targeted financial policies such as investment support for power plants with a high 
conversion efficiency, regulation such as minimum standards for the conversion efficiency of 
new built plants or a RD&D scheme. 
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Requiring new-built fossil fuel power plants to be designed “capture ready” could bring CCS 
forward. This would also have indirect implications on energy prices and make energy from 
fossil fuels more expensive. Support and co-operation with Annex I countries will be needed 
in this field. 
GHG emissions stemming from the power production sector can also be indirectly targeted. 
Climate policy instruments and measures aiming at improving energy end-use efficiency and 
energy conservation in households or industry have an effect on the country’s energy 
demand. Especially for the household sector, a promising policy instrument, the national 
electricity saving programme (PROCEL), is already in place. The programme consists of a 
package of regulatory (e.g. MEPS), information (e.g. energy labelling) and targeted policy 
instruments (e.g. funding for DSM activities). A more detailed discussion of additional policy 
instruments for improving energy end-use efficiency in the household and service sector can 
be found in the sourcebook (see Appendix C). 
 
4.3.2.3 Industry 
Suggestions for improving the climate policy mix in the industrial sector are made in the 
following.  
Table 9: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving the 
existing policy mix in the industrial sector (Climate policy measures and instruments for which 
the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are highlighted in 
italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • National electricity saving 
programme (PROCEL) 
• National programme for the rational 
use of fuel (CONPET) 
 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy 
efficiency and RES 
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Direct investment support for 
energy efficiency measures 
• Enhanced financial support for the 
optimisation and installation of 
energy-efficient technologies linked 
to energy audits and management 
systems 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• MEPS for electric motors  • Minimum energy efficiency 
standards (for energy using 
equipment as well as included in 
building permits for new industrial 
production facilities) 
Information and know-
how transfer 
• Energy audits 
• Load management 
• Training activities 
• Energy management systems 
Research and technology 
transfer  
• Research activities • RD&D scheme for energy efficient 
production technologies and 
methods 
 
For exploiting the ambitious potential of 59 MtCO2eq in 2020 in the industrial sector, the 
following additional climate policies and measures are suggested. 
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Cross-cutting issues are the gradual phase-out of subsidies for energy from fossil fuels and 
the potential introduction of a domestic emissions trading scheme. 
In Brazil, promising climate policy instruments targeting the industrial sector such as the 
national electricity saving programme (PROCEL) and the national programme for the rational 
use of fuel (CONPET) are already in place. These programmes consist of a package of 
different instruments such as investment support for energy efficiency measures, MEPS for 
electric motors, or energy audits. A number of additional policy instruments can contribute to 
realising the emissions reduction potential. Such policy instruments include enhanced direct 
financial support for energy efficiency measures, which should be combined with energy 
audits and energy management systems, an extension of MEPS to other appliances and 
fields of application, energy management systems, as well as RD&D on energy efficient 
production technologies and methods. 
 
4.4 Options for a stronger involvement of Brazil in the international 
regime 
Brazil has so far not been very positive about taking on international commitments to protect 
the climate. It rather stressed the responsibility of Annex I countries for reducing GHG 
emissions, as evidenced by the “Brazilian proposal”. Recently, Brazil showed some 
willingness to take on sectoral commitments. Brazil is a speaker of the G77/China and in this 
position blocks the attempt of Annex I countries to require more frequent submissions of 
National Communications and Inventories, which would be a prerequisite for any country-
wide commitment.  
 
4.4.1 Analysis 
Brazil has the responsibility, capability and potential to make a contribution to the 
international effort to reducing emissions. Brazil is still a developing country and its indicators 
are only at the very low end of the range of those of Annex I countries. But Brazil could be 
capable of handling an emission limitation or reduction target of limited scope and stringency 
compared to those of Annex I countries: 
• Responsibility: Brazil’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions 
excluding LULUCF is below world average but above non-Annex I average. With 
LULUCF emissions it is likely to be higher, but sound historical estimates of 
emissions from the LULCUF sector are not available. 
• Capability: Brazil’s per capita income is about world average. However, the regional 
and social income distribution is still very unequal. Its human development index is far 
above world average. It has in place many initiatives, laws and standards to reduce 
the emission intensity of electricity, transport and industry. But some institutional 
difficulties exist in terms of implementing policies. 
• Potential: Despite the high share of renewable sources in electricity production, Brazil 
has a substantial mitigation potential. According to the figures from Phase II of the 
project, the no-regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions below BAU levels amounts 
to 104 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 187 Mt and the ambitious mitigation potential to 
429 MtCO2eq. These would be equal to a 3%, 6% or 14% reduction compared to 
BAU levels respectively and a 20%, 16% or 6% increase compared to 2005 
emissions levels. 
Earlier analyses also put Brazil at a high level compared to other developing countries. Ott et 
al. (2004) classify Brazil as “rapidly industrialising country” implying an absolute limitation 
target if funding and technology are provided by Annex I countries. Others find that Brazil 
would have to accede to Annex I soon if emissions/capita or GDP/capita thresholds were 
applied (Gupta 2003; Höhne et al. 2005). 
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In addition, Brazil disposes of the technical capacity necessary to quantify emissions and 
reductions. National statistics for Brazil are available and they include economic, financial, 
social, energy and industry indicators (IBGE 2006; MME 2006). In the National 
Communication, detailed GHG emission data are available for all gases and sectors for 1990 
and 1994 (MCT 2004). GHG emissions data for more recent years exist, but are not officially 
published. Existing institutions in Brazil have the ability to quantify future emissions and the 
effect of policies (e.g. La Rovere and do Valle Costa 2005). Already in the Initial National 
Communication (MCT 2004) estimates were made on emission reductions due to single 
policies, e.g. taxes.  
 
4.4.2 Suggestions for a potential contribution 
Given the amount of global emission reductions required to keep temperature change below 
2°C and based on the above analysis, we suggest that it would be equitable and feasible for 
Brazil to commit to an absolute country-wide no-lose emission target.  
We propose two options for the level of stringency based on the assessment of what amount 
of reductions is necessary by 2020 to bring global emissions on a 2°C trajectory (see section 
11): 
The target could either be set at a stringent level correlated to the ambitious potential as 
analysed in this project, but implementation be made contingent on the provision of financial 
and technical support from Annex I countries. The target would in this case amount to about 
2,555 MtCO2eq annual emissions in 2020, 14% below the BAU level. 
Alternatively, the target could be set at a less stringent level, for instance correlated to the 
co-benefit mitigation potential. This target would amount to about 2,796 MtCO2eq, 16% 
above 2005 levels. Brazil could then nevertheless implement ambitious policies and 
measures to overachieve the target and sell the resulting surplus on the carbon market. This 
alternative would require less direct financial and technical support from Annex I countries 
but more support through the carbon market and hence emission reduction targets for Annex 
I countries of 45% compared to 1990, as opposed to the -30% target as assumed in the 
option above. 
If a country-wide target is not politically feasible, a second-best option could be to implement 
sectoral or policy-based CDM projects in the power, industry and transport sectors. 
Sectoral/policy CDM would probably be politically more acceptable for developing countries. 
However, the technical implementation of sectoral/policy CDM and sectoral no-lose targets 
would probably be very similar and no-lose targets have a twofold advantage over 
sectoral/policy CDM: first, there would be no need to assess the additionality of emission 
reductions, and second, no-lose targets open the opportunity to achieve net reductions, 
namely the difference between BAU and the target. Under the CDM, by contrast, everything 
below BAU would be credited and lead to higher emissions in Annex I countries.  
5. China 
5.1 China in comparison to other countries 
Table 10 provides a range of energy and emission indicators. The right column shows how 
China performs compared to other countries. The basic data illustrates that China ranks at 
around the average of developing countries with respect to its state of development. Its 
emissions and GDP per capita are slightly above non-Annex I average. China has 
experienced strong economic and emission growth in the last 5 years. Growth rates are 
among the highest in the world. China is strongly dependant on coal; its emissions per kWh 
electricity are among the highest in the world. China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP 
declined by about 50% between 1990 and 2002 (NDRC 2004).  
 74
Table 10. Energy and emission indicators for China 
 Indicator Value Meter 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 
Cumulative emissions 1900 to 2004 per 
capita per year 1.1 tCO2eq/cap./y   
    
GDP per capita (2004) 5,700 US $ PPP 2000/cap. 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 
Human development index 2002 0.745 (medium) 
    
Past emission trend from 1990 to 2004 +48%  
Emissions per capita (2003) 3.9 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions per GDP (2004) 688 tCO2eq/MUS$ (2000) 
Emissions per kWh electricity (2003) 771 gCO2/kWh 
Energy efficiency in industry Low  
Emissions in transport per capita 
(2003) 0.22 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in households and services 
per capita (2003) 0.34 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in agriculture per capita 
(2000) 0.83 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in waste per capita (2000) 0.13 tCO2eq/cap.  
P
ot
en
tia
l 
Emissions in land use change and 
forestry per capita (2000) -0.04 tCO2eq/cap. 
For detailed explanation of the meters and data sources see Appendix A. 
 
Figure 7 shows the shares of China’s energy sources up to the year 2003. Coal is by far the 
most important energy source (60% in 2003). Oil (20%), biomass and waste (15%) also 
contribute considerably to total primary energy supply. Gas, nuclear energy and hydropower 
only play a minor role. Lately the use of oil and gas has increased while the share of coal has 
declined (Chandler et al. 2002). The share of biomass is significant but decreasing. 
China is the largest coal producing and consuming country (Jiang et al. 2003). Coal is 
responsible for about 80% of national emissions. China’s remaining proven coal reserves 
could be large, but depending on the source the figures vary. Coal is assumed to be the 
dominant energy source for the future (World Bank 2006). Also for oil and natural gas 
considerable domestic resources are available. There is furthermore a huge potential of 
renewable energy sources, such as hydropower, biomass, wind, solar and geothermal (van 
Vuuren et al. 2003). 
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Figure 7. China’s primary energy supply between 1990 and 2003 (IEA 2005b) 
Apart from the high share of coal, the low energy efficiency and the importance of the energy 
intensive industry for the national economy are currently responsible for China’s relatively 
high emissions. Despite the unequalled reduction of energy and emission intensity combined 
with high economic growth, China’s energy intensity is still very high compared to that of 
industrialised countries. 
Overall, China is classified as country with a medium human development. Its per capita 
income is on a developing country average level. The dominance of coal in China’s energy 
mix and the comparatively low energy efficiency leads to high emission intensity in electricity 
generation. The overall per capita emissions are still low. Nevertheless, its national 
emissions are high, also due to substantial exports (Arquit Niederberger et al. 2006, to be 
published). Although China’s energy intensity declined considerably during the last decades, 
its absolute energy demand strongly increased. This trend makes China a very important 
party in the future global climate regime.  
 
5.2 Reference emissions and mitigation potential 
Figure 8 below shows China’s greenhouse gas emissions under the business-as-usual 
scenario and all three reduction scenarios calculated in this project. The scenario parameters 
are based on national studies as far as possible. Major sources for future data in China are 
Chen et al. 2006; USEPA 2006b and trend extrapolation of national and IEA statistics (IEA 
2006). 
As illustrated in Figure 8, the reduction potential for China is 8% (no-regret), 15% (co-benefit) 
and 32% (ambitious potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the (1) 
power, (2) industrial and (3) transportation sector. In the power sector, there exists an 
ambitious mitigation potential of 1322 MtCO2eq in 2020. The ambitious potential in the 
industry sector is estimated at 770 MtCO2eq. In the transportation sector, there is an 
ambitious potential of about 395 MtCO2eq. The total ambitious mitigation potential in China is 
estimated at 2930 MtCO2eq in the year 2020. A detailed overview of the potential per sector 
and scenario can be found in Appendix B. 
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Figure 8. Scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions in China between 1990 and 2020. 
 
Figure 9 shows China’s total reduction potential on the sector level under the ambitious 
potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual scenario and the remaining emissions 
according to sectors. 
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Figure 9. China’s emissions under the business-as-usual and the ambitious potential scenario 
on a sector basis between 1990 and 2020. Striped areas show the sectoral emission reduction 
potential under the ambitious potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual scenario. 
(Emissions from LUCF kept constant after 2003 due to data availability) 
 
Most important findings for China: 
- China’s emissions are projected to increase by about 3.3% per year between 2000 
and 2020 under the business-as-usual scenario.  
 77
- In 2000 most emissions resulted from power production, agriculture and industry 
(31%, 25%, and 23% respectively). Under the business-as-usual scenario, this trend 
is projected to be more or less similar, although the importance of power production 
will increase slightly, while the share of agriculture will decrease. 
- In the power sector, a major reduction opportunity would be to move away from coal 
to renewable energy sources (under optimistic assumptions). Energy end-use 
efficiency especially in industry can contribute with reductions. We also assumed 1% 
of electricity generation with CCS technology by 2020 as ambitious potential. 
- In industry, the move to renewable energy sources, efficiency improvements and 
process changes are major reduction options. 
- Reduction options in agriculture are limited. 
- In the transport sector reduction options are considerable compared to the share of 
transport in overall emissions but limited regarding national emissions as a whole. 
Options are e.g. to increase the share of natural gas, efficiency gains, especially in 
aviation and road transport, and a shift to increase the relative share of rail and 
shipping.  
- Under the no-regret potential scenario reductions of 8% below BAU (36% above 2005 
emissions) might be possible. Under the co-benefit potential scenario reductions of 
15% below BAU (27% above 2005 emissions) could be feasible. Under the ambitious 
potential scenario overall emission reductions of 32% below BAU (1% above 2005 
emissions) might be possible. 
 
5.3 Existing and possible further national climate policies 
5.3.1 Overview of existing climate policies and measures 
This section provides a general overview of existing climate policies and measures in China. 
For this purpose, we distinguish between policies and measures targeting energy efficiency 
improvements, renewable energy and other relevant sources of GHG emissions. If not stated 
otherwise, sources for this section include NDRC (2004; 2006), Peiyan (2005), Government 
China (2004; 2005) and Jiang et al (2003). 
Climate policy in China is mainly implemented and enforced at the regional level. The central 
government imposes standards that often have the form of directives and leaves their 
implementation and enforcement to the local governments. Often, local governments do not 
have the capacity or will to implement such policies. There is little experience with market-
based mechanisms, while energy efficiency standards and voluntary agreements are widely-
used policy instruments. An important driver for implementing climate policy instruments is 
combating air pollution and securing energy supply. The main focus of climate policy in 
China is on reducing the energy intensity of its economy. Framework policies include China’s 
National Climate Change Programme (outlines China’s energy policy until 2010) and the 11th 
five year plan, which foresees an energy intensity target (-20% until 2010) and a pollution 
reduction target (-10% until 2010).  
A number of policies and measures targeting energy efficiency and demand side 
management have been implemented in China. The framework is set by the energy intensity 
target of the 11th five year plan. Furthermore, there are instruments targeting different sectors 
such as the law on energy conservation (targeting energy intensive products) or programmes 
consisting of MEPS and energy labelling. For the industrial sector, the 1000 enterprises 
programme (voluntary agreements between the government and the energy intensive 
companies) is one major instrument. Other important instruments include energy 
conservation management systems or standards on industrial energy efficiency. For the 
residential and commercial sector, instruments such as guidelines and standards for energy 
conservation in buildings, the China energy label or public procurement of energy saving 
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products have been implemented. Energy consumption standards for cars have been set for 
targeting energy efficiency in the transportation sector. However, consumers of energy 
receive subsidies and often do not have to pay directly for their individual consumption (e.g. 
energy consumption for heating is charged according to square meters and not according to 
actual consumption). For energy efficiency on the supply side, there is a programme aiming 
at the upgrading of existing coal power plants. 
The framework for promoting renewable energy is outlined by the renewable energy target 
(15% renewable energy in total energy supply by 2020). Another important climate policy 
instrument is the renewable energy law, which sets the financial and regulative framework for 
renewable electricity production. However, a pitfall of the law can be seen in the fact that 
selling green electricity to the grid is often connected with difficulties for the producers. 
Furthermore, there is a law targeting electricity production from wind, which puts trade 
restrictions on the import of wind power equipment from outside China. 
A number of climate policies and measures targeting other relevant sources of GHG 
emissions are in place in China. These instruments include programmes targeting waste 
reduction and minimisation and a law on cleaner production aiming at GHG emissions from 
the waste sector. In the agricultural sector, there are standards on the rational use of 
fertilisers; requirements to built manure treatment facilities, a law protecting grasslands and a 
campaign promoting organic farming. 
 
5.3.2 Suggestions for additional climate policy instruments and 
measures 
The following section analyses the existing climate policies and measures for sectors with 
the highest GHG emissions reduction potential in China. Based on the sourcebook, we make 
suggestions for improving the existing mix of climate policy instruments and measures with 
additional policies and measures in order to exploit the full GHG emissions reduction 
potential. The three sectors with the highest GHG emissions reduction potential between 
2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the (1) power, (2) industrial and (3) transportation 
sector.  
Climate policy measures and instruments for which the country needs financial assistance 
from Annex I countries are highlighted in italics in the following tables. Such instruments are 
mainly investment support or RD&D schemes. Section 2.3 presents more generally which 
category of policy instruments is considered appropriate for addressing the no-regret, co-
benefits, and ambitious potential, respectively. 
 
5.3.2.1 Power 
This section outlines existing climate policies and measures in the power sector. Suggestions 
for improving the existing climate policy mix are given in order to exploit the GHG emissions 
reduction potential.  
Table 11: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the power and heat sector (Climate policy measures and instruments 
for which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • Overall renewable energy target • Specific renewable energy targets 
for electricity, heat and cold supply 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Ecological finance reform 
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
• Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy 
efficiency and RES 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Renewable energy law 
• Projects and policies to improve the 
infrastructure for gas transmission 
• Financial support for the installation 
of RES technologies for cold and 
heat 
• Investment support for 
improvements in the conversion 
efficiency of fossil fuel power plants 
(linked to MEPS, see below) 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Wind power Construction 
Administration  
• Up scaling of power generation 
plants (“guimohua programme”) 
• Favourable regulations on grid 
access and power purchase 
agreements for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Create target for electric utilities 
and other energy companies to 
reduce annual energy consumption 
through DSM by 1% per year 
(compared to the baseline, i.e. 
compared to business-as-usual)  
• Accelerated building permission 
procedures for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Building codes with stringent 
energy efficiency levels and a 
mandatory share of RES for heat 
and cold 
• Dynamic minimum conversion 
efficiency standards, regularly 
updated 
• “CCS-ready” obligation for new 
built power plants 
Information and know-
how transfer 
 • Network of local actors 
• Demonstration and training on RES 
and CHP technologies targeting 
contractors, retails sales staff, 
architects and engineers 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • RD&D schemes for accelerated 
development, technical 
improvement, and market 
introduction of RES and CHP 
technologies for electricity, heat 
and cold, efficient fossil fuel power 
plants and for analysis of CCS 
• Public and co-operative 
procurement of RES and CHP 
technologies 
 
A number of additional climate policies and measures are suggested for strengthening the 
existing mix in the power sector in order to exploit the ambitious potential of 1322 MtCO2eq in 
the year 2020.  
The framework for realising further emission reduction potential in the power sector could be 
set by an ecological finance reform, a domestic emissions trading scheme, and a gradual 
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phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies backed by technical and financial support for RES 
technologies and energy (end-use) efficiency. This could contribute to levelling the playing 
field for RES and energy efficiency technologies. 
The existing target for RES and the renewable energy law provide a good starting point for 
increasing the share of renewable electricity in China.  
However, strengthening the existing RES programme with additional policy instruments such 
as favourable regulations on grid access and power purchase or accelerated building 
permission procedures for RES and CHP plants, information measures such as networks of 
local actors, or demonstration and training on RES technologies for relevant actors could 
improve the effectiveness of the existing policy instruments in this field. Furthermore, 
research in RES technologies and public and co-operative procurement schemes for such 
technologies could also be feasible policy instruments for increasing the share of RES. 
RES technologies for heat and cold could contribute to reducing fossil fuel and electricity 
consumption for these fields of application. Based on a target for heat and cold from RES, 
additional policy instruments like direct investment support, building codes with stringent 
energy efficiency levels and a mandatory share of RES for heating and cooling, or training 
activities for relevant actors help to realise the emission reduction potential in this field. 
Additional policies and measures for promoting efficient fossil fuel power plants could be 
targeted financial policies such as investment support for power plants with high conversion 
efficiency, regulation such as minimum standards for the conversion efficiency of new built 
plants, or a RD&D scheme. 
Requiring new built fossil fuel power plants to be designed “capture ready” could bring CCS 
forward. This would also have indirect implications on energy prices and make energy from 
fossil fuels more expensive. Support and co-operation with Annex I countries will be 
particularly needed in this field. 
GHG emissions stemming from the power production sector can also be indirectly targeted. 
Climate policy instruments and measures aiming at improving energy end-use efficiency and 
energy conservation in households, services, or industry have an effect on the country’s 
energy demand. Especially for the household sector, promising policy instruments such as 
building standards or the China energy label are already in place.  
A more detailed discussion of additional policy instruments for improving energy end-use 
efficiency in the household and service sector can be found in the sourcebook. 
 
5.3.2.2 Industry 
Suggestions for improving the climate policy mix in the industrial sector are made in the 
following.  
Table 12: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the industrial sector (Climate policy measures and instruments for 
which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • Medium- and Long-term Plan for 
Energy Conservation 
 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Energy tax under discussion • Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-
efficiency and RES 
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Green credits • Financial support for the 
optimisation and installation of 
energy efficient technologies linked 
to energy audits and management 
systems 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Top 1000 Enterprises Programme 
• Energy efficiency standards 
• Extension of the existing minimum 
energy efficiency standards (for 
energy using equipment as well as 
building permits for new industrial 
production facilities) 
Information and know-
how transfer 
• Energy conservation management 
system 
• Environmental friendly company 
status 
• Energy management systems 
• Energy audits 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • RD&D scheme for energy efficient 
production technologies and 
methods 
 
For exploiting the ambitious potential of 770 MtCO2eq in 2020 in the industrial sector, the 
following additional climate policies and measures are suggested. 
Cross-cutting issues are the gradual phase out of subsidies for energy from fossil fuels and 
the potential introduction of a domestic emissions trading scheme. 
In China, some promising climate policy instruments targeting the industrial sector are 
already in place, such as plans for energy conservation, voluntary agreements like the top 
1000 enterprises programme (agreement of the top 1000 energy-intensive companies to 
reduce their energy consumption), energy efficiency standards for equipment or information 
measures such as energy conservation management systems or the environmental friendly 
company status which also includes “green credits” (allowance of credits is connected to the 
environmental performance of a company). 
A number of additional policy instruments can contribute in realising the emission reduction 
potential. Such policy instruments include direct financial support for energy efficiency 
measures (should be combined with energy audits and energy management systems), an 
extension of MEPS to other appliances and fields of application, energy management 
systems as well as RD&D on energy efficient production technologies and methods. 
 
5.3.2.3 Transport 
This section makes suggestions for improving the mix of climate policy instruments in the 
transportation sector.  
Table 13: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the transportation sector (Climate policy measures and instruments 
for which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • Policy framework for improving 
public transport 
 
• Targets/quotas for biofuels 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Tax exemptions for sustainable 
biofuels 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
• Energy taxation on fuels 
• Phase-out of subsidies and tax 
exemptions for vehicle fuels 
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Road fees, congestion charges 
• CO2-differentiated vehicle taxation 
• Depreciation rules favouring 
energy efficient vehicles 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Energy consumption standards for 
cars 
 
• Dynamic MEPS for vehicles 
components 
• Tighter speed limits 
• Spatial planning favouring non-
motorised and public transport 
• Integrated transport planning 
Information and know-
how transfer 
 • Vehicle labelling 
• Driver training programmes 
• Promotion of public transport 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • Research on sustainable 
transportation systems 
 
Currently, GHG emissions of the transportation sector in China are mainly targeted by 
energy consumption standards for cars. Moreover, there are efforts aiming at improving 
public transport or temporarily rationing of petrol due to shortages in supply. 
The ambitious potential of about 395 MtCO2eq in 2020 in the transport sector can be realised 
by introducing a number of additional climate policies and measures.  
Cross-cutting policy instruments are a phase out of subsidies and price setting by the 
government as well as energy taxation on fuels. Furthermore, a domestic emission trading 
scheme in the transport sector could also be a feasible instrument (connected to an average 
specific emission target).  
Aiming at different fields of application (biofuels, individual motor car transport, air transport, 
public transport and freight transport), additional policy instruments could support the 
realisation of the ambitious potential. Policy instruments for targeting biofuels include a quota 
and tax exemptions. For targeting vehicles, a number of different policy instruments are 
available. Such policy instruments could be targeted economic and fiscal policies and 
measures such as road charges, CO2-differentiated vehicle taxation or favourable 
depreciation rules for efficient vehicles. Standards could consist of dynamic MEPS for vehicle 
components, speed limits or integrated transport planning. Additional climate policy 
instruments of the category information and know how transfer could be vehicle labelling, 
driver training programmes or promotion of public transport. A shift from road-based to rail- 
or waterway-based transport can be induced by direct financial support such as tax 
reductions or subsidies. 
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5.4 Options for a stronger involvement of China in the international 
regime 
China has consistently stressed the responsibility of Annex I countries for the climate 
problem. Regarding potential commitments by non-Annex I countries, however, China has 
recently softened its position and indicated the readiness to take on sectoral commitments in 
return for technology transfer. Technology transfer is crucial for China in order to ensure a 
steady energy supply for its rapid economic development. Therefore, China is keen on 
enhancing technology cooperation, as evidenced by its proposal to establish an international 
fund to purchase intellectual property rights. 
 
5.4.1 Analysis 
China has slightly more responsibility and capability than the average of the developing 
countries and has very large potential to mitigate emissions. Therefore, efforts have to be 
made to stabilise emissions with support by other countries: 
• Responsibility: China’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions 
excluding LULUCF is at about non-Annex I average compared on a per capita basis. 
Its current per capita emissions are above non-Annex I average. In absolute terms 
considering all gases and sources, China is almost equal to the USA, the largest 
emitter in the World, and emissions are rapidly increasing. 
• Capability: Per capita income is slightly above developing country average and the 
human development index score is medium. Income is very unequally distributed 
amongst the population. 
• Potential: The mitigation potential is very high. According to the figures from Phase II 
of the project, the no-regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions below BAU levels 
amounts to 777 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 1,342 Mt and the ambitious mitigation 
potential to 2,930 MtCO2eq. These would be equal to an 8%, 15% or 32% reduction 
compared to BAU levels respectively and a 36%, 27% or 1% increase compared to 
2005 emissions levels.  
Earlier analyses put China at medium/high level compared to other developing countries. Ott 
et al. (2004) classify China as “rapidly industrialising country” implying an absolute limitation 
target if funding and technology is provided by Annex I countries. Others find that China 
would have to take on further action in the early half of this century if emissions/capita or 
emissions/GDP are applied (Gupta 2003; Höhne et al. 2005).  
China has some of the capacity necessary to quantify emissions and reductions in place. 
Comprehensive statistics do exist in China, which include mainly economic, financial, social 
and energy-related indicators but also data on environmental protection (NBS 2006). Energy 
consumption per unit of GDP is already estimated each month. In addition, some data are 
available on Chinese greenhouse gas emission in the National Communication (Government 
China 2004). Additional data are available, but have not officially been published.  
 
5.4.2 Suggestions for a potential contribution 
Given the amount of global emission reductions required to keep temperature change below 
2°C and based on the above analysis, we suggest that it would be equitable and feasible for 
China to commit to no-lose sectoral targets for the power production, iron/steel and cement 
sectors, where relatively good data are available. 
We propose two options for the level of stringency of the no-lose targets based on the 
assessment of what amount of reductions is necessary by 2020 to bring global emissions on 
a 2°C trajectory (see section 11): 
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The target could either be set at a stringent level correlated to the ambitious mitigation 
potential but implementation be made contingent on the provision of financial and technical 
support from Annex I countries. The total target for the covered sectors would in this case 
amount to annual emissions of about 2,754 MtCO2 in 2020, about 39% below the BAU level. 
Alternatively, the targets could be set at a lower level, for instance at the level indicated by 
the co-benefit mitigation potential. In this case the total target for all covered sectors would 
amount to 3,678 MtCO2, about 19% below BAU levels. China could then nevertheless 
implement ambitious policies and measures to overachieve the target and sell the resulting 
surplus on the carbon market. This alternative would require less direct financial and non-
financial support from Annex I countries but more support through the carbon market and 
hence more stringent emission reduction targets for Annex I countries of 45% compared to 
1990 as opposed to -30% as assumed for the option above. 
If targets are not politically feasible, a second-best option could be to implement sectoral or 
policy-based CDM projects in the power production, iron/steel and cement sectors. Sectoral 
CDM would probably be politically more acceptable for developing countries. However, the 
technical implementation of sectoral CDM and sectoral no-lose targets would probably be 
very similar and no-lose targets have a twofold advantage: first, there would be no need to 
assess the additionality of emission reductions, and secondly, no-lose targets open the 
opportunity to achieve net reductions, namely the difference between BAU and the target. 
Under the CDM, everything below BAU would be credited and lead to higher emissions in 
Annex I countries.  
In addition, China could commit to implementing a set of SD PAMs for the sectors not 
covered by the sectoral targets or sectoral CDM. China would quantify the effect of the 
package of SD PAMs in advance. The total package of sectoral no-lose targets and 
SD PAMs should aim at mobilising the full ambitious mitigation potential. However, the 
implementation of these policies and measures would be conditional on additional 
international funding to cover the higher costs compared to business-as-usual development.  
Due to missing capacity in these sectors, the emission reductions achieved through PAMs 
could probably only be roughly estimated. Therefore, no direct link is assumed between 
policies and the international carbon markets. Practical measures related to investment 
needs could be linked to international funding, e.g. through the GEF or other multilateral 
funds, but also to private sector CDM projects. 
6. India 
6.1 India in comparison to other countries  
Table 14 provides a range of energy and emission indicators. The right column shows how 
India performs compared to other countries. In absolute terms India is one of the biggest 
emitters. In 2002 it contributed about 4.5% to global CO2 emissions (WRI 2006). 
Nevertheless, per capita emissions as well as cumulative emissions are very low. The 
emission intensity in electricity generation is quite high due to inefficient production based on 
coal and oil. India’s per capita GDP ranges far behind the world average and even behind 
non-Annex I average.  
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Table 14. Energy and emission indicators for India 
 Indicator Value Meter 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 
Cumulative emissions 1900 to 2004 per 
capita per year 0.6 tCO2eq/cap./y   
    
GDP per capita (2004) 3,100 US $ PPP 2000/cap. 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 
Human development index 2002 0.595 (medium) 
    
Past emission trend from 1990 to 2004 +50%  
Emissions per capita (2003) 1.5 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions per GDP (2004) 490 tCO2eq/MUS$ (2000) 
Emissions per kWh electricity (2003) 912 gCO2/kWh 
Energy efficiency in industry Low  
Emissions in transport per capita 
(2003) 0.09 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in households and services 
per capita (2003) 0.15 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in agriculture per capita 
(2000) 0.37 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in waste per capita (2000) 0.11 tCO2eq/cap.  
P
ot
en
tia
l 
Emissions in land use change and 
forestry per capita (2000) -0.04 tCO2eq/cap. 
For detailed explanation of the meters and data sources see Appendix A. 
 
Figure 10 shows the shares of India’s energy sources up to the year 2003. Overall, slightly 
more than half of India’s primary energy is supplied with coal or oil (56% in 2003). Coal is 
assumed to remain important for India’s energy supply in the future. Partly, it is mined 
domestically (MoEF 2004). The rest of India’s primary energy consumption is currently 
supplied mainly with biomass (38%). A large share of the biomass is used in small domestic 
appliances (e.g. for cooking). Solar and hydropower are becoming more important. 
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Primary energy supply
Share in 2003
Biomass/waste 38.2%
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Figure 10. India’s primary energy supply between 1990 and 2003 (IEA 2005b) 
Overall, India is in a medium development state. GDP/cap and HDI are below development 
countries’ average and close to the average of low income countries (UNDP 2004). Its 
emissions are strongly increasing. The emissions per unit of GDP are comparatively high, 
the emissions per capita are low, also because still about half of the population is without 
reliable electricity access (World Bank 2006). Although India has a high share of carbon free 
energy sources, low conversion efficiency and an intensive use of coal lead to comparatively 
high specific emissions in energy production. However, India’s energy and carbon intensities 
declined after 1995 (Chandler et al. 2002). Similar to Brazil, the share of biomass for 
residential use is high but decreasing. 
 
6.2 Reference emissions and mitigation potential  
Figure 11 below shows India’s greenhouse gas emissions under the business-as-usual 
scenario and all three reduction scenarios. The scenario parameters are based on national 
studies as far as possible. Major sources for future data in India are TERI 2006; USEPA 
2006b and trend extrapolation of national and IEA statistics (IEA 2005a). 
As illustrated in Figure 11, the reduction potential for India is 12% (no-regret), 22% (co-
benefit) and 38% (mitigation potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious mitigation potential) are the 
(1) power, (2) industrial and (3) transport sector. In the power sector, there exists an 
ambitious potential of 647 MtCO2eq. For the industrial sector, the ambitious potential is 
estimated at 245 MtCO2eq. The ambitious potential in the transport sector is estimated at 
231 MtCO2eq. The total ambitious mitigation potential in India is estimated at 
1,336 MtCO2eq. A detailed overview of the potential per sector and scenario can be found in 
Appendix B. 
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Figure 11. Scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions in India between 1990 and 2020. 
Figure 12 shows India’s total reduction potential on the sector level under the ambitious 
potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual scenario and the remaining emissions 
according to sectors.  
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Figure 12. India’s emissions under the business-as-usual and the ambitious potential scenario 
on a sector basis between 1990 and 2020. Striped areas show the sectoral emission reduction 
potential under the ambitious potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual scenario. 
(Emissions from LUCF kept constant after 2003 due to data availability) 
 
Most important findings for India: 
- India’s emissions are projected to increase constantly by about 4.2% per year 
between 2000 and 2020 under the business-as-usual scenario. 
- In 2000, most emissions resulted from power production (36%), agriculture (22%) and 
industry (16%). Under the business-as-usual scenario, this trend is projected to be 
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more or less similar, although the importance of power production will decrease 
slightly, while the share of industry will increase. 
- In the power sector, a major reduction opportunity would be to move away from coal 
to renewable energy sources. We also assumed 1% of electricity generation with 
CCS technology by 2020 as ambitious potential. Efficiency of current power plants 
can be increased substantially. In addition, the decrease of distribution losses is a 
major reduction option. 
- Major reductions can be achieved in the industry sector by increasing efficiency and 
moving to renewable energy sources. (It should be noted that our estimates for 
India’s industry are lower compared to other estimates, c.f. TERI 2006). 
- In the transport sector reduction options are considerable. A shift to more natural gas 
and biomass is one emission reduction option. Another element is to increase 
efficiency, especially in aviation and road transport, and a shift to increase the 
absolute amount of rail transport.  
- Under the no-regret potential scenario reductions of 12% below BAU (69% above 
2005 emissions) might be possible. Under the co-benefit potential scenario 
reductions of 22% below BAU (49% above 2005 emissions) could be feasible. Under 
the ambitious potential scenario, overall emission reductions of 38% below BAU (19% 
above 2005 emissions) might be possible. 
 
6.3 Existing and possible further national climate policies 
6.3.1 Overview of existing climate policies and measures 
The following section provides a general overview of India’s climate policy instruments and 
measures. For this purpose, it distinguishes between policies and measures targeting energy 
efficiency improvements, renewable energy and other relevant sources of GHG emissions. If 
not stated otherwise, sources for this section include IREDA (2006), MNES (2005), MoEF 
(1992), Shukla (2003) and Chandler et al. (2002). 
Indian energy policy can be characterised by a strong focus on environmental (energy) 
audits, energy management and technical measures. The Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) 
plays an important role in bringing energy efficiency forward. Furthermore, there is a focus on 
RES such as wind and biomass. Big challenges for India’s energy policy are the transmission 
and distribution losses as well as the outdated infrastructure of the energy system. The 
framework for climate policy is set by the 11th five-year plan, which sets e.g. targets for 
energy efficiency improvements and the energy conservation act, which foresees different 
measures such as MEPS for electric equipment, energy audits for different target groups, 
awareness campaigns or financial support for energy saving measures. Moreover, there is a 
policy statement for abatement of pollution that sets standards for different types of 
emissions, foresees fiscal incentives for the installation of pollution abatement technologies 
and environmental audits. 
A number of policies and measures targeting energy efficiency and demand side 
management have been introduced in recent years. They include MEPS for electronic 
equipment (refrigerator, tubular fluorescent lamps, room air conditioners, direct cool 
refrigerator, distribution transformers), energy labelling, direct investment support for energy 
efficiency measures, energy audits, energy management systems, mandatory reporting 
requirements on energy efficiency improvements for companies, training of different actors, 
awareness campaigns or standardisation of energy efficient water pumps. Moreover, there 
are measures targeting distribution losses in the electricity grid. 
Renewable energy is promoted through a renewable electricity target (10% of additional 
installed capacity until 2012 shall come from renewables). The renewable energy programme 
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promotes RES technologies by providing subsidies. Furthermore, there are programmes 
aiming at a more efficient use of biomass. 
A number of climate policies and measures targeting other relevant sources of GHG 
emissions have been implemented in India. They include general improvements on the 
supply side of energy such as investments in the infrastructure for natural gas, clean coal 
initiatives (restructuring of the coal sector), emission limiting performance standards for cars, 
conversion of public vehicles from petrol to gas, the promotion of the efficient use of 
fertilisers or measures targeting livestock. 
 
6.3.2 Suggestions for additional climate policy instruments and 
measures 
This section analyses the existing climate policies and measures for sectors with the highest 
GHG emissions reduction potential in India. Using the sourcebook as a starting point, this 
section makes suggestions for improving the existing mix of climate policy instruments and 
measures with additional policies and measures in order to exploit the full GHG emissions 
reduction potential. The three sectors with the highest GHG emissions reduction potential 
between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the (1) power, (2) industrial and (3) 
transport sector.  
Climate policy measures and instruments for which the country needs financial assistance 
from Annex I countries are highlighted in italics in the following tables. Such instruments are 
mainly investment support or RD&D schemes. Section 2.3 presents more generally which 
category of policy instruments is considered appropriate for addressing the no-regret, co-
benefits, and ambitious potential, respectively. 
 
6.3.2.1 Power 
This section outlines existing climate policies and measures in the power sector. Suggestions 
for improving the existing climate policy mix are made in order to exploit the GHG emission 
reduction potential.  
Table 15: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the power and heat sector (Climate policy measures and instruments 
for which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • Renewable electricity target (10% 
of additional capacity installed until 
2012 from RES) 
 
• Renewable energy targets heat 
and cold supply 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-
efficiency and RES Domestic 
emission trading scheme 
• Ecological Finance Reform 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Renewable energy programme 
• New and renewable energy policy 
statement 
• Improvement of infrastructure for 
natural gas 
 
• Feed-in tariffs or electricity quota 
(green certificates) for RES and 
CHP 
• Financial support for the installation 
of RES technologies for cold and 
heat 
• Investment support for 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
 improvements in the conversion 
efficiency of fossil fuel power plants 
(linked to MEPS, see below) 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Triple biomass conversion 
efficiency 
 
• Favourable regulations on grid 
access and power purchase 
agreements for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Create target for energy savings of 
1% per year (compared against the 
baseline)  
• Accelerated building permission 
procedures for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Building codes with a mandatory 
share of RES for heat and cold 
• Dynamic minimum conversion 
efficiency standards, regularly 
updated 
• “CCS-ready” obligation for new 
built power plants  
Information and know-
how transfer 
 • Network of local actors 
• Demonstration and training on RES 
technologies targeting contractors, 
retails sales staff, architects and 
engineers 
Research and technology 
transfer  
• Technology development in the 
energy sector 
 
• RD&D schemes for accelerated 
development, technical 
improvement and market 
introduction of RES technologies 
for electricity, heat and cold, 
efficient fossil fuel power plants 
and for analysis of CCS 
• Public and co-operative 
procurement of RES technologies 
 
In order to exploit the ambitious potential of 647 MtCO2eq in the power sector, a number of 
additional climate policies and measures are suggested for strengthening the existing mix.  
A first and necessary step is the gradual phase out of subsidies for power from fossil fuels 
and coal. This would contribute to levelling the playing field for RES technologies and make 
investments in energy efficiency more profitable. Unused subsidies for coal and other fossil 
fuels could be used for financing energy-efficiency and RES. In turn, improved energy-
efficiency would contribute to lowering the energy costs for consumers and outweigh the 
higher costs of energy due to the phase-out of subsidies. General economic and fiscal 
policies such as an ecological finance reform or an emissions trading scheme could also 
contribute to achieving the GHG emissions reduction potential in the power sector. 
The existing policy mix for RES technologies or CHP for electricity could be supplemented by 
feed-in tariffs or green certificates, by introducing favourable regulations on grid access and 
power purchase agreements, accelerated building permission procedures, strengthening 
information measures by training for relevant actors as well as promoting research and 
technology transfer through RD&D schemes and co-operative procurement. 
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Today, there are no specific policy instruments targeting RES technologies for heat and cold. 
These technologies could be promoted through targeted financial support for the installation 
of RES technologies for cold and heat, standards like building codes with a mandatory share 
of RES for heat and cold, information such as networks and training for relevant actors as 
well as research and technology transfer measures like RD&D schemes as well as public 
and co-operative procurement. 
Additional policies and measures for promoting efficient fossil fuel power plants could be 
targeted financial policies such as investment support for power plants with high conversion 
efficiency, regulation such as minimum standards for the conversion efficiency of new built 
plants or a RD&D scheme. 
Requiring new built fossil fuel power plants to be designed “capture ready” could bring CCS 
forward. This would also have indirect implications on energy prices and make energy from 
fossil fuels more expensive. Support and co-operation with Annex I countries will be needed 
in this field. 
GHG emissions stemming from the power production sector can also be indirectly targeted. 
Climate policy instruments and measures aiming at improving energy end-use efficiency and 
energy conservation in households or industry have an effect on the country’s energy 
demand. Especially in the household sector, there are already a number of promising energy 
efficiency policy instruments in place. They include a range of activities on the demand side 
such as labelling, MEPS or information campaigns. A more detailed discussion of additional 
policy instruments for improving energy end-use efficiency in the household and service 
sector can be found in the sourcebook.  
 
6.3.2.2 Industry 
This section gives suggestions for improving the climate policy mix in the industrial sector. 
Table 16: Overview over existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the industrial sector (Climate policy measures and instruments for 
which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy   
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-
efficiency and RES  
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Financial support for the 
optimisation and installation of 
energy efficient technologies linked 
to energy audits and management 
systems 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Clean coal initiatives (restructuring 
of the coal sector) 
• Mandatory reporting on energy 
efficiency improvements 
 
• Extension of the energy efficiency 
accord 
• Minimum energy efficiency 
standards (for energy using 
equipment as well as building 
permits for new industrial 
production facilities) 
Information and know-
how transfer 
• Energy audits 
• Energy management training by 
• Information and training of relevant 
actors 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
the Bureau on Energy Efficiency 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • RD&D scheme for energy efficient 
production technologies and 
methods 
 
The existing policy mix in the industrial sector in India has a focus on energy audits and 
energy management activities.  
For exploiting the ambitious potential of 245 MtCO2eq in the industrial sector, the following 
paragraph suggests additional climate policies and measures. 
Crosscutting issues are the gradual phase out of subsidies for coal and energy from fossil 
fuels as well as the potential introduction of a domestic emissions trading scheme. 
The recent mix of policy instruments could be supplemented by direct financial support for 
introducing energy efficient technologies and production methods. Such an instrument 
should also be linked to other policy instruments such as the participation in energy audits or 
the introduction of energy management systems. Furthermore, additional policy instruments 
include information and training of relevant actors or a RD&D scheme for energy efficient 
production technologies and methods.  
 
6.3.2.3 Transport 
This section gives suggestions for improving the existing mix of climate policy instruments in 
the transportation sector.  
Table 17: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the transportation sector (Climate policy measures and instruments 
for which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy  • Targets/quotas for sustainable 
biofuels 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Tax exemptions for sustainable 
biofuels 
• Energy taxation on fuels 
• Phase-out of subsidies and tax 
exemptions for vehicle fuels 
• Domestic emission trading scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Road fees, congestion charges 
• CO2 differentiated vehicle taxation 
• Depreciation rules favouring 
energy efficient vehicles 
• Financial support for switching from 
road-based to rail- or waterway 
based transportation 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Emission limiting performance 
standards 
• Conversion of public vehicles from 
petrol to gas 
• Average specific emissions target 
for new vehicles regarding GHG 
emissions 
• Dynamic MEPS for vehicles 
components 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
 • Tighter speed limits 
• Spatial planning favouring non-
motorised and public transport 
• Integrated transport planning 
Information and know-
how transfer 
 • Vehicle labelling 
• Driver training programmes 
• Promotion of public transport 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • Research on sustainable 
transportation systems 
 
The existing mix of climate policy instruments and measures in the Indian transportation 
sector consists mainly of standards (e.g. emission standards).  
The ambitious potential of about 231 MtCO2eq in 2020 in the transport sector can be realised 
by introducing a number of additional climate policies and measures.  
Crosscutting policy instruments are a phase out of subsidies and energy taxation on fuels as 
well as a domestic emissions trading scheme in the transport sector (connected to an 
average specific emission target).  
Aiming at different fields of application (biofuels, individual motor car transport, air transport, 
public transport and freight transport), additional policy instruments could support the 
realisation of the ambitious potential. Policy instruments for targeting biofuels include a quota 
and tax exemptions. For targeting vehicles, several policy instruments are available. Such 
policy instruments could be targeted economic and fiscal policies and measures like for 
example road charges, a CO2-differentiated vehicle taxation or favourable depreciation rules 
for efficient vehicles. Standards could consist of average specific emission targets for new 
vehicles, dynamic MEPS for vehicle components, speed limits or integrated transport 
planning. Additional climate policy instruments of the category information and know how 
transfer could be vehicle labelling, driver training programmes or promotion of public 
transport and modal split. A shift from road-based to rail- or waterway-based transport can be 
induced by direct financial support such as tax reductions or subsidies.  
 
6.4 Options for a stronger involvement of India in the international 
regime 
India is the least advanced among the six countries analysed in this study and is not 
comparable to the others in terms of either GDP or emissions per capita. This is why it has 
for many years stressed the developing countries’ need to increase their energy use and put 
economic development upfront. For some years India has been advocating the principle of 
“Contraction and Convergence” with the aim of reaching equal per capita emissions globally 
in 2050. It has put less emphasis on technology cooperation than China. 
 
6.4.1 Analysis 
India has less responsibility and capability compared to the average of developing countries 
but has a very large potential to mitigate emissions: 
• Responsibility: India’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions excluding 
LULUCF is below non-Annex I average compared on a per capita basis. Its current 
per capita emissions are well below non-Annex I average. In absolute terms, India’s 
emissions are substantial and increasing rapidly. 
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• Capability: Per capita income and the human development index score are below 
non-Annex I average. Income is very unequally distributed amongst the population. 
Policy implementation may be difficult. 
• Potential: The mitigation potential is high due to low efficiency and strongly increasing 
emissions in absolute and relative terms. According to the figures from Phase II of the 
project, the no-regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions below BAU levels amounts 
to 416 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 775 Mt and the ambitious mitigation potential to 
1,336 MtCO2eq. These would be equal to a 12%, 22% or 38% reduction compared to 
BAU levels respectively and a 69%, 49% or 19% increase compared to 2005 
emissions levels. 
Earlier analyses put India at a low level compared to other developing countries. Ott et al. 
(2004) classify India as “other developing country” implying no emission targets, but support 
for emission reductions through policies and measures. Others find that India would first 
have to be supported and would only have to take on further action in the later half of this 
century if emissions/capita or emissions/GDP are applied (Gupta 2003; Höhne et al. 2005). 
India disposes of some capacity to quantify emissions and reductions. A wide range of 
statistics does exist. Economic, financial, social and energy indicators are usually included 
(MOSPI 2006, MPNG 2006). The reliability is difficult to estimate, though. The Initial National 
Communication gives detailed data for all gases and sectors for 1990 and 1994 (MoEF 
2004). Apart from that no emissions data have been officially published yet. 
Generally, the institutional infrastructure in India is comparatively weak. The implementation 
and monitoring of measures appears to be very difficult. This would have to be improved in 
order to be able to implement climate change policies successfully and to attract foreign 
capital. India will for the foreseeable future probably not be able to quantify emissions and 
reductions on a large scale.  
 
6.4.2 Suggestions for a potential contribution 
Based on the above analysis, we suggest that it would be feasible and equitable for India to 
implement a set of SD PAMs. India would quantify the effect of the package of SD PAMs in 
advance. The total package should aim at mobilising the full ambitious mitigation potential. 
However, the implementation of these policies and measures would be conditional on 
additional international funding to cover the higher costs compared to business-as-usual 
development.  
Due to the lack of technical capacity, the emission reductions achieved through policies 
implemented in India can probably only be roughly estimated. Therefore, no direct link is 
assumed between policies and the international carbon markets. Practical measures related 
to investment needs (e.g. extension of supply grids and renewable or cleaner technologies) 
could be linked to international funding, e.g. through the GEF or other international funds, but 
also to private sector CDM projects. However, given the need for a 30% domestic reduction 
by Annex I countries (see section 11), a large-scale utilisation of the CDM would require 
correspondingly more stringent commitments from Annex I countries to keep global 
emissions on a 2° trajectory. 
7. Mexico 
7.1 Mexico in comparison to other countries  
Table 18 provides different energy and emission indicators. The right column shows how 
Mexico performs compared to other countries. On the national level Mexico is the largest 
emitter in Latin America.  
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The basic data illustrate that Mexico ranks very high among developing countries with 
respect to its state of development. Its GDP per capita is above that of most developing 
countries and is at above world average. Mexico’s emissions per capita are around world 
average and increasing. The energy system is dependant on oil and gas and emissions 
mostly occur in the electricity and transport sectors where emissions are well above world 
average. Emissions from land-use change are also substantial. At the same time a high 
reduction potential at comparatively low costs exists. 
Table 18. Energy and emission indicators for Mexico 
 Indicator Value Meter 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 
Cumulative emissions 1900 to 2004 per 
capita per year 1.4 tCO2eq/cap./y  
    
GDP per capita (2004) 9,500 US $ PPP 2000/cap. 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 
Human development index 2002 0.802 (high) 
    
Past emission trend from 1990 to 2004 +30%  
Emissions per capita (2003) 4.9 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions per GDP (2004) 521 tCO2eq/MUS$ (2000) 
Emissions per kWh electricity (2003) 576 gCO2/kWh 
Energy efficiency in industry Low  
Emissions in transport per capita 
(2003) 1.27 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in households and services 
per capita (2003) 0.33 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in agriculture per capita 
(2000) 0.41 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in waste per capita (2000) 0.15 tCO2eq/cap.  
P
ot
en
tia
l 
Emissions in land use change and 
forestry per capita (1990) 1.37 tCO2eq/cap. 
For detailed explanation of the meters and data sources see Appendix A. 
 
Figure 13 shows the shares of Mexico’s energy sources up to the year 2003. Oil is by far the 
most important energy source. Mexico is an oil processing and exporting country. It also has 
own natural gas reserves. About 57% of the domestic primary energy supply were provided 
by oil in 2003. Gas supplied about 26%. Biomass (5%), other renewable sources (3%), coal 
(5%) and nuclear energy (2%) play only a minor role. 
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Primary energy supply
Share in 2003
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Figure 13. Mexico’s primary energy supply between 1990 and 2003 (IEA 2005b) 
Overall, Mexico is classified as a country with a high human development index. Its GDP lies 
well above world average and middle income countries average. After the establishment of 
the UNFCCC it became member of the OECD and is therefore, similar to South Korea, non-
Annex I but OECD country. The dominance of oil in Mexico’s energy mix leads to 
comparatively high emissions. Mexico’s per capita emissions in 2002 were considerable and 
even slightly higher than those of some low-emission Annex I countries, namely Lithuania, 
Turkey and Latvia. Over the last years Mexico’s emissions have been increasing. 
 
7.2 Reference emissions and mitigation potential 
Figure 14 below shows Mexico’s greenhouse gas emissions under the business-as-usual 
scenario and all three reduction scenarios as calculated in this project. The scenario 
parameters are based on national studies as far as possible. Major sources for future data in 
Mexico are USEPA 2006b and trend extrapolation of national statistics. 
As illustrated in Figure 14, the reduction potential for Mexico is 8% (no-regret), 16% (co-
benefit) and 39% (ambitious potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the (1) 
power, (2) transport and (3) industrial sector. In the power sector, there exists an ambitious 
potential of 186 MtCO2eq. For the transport sector, the ambitious potential is estimated at 
111 MtCO2eq. The ambitious potential in the industrial sector is estimated at 41 MtCO2eq. 
The total ambitious mitigation potential in Mexico is estimated at 417 MtCO2eq. A detailed 
overview of the potential per sector and scenario can be found in Appendix B. 
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Figure 14. Scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions in Mexico between 1990 and 2020. 
 
Figure 15 shows Mexico’s total reduction potential on the sector level under the ambitious 
potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual scenario and the remaining emissions 
according to sectors.  
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Figure 15. Mexico’s emissions under the business-as-usual and the ambitious potential 
scenario on a sector basis between 1990 and 2020. Striped areas show the sectoral emission 
reduction potential under the ambitious potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual 
scenario. (Emissions from LUCF kept constant after 2003 due to data availability) 
 
Most important findings for Mexico: 
- Mexico’s emissions are projected to increase slightly by about 1.9% per year between 
2000 and 2020 under the business-as-usual scenario. 
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- In 2000 most emissions result from power production (26%), transport (19%) and 
industry (13%). Under the business-as-usual scenario, this trend is projected to be 
more or less similar although the importance of transport and power production will 
increase slightly, while the shares of industry and agriculture will increase slightly. 
- Mexico has already a high share of gas in electricity production. Movement to 
renewable energy sources would be a significant reduction option as well as 
reduction of distribution losses.  
- Major reductions can be achieved in the industry sector by increasing efficiency and 
moving to renewable energy sources. 
- Some limited reduction potential is available in the agriculture and waste sectors. 
- In the transport sector reduction options are considerable. A shift to more biomass 
use is one emission reduction option. Another element is to increase efficiency, 
especially in aviation and road transport, and a shift to increase the absolute amount 
of rail transport.  
- Under the no-regret potential scenario reductions of 8% below BAU (26% above 2005 
emissions) might be possible. Under the co-benefit potential scenario reductions of 
16% below BAU (14% above 2005 emissions) could be feasible. Under the ambitious 
potential scenario overall emission reductions of 39% below BAU (17% below 2005 
emissions) might be possible. 
 
7.3 Existing and possible further national climate policies 
7.3.1 Overview of existing climate policies and measures 
The following section gives a general overview of Mexico’s climate policy instruments and 
measures. For this purpose, it distinguishes between policies and measures targeting energy 
efficiency improvements, renewable energy and other relevant sources of GHG emissions. If 
not stated otherwise, sources for this section include a review of a country expert (Odón de 
Buen), Government of Mexico (1997; 2001), Inclan-Gallardo (2004), SEMARNAT (2001), 
and Sussman et al. (2006). 
Energy suppliers in Mexico are obliged by the constitution to use the least expensive energy 
option at all times. No feed-in tariffs for RES exist which makes investments in these 
technologies difficult. Furthermore, the Mexican energy industry is subsidised which keeps 
energy prices for residential and agricultural consumers low. At this point, electricity and 
gasoline are subsidised to some extent. In the case of electricity, the subsidy applies mainly 
to the residential and agricultural (water pumping) sectors. The estimated monetary value of 
these subsidies is close to 5,000 Million US$. In the case of gasoline, as the price is 
controlled and close to 40% of the gasoline is imported from the US, as long as the gasoline 
price in the US remains higher than Mexico’s, gasoline will be subsidised to an extent. If 
gasoline prices go down in the US and below prices in Mexico, chances are that the price will 
remain higher (as has happened in the past during other shifts in the price differential).  
Regarding the possible introduction of energy taxes, it has to be noted that Mexico is a 
country with very low tax collection and uses part of its oil revenues to finance 30% of its 
government expenses. Up to now high oil prices have meant more income than predicted. 
However, the decline of its largest oil field (Cantarell, the second largest in the world) is 
reducing the exported volume by about 10% per year. It is also an economy that tries to keep 
inflation at bay and one of the strategies is to control energy prices (with electricity and 
gasoline under government control). Attempts to implement a complete and effective fiscal 
reform have failed as a result of politically weak governments and politicians not wanting to 
be blamed for affecting people’s livelihoods. One clear example of this is the proposal of a 
fiscal reform that includes a 5% increase in gasoline prices (in many ways to help pay for a 
two digit prices differential that is paid to import 40% of the gasoline used in Mexico). 
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However, this reform had to be frozen (postponed for at least four months) as a price 
escalation was affecting macroeconomic stability. Due to this reasons, there will be 
difficulties in introducing energy taxes in Mexico. 
However, the Mexican government has a remarkable energy efficiency standards 
programme and has started to improve the conditions for RES by giving economic 
incentives. Nevertheless, the enforcement and follow-up of climate policy instruments and 
long term goals is often poor in Mexico (according to the view of a country expert). As a 
result, this leads to a reduced effectiveness of the climate policy instruments in place. 
A number of policies and measures targeting energy efficiency and demand side 
management have been introduced in recent years. For the industrial sector there is the 
SIRG programme for industrial regulation and management, which sets standards for 
industrial appliances such as motors or commercial refrigerators. The Energy Efficiency 
Industry Partnership (EEIP) aims at reducing energy consumption in this sector by training 
activities. For the petroleum industry, there is a programme aiming at reducing energy 
consumption by promoting best practice examples. For the residential and commercial sector 
instruments such as building codes, electric appliance standards or programmes aiming at 
energy efficient lighting and air conditioning in commercial buildings are in place. 
Renewable energy is promoted through a renewable energy target, which aims at a share of 
8% of renewable electricity generation in 2012. Mexico is on track to meeting this target due 
to a number of large-scale hydropower projects that will be realised in the coming years. A 
number of financial incentives such as depreciation rules for RES technologies, a green fund, 
financial support for solar water heating or accelerated depreciation rules can be found.  
Only a small number of climate policies and measures targeting other relevant sources of 
GHG emissions have been implemented in Mexico. They include measures aiming at 
reducing the leakage of natural gas, promotion of public transport, and programmes to use 
waste for energy generation or aiming at reducing deforestation. 
 
7.3.2 Suggestions for additional climate policy instruments and 
measures 
The following section analyses the existing climate policies and measures for sectors with 
the highest GHG emissions reduction potential in Mexico. Using the sourcebook as a starting 
point, this section gives suggestions for improving the existing mix of climate policy 
instruments and measures with additional policies and measures in order to exploit the full 
reduction GHG emissions reduction potential. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the (1) 
power, (2) transport and (3) industrial sector.  
Climate policy measures and instruments for which the country needs financial assistance 
from Annex I countries are highlighted in italics in the following tables. Such instruments are 
mainly investment support or RD&D schemes. Section 2.3 presents more generally which 
category of policy instruments is considered appropriate for addressing the no-regret, co-
benefits, and ambitious potential, respectively. 
 
7.3.2.1 Power 
This section outlines existing climate policies and measures in the power sector. Suggestions 
for improving the existing climate policy mix are made in order to exploit the GHG emissions 
reduction potential.  
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Table 19: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the power and heat sector (Climate policy measures and instruments 
for which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • 8% renewable energy target 
 
• Renewable energy targets for 
electricity, heat and cold supply 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-
efficiency and RES  
• Domestic emission trading scheme 
• Ecological Finance Reform 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Accelerated depreciation rules for 
renewable technologies 
• Green Fund 
• National programme for rural 
energy 
• Standard contract for renewable 
energy self-supply power projects 
• Programme for energy efficiency in 
buildings and solar water heating 
(CONAE) 
• Feed-in tariffs or electricity quota 
(green certificates) for RES and 
CHP 
• Financial support for the installation 
of RES technologies for cold and 
heat 
• Investment support for 
improvements in the conversion 
efficiency of fossil fuel power plants 
(linked to MEPS, see below) 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• National Plan of Environment and 
Resources 
 
• Favourable regulations on grid 
access and power purchase 
agreements for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Create target for energy savings 
from DSM of 1% per year 
(compared against the baseline)  
• Accelerated building permission 
procedures for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Building codes with a mandatory 
share of RES for heat and cold 
• Dynamic minimum conversion 
efficiency standards, regularly 
updated 
• “CCS-ready” obligation for new 
built power plants  
Information and know-
how transfer 
 • Network of local actors 
• Demonstration and training on RES 
technologies targeting contractors, 
retails sales staff, architects and 
engineers 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • RD&D schemes for accelerated 
development, technical 
improvement and market 
introduction of RES technologies 
for electricity, heat and cold, 
efficient fossil fuel power plants 
and for analysis of CCS 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
• Public and co-operative 
procurement of RES technologies 
 
The existing mix of policy instruments targeting RES technologies consists mainly of targeted 
economic instruments such as direct investment support. However, an overall framework for 
promoting RES is missing in Mexico. 
In order to exploit the ambitious potential of 186 MtCO2eq in the power sector, a number of 
additional climate policies and measures are suggested for strengthening the existing mix.  
A first and necessary step is the gradual phase out of subsidies for the energy industry. This 
would contribute to levelling the playing field for RES technologies and make investments in 
energy efficiency more profitable. Saved subsidies for the energy industry could be used for 
financing energy-efficiency and RES. In turn, improved energy-efficiency would contribute to 
lowering the energy costs for consumers and outweigh the higher costs of energy due to the 
phase-out of subsidies. General economic and fiscal policies such as an ecological finance 
reform or an emission trading scheme could also contribute to achieving the GHG emissions 
reduction potential in the Mexican power sector. 
The existing policy mix for RES technologies for electricity could be supplemented through 
extending the targeted economic policy instruments by feed-in tariffs or green certificates, 
improving the legal framework by introducing favourable regulations on grid access and 
power purchase agreements, accelerated building permission procedures, strengthening 
information measures by training for relevant actors as well as promoting research and 
technology transfer through RD&D schemes and co-operative procurement. 
RES technologies for heat and cold could be promoted through targeted financial support for 
the installation of RES technologies for cold and heat, standards like building codes with a 
mandatory share of RES for heat and cold, information such as networks and training for 
relevant actors as well as research and technology transfer measures like RD&D schemes 
and public and co-operative procurement. 
Additional policies and measures for promoting efficient fossil fuel power plants could be 
targeted financial policies such as investment support for power plants with high conversion 
efficiency, minimum standards for the conversion efficiency of new built plants or a RD&D 
scheme. 
Requiring newly-built fossil fuel power plants to be designed “capture ready” could bring CCS 
forward. This would also have indirect implications on energy prices and make energy from 
fossil fuels more expensive. Support and co-operation with Annex I countries will be needed 
in this field. 
GHG emissions stemming from the power production sector can also be indirectly targeted. 
Climate policy instruments and measures aiming at improving energy end-use efficiency and 
energy conservation in households or the industry have an effect on the country’s energy 
demand. In the household sector, there are already a number of energy efficiency policy 
instruments in place. They aim at energy efficiency in buildings, domestic appliances or 
lighting. A more detailed discussion of additional policy instruments for improving energy 
end-use efficiency in the household and service sector can be found in the sourcebook.  
 
7.3.2.2 Transport 
This section gives suggestions for improving the existing mix of climate policy instruments in 
the transportation sector.  
Table 20: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the transportation sector (Climate policy measures and instruments 
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for which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy  • Targets/quotas for sustainable 
biofuels 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Tax exemptions for sustainable 
biofuels 
• Energy taxation on fuels 
• Phase-out of subsidies and tax 
exemptions for vehicle fuels 
• Domestic emission trading scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Use of hybrid buses in public 
transport 
 
• Road fees, congestion charges 
• CO2-differentiated vehicle taxation 
• Depreciation rules favouring 
energy efficient vehicles 
• Financial support for switching from 
road-based to rail- or waterway 
based transportation 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Programmes to improve air quality 
in metropolitan areas 
• Programmes to promote public 
transport 
 
• Average specific emissions target 
for new vehicles regarding GHG 
emissions 
• Dynamic MEPS for vehicles 
components 
• Tighter speed limits 
• Spatial planning favouring non-
motorised and public transport 
• Integrated transport planning 
Information and know-
how transfer 
 • Vehicle labelling 
• Driver training programmes 
• Promotion of public transport 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • Research on sustainable 
transportation systems 
 
The existing mix of climate policy instruments and measures in the Mexican transportation 
sector consists of several instruments. They include targeted economic and fiscal policies 
(financial support for the use of hybrid busses) and regulations (programmes to improve air 
quality in metropolitan areas and promotion of public transport through bus lanes, etc.). 
The ambitious potential of about 111 MtCO2eq in 2020 in the transport sector can be realised 
by introducing a number of additional climate policies and measures.  
Crosscutting policy instruments are a phase out of subsidies and energy taxation on fuels as 
well as a domestic emissions trading scheme in the transport sector (connected to an 
average specific emission target).  
Aiming at different fields of application (biofuels, individual motor car transport, air transport, 
public transport and freight transport), additional policy instruments could support the 
realisation of the ambitious potential. Policy instruments for targeting biofuels include a quota 
and tax exemptions. For targeting vehicles, several policy instruments are available. Such 
policy instruments could be targeted economic and fiscal policies and measures like for 
example road charges, a CO2-differentiated vehicle taxation or favourable depreciation rules 
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for efficient vehicles. Standards could consist of average specific emission targets for new 
vehicles, dynamic MEPS for vehicle components, speed limits or integrated transport 
planning. Additional climate policy instruments of the category information and know how 
transfer could be vehicle labelling, driver training programmes or promotion of public 
transport and modal split. A shift from road-based to rail- or waterway-based transport can be 
induced by direct financial support such as tax reductions or subsidies.  
 
7.3.2.3 Industry 
This section gives suggestions for improving the climate policy mix in the industrial sector in 
Mexico. 
Table 21: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the industrial sector (Climate policy measures and instruments for 
which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy   
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-
efficiency and RES  
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Financial support for the 
optimisation and installation of 
energy efficient technologies linked 
to energy audits and management 
systems 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Integrated system of industrial 
environmental regulation and 
management (SIRG programme) 
• Promotion of the use of natural gas 
• Minimum energy efficiency 
standards (for energy using 
equipment as well as building 
permits for new industrial 
production facilities) 
Information and know-
how transfer 
• Registration of emissions and 
pollution transfer 
• Energy Efficiency Industry 
Partnership (EEIP) 
• Programme for energy saving of 
the national Mexican petroleum 
company 
• Information and training of relevant 
actors 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • RD&D scheme for energy efficient 
production technologies and 
methods 
 
The existing policy mix in the industrial sector consists of several policy instruments. The 
SIRG programme sets standards for industrial appliances such as motors or commercial 
refrigerators. The Energy Efficiency Industry Partnership (EEIP) aims at reducing energy 
consumption in this sector by training activities. For the petroleum industry, there is a 
programme aiming at reducing energy consumption by promoting best practice examples. 
For exploiting the ambitious potential of 41 MtCO2eq in the industrial sector, the following 
additional climate policies and measures are suggested. 
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Cross-cutting issues are the gradual phase out of subsidies for energy from fossil fuels and 
the potential introduction of a domestic emissions trading scheme. 
The recent mix of policy instruments could be supplemented by direct financial support for 
introducing energy efficient technologies and production methods. Such an instrument 
should also be linked to other policy instruments such as the participation in energy audits or 
the introduction of energy management systems. Furthermore, additional policy instruments 
include information and training of relevant actors or a RD&D scheme for energy efficient 
production technologies and methods. 
 
7.4 Options for a stronger involvement of Mexico in the international 
regime 
Mexico belongs not only to G77/China but also to the Environmental Integrity Group. As it is 
an OECD member and its GDP exceeds those of some countries with economies in 
transition, it is one of the first candidates for graduating from the group of non-Annex I 
countries and taking a comparable level of commitments as Annex I countries. Mexico has 
substantial capacities not only in economic terms but also in technical terms, as evidenced in 
its recent submission of the third National Communication. Mexico has been relatively 
positive towards taking some commitments, for example in its AWG 4 statement that 
stresses the need for an evolution of the current division between Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries into a more realistic form of differentiation. 
 
7.4.1 Analysis 
Mexico has the responsibility, capability and potential to make a contribution to the 
international effort to reducing emissions. Mexico is still a developing country and its 
indicators are only at the low end of the range of those of Annex I countries. But Mexico 
could be capable to handle an emission limitation or reduction target of limited scope and 
stringency compared to those of Annex I countries: 
• Responsibility: Mexico’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions 
excluding LULUCF is below world average but slightly above non-Annex I average.  
• Capability: Mexico’s per capita income is slightly above world average. Its human 
development index is far above world average.  
• Potential: Mexico has a substantial mitigation potential. According to the figures from 
Phase II of the project, the no-regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions below BAU 
levels amounts to 82 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 173 Mt and the ambitious potential 
to 417 MtCO2eq. These would be equal to a 8%, 16% or 39% reduction compared to 
BAU levels respectively and a +26%, +14% or -17% change compared to 2005 
emissions levels. 
Earlier analyses put Mexico also at a high level compared to other developing countries. Ott 
et al. (2004) classify Mexico as “rapidly industrialising country” implying an absolute limitation 
target if funding and technology are provided by Annex I countries. Others find that Mexico 
would have to accede to Annex I soon if emissions/capita or GDP/capita thresholds are 
applied, a little earlier for GDP/capita (Gupta 2003; Höhne et al. 2005).  
In addition, Mexico disposes of the technical capacity necessary for quantifying emissions 
and reductions. Comprehensive statistics exist in Mexico, which include economic, financial, 
social and energy indicators. Mexico is one of the few non-Annex I countries that officially 
publish emissions data. Mexico is also the only non-Annex I country that has already 
submitted its third National Communication.  
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7.4.2 Suggestions for a potential contribution 
Given the amount of global emission reductions required to keep temperature change below 
2°C and based on the above analysis, we suggest that it would be equitable and feasible for 
Mexico to commit to an absolute country-wide no-lose emission target.  
We propose two options for the level of stringency based on the assessment of what amount 
of reductions is necessary by 2020 to bring global emissions on a 2°C trajectory (see section 
11): 
The target could either be set at a stringent level correlated to the ambitious mitigation 
potential but implementation would have to be made contingent on the provision of financial 
and technical support from Annex I countries. The target would in this case amount to about 
638 MtCO2eq annual emissions in 2020, 39% below the BAU level and 17% below 2005 
emissions. 
Alternatively, the target could be set at a lower level, for instance at a level correlated to the 
co-benefit mitigation potential. This target would amount to 882 MtCO2eq, 16% below the 
BAU level and 14% above 2005 level. Mexico could then, nevertheless, implement ambitious 
policies and measures to overachieve the target and sell the resulting surplus on the carbon 
market. This alternative would require less direct financial and technical support from Annex I 
countries but more support through the carbon market and hence more stringent emission 
reduction targets for Annex I countries 45% compared to 1990 as opposed to 30% as 
assumed for the option above. 
If a country-wide target is not politically feasible, a second-best option could be to implement 
sectoral CDM or policy-based CDM projects in the power, transport and industry sectors. 
Sectoral/policy CDM would probably be politically more acceptable for developing countries. 
However, the technical implementation of sectoral/policy CDM and sectoral no-lose targets 
would probably be very similar and no-lose targets have a twofold advantage over 
sectoral/policy CDM: first, there would be no need to assess the additionality of emission 
reductions, and second, no-lose targets open the opportunity to achieve net reductions, 
namely the difference between BAU and the target. Under the CDM, by contrast, everything 
below BAU would be credited and lead to higher emissions in Annex I countries.  
8. South Africa 
8.1 South Africa in comparison to other countries 
Table 22 provides different energy and emission indicators. The right column shows how 
South Africa performs compared to other countries. The basic data illustrates that South 
Africa ranks above the average of developing countries with respect to its state of 
development. However, large inequalities can be found within the country. 
Its emissions and GDP per capita are well above world average. Its emissions per capita are 
close to Annex I average. Due to the extensive use of coal, South Africa’s emissions per 
kWh electricity are among the highest in the world. Its emissions per capita are close to 
Annex I average, but have only increased slightly in the last 10 years. It is by far the largest 
emitter of greenhouse gas emissions in Africa (DME 2005). 
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Table 22. Energy and emission indicators for South Africa 
 Indicator Value Meter 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 
Cumulative emissions 1900 to 2004 per 
capita per year 3.4 tCO2eq/cap./y   
    
GDP per capita (2004) 10,800 US $ PPP 2000/cap.3  
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 
Human development index 2002 0.666 (medium) 
    
Past emission trend from 1990 to 2004 +18%  
Emissions per capita (2003) 10.5 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions per GDP (2004) 969 tCO2eq/MUS$ (2000) 
Emissions per kWh electricity (2003) 853 gCO2/kWh 
Energy efficiency in industry Low  
Emissions in transport per capita 
(2003) 0.93 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in households and services 
per capita (2003) 0.58 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in agriculture per capita 
(2000) 0.93 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in waste per capita (2000) 0.49 tCO2eq/cap.  
P
ot
en
tia
l 
Emissions in land use change and 
forestry per capita (2000) 0.04 tCO2eq/cap. 
For detailed explanation of the meters and data sources see Appendix A. 
 
Figure 16 shows the shares of South Africa’s energy sources up to the year 2003. Coal is by 
far the most important energy source. About 70% of South Africa’s primary energy supply 
and about 90% of electricity supply are provided by coal (Winkler 2006, p. 4). Coal can be 
assumed to remain the most important energy source for South Africa during the next 20-30 
years (Mwakasonda and Winkler 2005). Biomass (11%)4, oil (10%), nuclear energy, gas and 
hydropower only play a minor role today. 
                                                
3 However, per capita GDP is much lower at market exchange rate. 
4 Alternative to the IEA data shown here, a lower figure for biomass of around 8% could also be 
realistic. 
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Primary energy supply
Share in 2003
Biomass/waste 11.1%
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Geothermal
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Figure 16. South Africa’s primary energy supply between 1990 and 2003 (IEA 2005b) 
Overall, the dominance of coal in South Africa’s energy mix leads to high emission intensity 
in electricity generation. This and the energy intensive industry result in very high emissions 
per GDP. Per capita emissions are lower than those of most Annex I countries but they are 
high for developing countries. South Africa’s emissions are likely to increase in the future due 
to development and a remaining high importance of coal as energy source. 
 
8.2 Reference emissions and mitigation potential 
Figure 17 below shows South Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions under the business-as-
usual scenario and all three reduction scenarios. The scenario parameters are based on 
national studies as far as possible. Major sources for future data in South Africa are EDRC 
2003; Winkler et al. 2005a; USEPA 2006b and trend extrapolation of official national and IEA 
statistics (IEA 2005a).  
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Figure 17. Scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions in South Africa between 1990 and 2020. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 17, the reduction potential for South Africa is 9% (no-regret), 18% (co-
benefit) and 35% (ambitious potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the (1) 
power, (2) transport and (3) industrial sector. In the power sector, there exists an ambitious 
potential of 67 MtCO2eq. For the transport sector, the ambitious potential is estimated at 
42 MtCO2eq. The ambitious potential in the industrial sector is estimated at 41 MtCO2eq. The 
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total ambitious potential in South Africa is estimated at 212 MtCO2eq. A detailed overview of 
the potential per sector and scenario can be found in Appendix B. 
Figure 18 shows South Africa’s total reduction potential on the sector level under the 
ambitious potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual scenario and the remaining 
emissions according to sectors.  
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Figure 18. South Africa’s emissions under the business-as-usual and the ambitious potential 
scenario on a sector basis between 1990 and 2020. Striped areas show the sectoral emission 
reduction potential under the ambitious potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual 
scenario. (Emissions from LUCF kept constant after 2003 due to data availability) 
 
Most important findings for South Africa: 
- South Africa’s emissions are projected to increase slightly by about 1.5% per year 
between 2000 and 2020 under the business-as-usual scenario. 
- In 2000 most emissions result from power production (45%), industry (17%) and 
transport (11%). Under the business-as-usual scenario, this trend is projected to be 
more or less similar, although the importance of power production will decrease, while 
the shares of most other sectors will increase by a few percentage points. 
- South Africa is highly dependent on domestic coal. Movement to renewable energy 
sources would be a significant reduction option. 
- Major reductions can be achieved in the industry sector by increasing efficiency and 
moving to renewable energy sources. 
- Some limited reduction potential is available in the agriculture and waste sectors. 
- In the transport sector reduction options are considerable. A shift to more natural gas 
and biomass use is one emission reduction option. Another element is to increase 
efficiency, especially in aviation and road transport, and a shift to increase the 
absolute amount of rail transport.  
- Under the no-regret potential scenario reductions of 9% below BAU (19% above 2005 
emissions) might be possible. Under the co-benefit potential scenario reductions of 
18% below BAU (7% above 2005 emissions) could be feasible. Under the ambitious 
potential scenario overall emission reductions of 35% below BAU (15% below 2005 
emissions) might be possible. 
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8.3 Existing and possible further national climate policies 
8.3.1 Overview of existing climate policies and measures 
The following section gives a general overview of South Africa’s climate policy instruments 
and measures. For this purpose, it distinguishes between policies and measures targeting 
energy efficiency improvements, renewable energy and other relevant sources of GHG 
emissions. 
If not stated otherwise, sources for this section include Chandler et al. 2002; DEAT 2004; 
RSA 2006; Winkler 2006), DME 2003), DME 2005) and Parliament SA 2000). Furthermore, a 
country expert (Stanford Mwakasonda) for South Africa has reviewed and commented the list 
of existing policy instruments. 
South African energy policy can be characterised by an overstrained power generating 
capacity and subsidies for power from fossil fuels. Today, South Africa faces an overstrained 
power generating capacity since energy demand is growing faster than supply. In order to 
deal with this problem, a number of policies and measures towards improving energy 
efficiency and demand side management have been taken in recent years. However, there 
are direct and indirect subsidies for power from fossil fuels and for fossil fuels as end-use 
energy, which counteract such policies and measures. For instance, there is no VAT on 
kerosene and an indirect support of electricity consumption through subsidies for coal. Such 
subsidies are not very likely to be removed in the near future. There is fear that it would 
make energy unaffordable for large parts of the population and slow down the current 
economic development. 
A number of policies and measures targeting energy efficiency and demand side 
management have been introduced in recent years in order to cope with the limited power 
generating capacity. The framework for energy efficiency policy is set by the South African 
energy efficiency strategy which aims at reducing final energy consumption by at least 12% 
compared against the BAU scenario until 2014 (with the year 2000 as the basis). For this 
purpose, several policies and measures targeting different sectors (with the main focus on 
industry and households) are foreseen. Such policy instruments include minimum efficiency 
standards for buildings and appliances, support mechanisms (appliance labelling, energy 
audits, information, training, research, and energy management systems) and financial 
instruments (moving from cross-subsidies to cost-reflective prices, fiscal and financial 
incentives such as subsidies for energy-efficient retrofitting of public buildings, fee-bates for 
less efficient vehicles or subsidies for replacing old taxis). However, there is no funding for 
financial support on a larger scale since there are more urgent development issues. A 
national “Energy Efficiency Agency“ and an “Energy Sector Education and Training Authority“ 
have been established. The Danish government has also supported capacity building on 
energy efficiency and renewable energy. Furthermore, the South African energy company 
ESKOM has been obliged to carry out demand side management activities targeting 
households as well as commercial and industrial consumers. For instance, one such activity 
has been a large programme for replacing old light bulbs with energy-efficient ones. 
Renewable energy is promoted through a renewable electricity target (additional 10,000 
GWh from renewables until 2013). In order to meet this target, subsidies for renewable 
energy technologies (renewable energy subsidy scheme) are available – however no 
progress has been made in introducing feed-in tariffs so far. The Renewable Energy Finance 
and Subsidy Office (REFSO), whose mandate includes the management of renewable 
energy subsidies and provision of advice to developers and other stakeholders on renewable 
energy finance and subsidies has been established. There is also an off-grid electrification 
programme that is based on PV. 
Only a small number of climate policies and measures targeting other relevant sources of 
GHG emissions have been implemented in South Africa. For instance, the white paper on 
integrated pollution and waste management led to the introduction of a national waste 
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management strategy. The focus of this strategy is on waste minimisation and utilisation. So 
far, household waste has been the main target while industrial waste has only been 
marginally addressed. In the agricultural sector, the land care framework policy targets GHG 
emissions stemming from this sector. The main aim is sustainable land management through 
e.g. capacity building and training, research and standards.  
 
8.3.2 Suggestions for additional climate policy instruments and 
measures 
The following section analyses the existing climate policies and measures for sectors with 
the highest GHG emissions reduction potential in South Africa. Using the sourcebook as a 
starting point, this section gives suggestions for improving the existing mix of climate policy 
instruments and measures with additional policies and measures in order to exploit the full 
reduction GHG emissions reduction potential. The three sectors with the highest GHG 
emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the (1) 
power, (2) transport and (3) industrial sector.  
Climate policy measures and instruments for which the country needs financial assistance 
from Annex I countries are highlighted in italics in the following tables. Such instruments are 
mainly investment support or RD&D schemes. Section 2.3 presents more generally which 
category of policy instruments is considered appropriate for addressing the no-regret, co-
benefits, and ambitious potential, respectively. 
 
8.3.2.1 Power 
This section outlines existing climate policies and measures in the power sector. Based on 
this, the following section gives suggestions for improving the existing climate policy mix in 
order to exploit the GHG emissions reduction potential. Due to the prevailing infrastructure 
and circumstances in South Africa the CHP technology is unlikely to be applicable for district 
heating in the near future. Therefore, CHP for district heating is not considered in the 
following. However, CHP for industrial use can be an option in the future. 
Table 23: Overview over existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the power and heat sector (Climate policy measures and instruments 
for which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • Renewable electricity target 
• White paper on renewable and 
energy policy 
• Renewable energy targets for 
electricity, heat and cold supply 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy 
efficiency and RES (e.g. backed by 
the ESKOM DSM scheme)  
• Domestic emission trading scheme 
• Ecological Finance Reform 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Subsidy scheme for renewable 
energy technologies 
• Power sector reforms 
• Off-grid electrification programme 
• Feed-in tariffs or electricity quota 
(green certificates) for RES and 
CHP 
• Financial support for the installation 
of RES technologies for cold and 
heat 
• Investment support for 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
improvements in the conversion 
efficiency of fossil fuel power plants 
(linked to MEPS, see below) 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Gas act: Substitution of coal by gas 
• National energy bill 
• ESKOM obligation for DSM 
• Favourable regulations on grid 
access and power purchase 
agreements for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Create/increase target for energy 
savings from DSM by ESKOM to 
1% per year (compared against the 
baseline)  
• Accelerated building permission 
procedures for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Building codes with a mandatory 
share of RES for heat and cold 
• Dynamic minimum conversion 
efficiency standards, regularly 
updated 
• “CCS-ready” obligation for new 
built power plants  
Information and know-
how transfer 
• Capacity building on energy 
efficiency and renewable energy 
• Network of local actors 
• Demonstration and training on RES 
technologies targeting contractors, 
retails sales staff, architects and 
engineers 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • RD&D schemes for accelerated 
development, technical 
improvement and market 
introduction of RES technologies 
for electricity, heat and cold, 
efficient fossil fuel power plants 
and for analysis of CCS 
• Public and co-operative 
procurement of RES technologies 
 
In order to exploit the ambitious potential of 67 MtCO2eq in the power sector, a number of 
additional climate policies and measures are suggested for strengthening the existing mix.  
A first and necessary step is the gradual phase out of subsidies for power from fossil fuels 
and coal. This could contribute to levelling the playing field for RES technologies and make 
investments in energy efficiency more profitable. Saved subsidies for coal and other fossil 
fuels could be used for financing energy-efficiency and RES. In turn, improved energy-
efficiency would contribute to lowering the energy costs for consumers and outweigh the 
higher costs of energy due to the phase-out of subsidies. General economic and fiscal 
policies such as an ecological finance reform or an emission trading scheme could also 
contribute to achieving the GHG emissions reduction potential in the power sector. 
An extension of the ESKOM DSM obligation to an energy saving target from DSM of e.g. 1% 
per year (compared against the baseline) would increase the effectiveness of the current 
obligation. 
The existing policy mix for RES technologies or CHP for electricity could be supplemented 
through extending the targeted economic policy instruments by feed-in tariffs or green 
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certificates, improving the legal framework by introducing favourable regulations on grid 
access and power purchase agreements, accelerated building permission procedures, 
strengthening information measures by training for relevant actors as well as promoting 
research and technology transfer through RD&D schemes and co-operative procurement. 
Today, there are no specific policy instruments targeting RES technologies for heat and cold. 
These technologies could be promoted through targeted financial support for the installation 
of RES technologies for cold and heat, standards like building codes with a mandatory share 
of RES for heat and cold, information such as networks and training for relevant actors as 
well as research and technology transfer measures like RD&D schemes and public and co-
operative procurement. 
Additional policies and measures for promoting efficient fossil fuel power plants could be 
targeted financial policies such as investment support for power plants with a high 
conversion efficiency, regulation such as minimum standards for the conversion efficiency of 
new built plants or a RD&D scheme. 
Requiring new built fossil fuel power plants to be designed “capture ready” could bring CCS 
forward. This would also have indirect implications on energy prices and make energy from 
fossil fuels more expensive. Support and co-operation with Annex I countries will be needed 
in this field. 
GHG emissions stemming from the power production sector can also be indirectly targeted. 
Climate policy instruments and measures aiming at improving energy end-use efficiency and 
energy conservation in households or the industry have an effect on the country’s energy 
demand. Especially in the household sector, there are already a number of promising energy 
efficiency policy instruments in place. They include an energy label for household appliances, 
minimum energy efficiency standards or demand side activities carried out by energy 
companies. A more detailed discussion of additional policy instruments for improving energy 
end-use efficiency in the household and service sector can be found in the sourcebook.  
 
8.3.2.2 Transport 
This section gives suggestions for improving the existing mix of climate policy instruments in 
the transportation sector.  
Table 24: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the transportation sector (Climate policy measures and instruments 
for which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy  • Targets/quotas for sustainable 
biofuels 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Tax exemptions for sustainable 
biofuels 
• Energy taxation on fuels 
• Phase-out of subsidies and tax 
exemptions for vehicle fuels 
• Domestic emission trading scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Support of efficient vehicles 
• Taxi recapitalisation programme 
 
• Road fees, congestion charges 
• CO2-differentiated vehicle taxation 
• Depreciation rules favouring 
energy efficient vehicles 
• Financial support for switching from 
road-based to rail- or waterway 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
based transportation 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• National Land Transport Transition 
Act 
• Vehicle emission strategy 
 
• Average specific emissions target 
for new vehicles regarding GHG 
emissions 
• Dynamic MEPS for vehicles 
components 
• Tighter speed limits 
• Spatial planning favouring non-
motorised and public transport 
• Integrated transport planning 
Information and know-
how transfer 
• Public awareness campaigns for 
using public transport 
• Vehicle labelling 
• Driver training programmes 
• Promotion of public transport 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • Research on sustainable 
transportation systems 
 
The existing mix of climate policy instruments and measures in the South African 
transportation sector consists of several instruments. They include mainly targeted economic 
and fiscal policies (e.g. financial support for efficient and low polluting vehicles, subsidies for 
scrapping old taxis), regulations (e.g. emission standards) and information measures (e.g. 
public awareness campaigns for using public transport). 
The ambitious potential of about 42 MtCO2eq in 2020 in the transport sector can be realised 
by introducing a number of additional climate policies and measures.  
Crosscutting policy instruments are a phase out of subsidies and energy taxation on fuels as 
well as a domestic emission trading scheme in the transport sector (connected to an average 
specific emission target).  
Aiming at different fields of application (biofuels, individual motor car transport, air transport, 
public transport and freight transport), additional policy instruments could support the 
realisation of the ambitious potential. Policy instruments for targeting biofuels include a quota 
and tax exemptions. For targeting vehicles, several policy instruments are available. Such 
policy instruments could be targeted economic and fiscal policies and measures like for 
example road charges, a CO2-differentiated vehicle taxation or favourable depreciation rules 
for efficient vehicles. Standards could consist of average specific emission targets for new 
vehicles, dynamic MEPS for vehicle components, speed limits or integrated transport 
planning. Additional climate policy instruments of the category information and know how 
transfer could be vehicle labelling, driver training programmes or promotion of public 
transport and modal split. A shift from road-based to rail- or waterway-based transport can be 
induced by direct financial support such as tax reductions or subsidies.  
 
8.3.2.3 Industry 
Suggestions for improving the climate policy mix in the industrial sector are made in the 
following.  
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Table 25: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the industrial sector (Climate policy measures and instruments for 
which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • Energy efficiency strategy for the 
industrial sector 
 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-
efficiency and RES (e.g. backed by 
the ESKOM DSM scheme) 
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Financial support for the 
optimisation and installation of 
energy efficient technologies linked 
to energy audits and management 
systems, e.g. as a part of the 
ESKOM DSM scheme 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Energy efficiency accord (voluntary 
agreement) 
• Extension of the energy efficiency 
accord 
• Minimum energy efficiency 
standards (for energy using 
equipment as well as building 
permits for new industrial 
production facilities) 
Information and know-
how transfer 
• Energy audits 
• Energy management systems 
• Information and training of relevant 
actors 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • RD&D scheme for energy efficient 
production technologies and 
methods 
 
The existing policy mix in the industrial sector has already a number of promising policy 
instruments. The framework is set by the energy efficiency strategy (which is linked to the 
general energy efficiency strategy), which aims at energy savings of about 14% until 2014. 
Specific measures include variable speed drives, efficient motors, compressed air 
management, efficient lighting, heating, ventilation and cooling as well as thermal savings 
(more efficient use and production of heat). Another important policy instrument is the energy 
efficiency accord, which includes the 37 large industries in South Africa. These industries 
have signed the Energy Efficiency Accord and established technical committees where they 
discuss how to fulfil the energy efficiency target. 
For exploiting the ambitious potential of 41 MtCO2eq in the industrial sector, the following 
additional climate policies and measures are suggested. 
Cross-cutting issues are the gradual phase out of subsidies for energy from fossil fuels and 
the potential introduction of a domestic emissions trading scheme. 
The recent mix of policy instruments could be supplemented by direct financial support for 
introducing energy efficient technologies and production methods. Such an instrument 
should also be linked to other policy instruments such as the participation in energy audits or 
the introduction of energy management systems. Furthermore, additional policy instruments 
include information and training of relevant actors or a RD&D scheme for energy efficient 
production technologies and methods. 
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8.4 Options for a stronger involvement of South Africa in the 
international regime 
South Africa has been constructive in the post-2012 negotiations, as evidenced by its 
proposal on “Sustainable Policies and Measures” (SD-PAMs). While it has indicated a 
willingness to take on a very loose type of commitment, South Africa is also one of the 
Parties to stress the responsibility of industrialised countries for the climate problem. This 
could be observed by its request for large and ambitious commitments by Annex I countries 
in AWG3. At AWG4, it called for mitigation through legally binding reductions by Annex I 
Parties and voluntary action by developing countries with technological and financial support. 
 
8.4.1 Analysis 
South Africa has the responsibility, capability and potential to make a contribution to the 
international effort to reducing emissions. In comparison to other countries, South Africa is at 
a relatively advanced development state with GDP/cap well above developing country 
average and still above world average. Per capita emissions are well above world average 
and in the range of those of Poland, Spain and Italy. South Africa would therefore be one of 
the first countries to move to an advanced stage in a multistage regime: 
• Responsibility: South Africa’s responsibility for climate change due to its historical 
emissions excluding LULUCF is slightly above world average. LULUCF emissions do 
not play a major role. 
• Capability: South Africa’s per capita income is above world average on a GDP PPP 
basis. But its human development index is just below average. This is an indication 
that the income is very unevenly distributed. 
• Potential: South Africa disposes of a substantial mitigation potential. According to the 
figures from Phase II of the project, the no-regret potential to reduce 2020 emissions 
below BAU levels amounts to 57 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 110 Mt and the 
ambitious mitigation potential to 212 MtCO2eq. These would be equal to a 9%, 18% 
or 35% reduction compared to BAU levels respectively and a +19%, +7% or -15% 
change compared to 2005 emissions levels. 
South Africa is still a developing country, its emissions are high but development is very 
unevenly distributed. The electricity/coal sector is by far the sector with the largest emissions 
and also the highest capability. This sector is also highly developed and likely to be 
institutionally capable to handle an emission limitation or reduction target. At the same time, 
high levels of inequality and the history of Apartheid mean that the country still has to 
address some very basic needs of some parts of the population. Hence climate targets need 
to allow South Africa’s socio-economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
Earlier analyses put South Africa also at a high level compared to other developing countries. 
Ott et al. (2004) classify South Africa as “rapidly industrialising country” implying an absolute 
limitation target (i.e. a ‘growth cap’ on emissions) if funding and technology are provided from 
Annex I countries. Others find that South Africa would have to accede to Annex I soon if 
emissions/capita or GDP/capita thresholds are applied, a little earlier for emissions/capita 
(Gupta 2003; Höhne et al. 2005).  
South Africa disposes of some of the technical capacity necessary to quantify emissions and 
reductions. Comprehensive statistics exist in South Africa. Mainly economic, financial, social 
and energy indicators are included (Statistics South Africa 2006). In the National 
Communication detailed data are available for all gases and sectors for 1990 and 1994 
(Government SA 2000). Apart from that no emission data have been officially published yet. 
National studies on the effect of policies to reduce emissions do exist. Winkler et al. (2005a, 
2005b) assume South Africa to have a sound institutional infrastructure “to measure and 
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verify the implementation of energy efficiency interventions in industry”. This includes 
industrial clients, the electric utility Eskom, energy service companies and four South African 
universities who are involved in measurement and verification. A National Energy Efficiency 
Agency was established under the Central Energy Fund in late 2005. 
According to the World Bank (2006), one of the major challenges South Africa faces is the 
development of institutional mechanisms to enable the formulation, adoption and 
implementation of integrated national climate change policies. According to the National 
Communication (Government SA 2000) “an urgent need exists for the establishment and 
maintenance of a greenhouse gas emissions inventory database. An independent verification 
system to ensure that only verified data is included in a national emissions database needs 
to be developed and maintained.” 
 
8.4.2  Suggestions for a potential contribution 
Given the amount of global emission reductions required to keep temperature change below 
2°C and based on the above analysis, we suggest that it would be equitable and feasible for 
South Africa to commit to sectoral no-lose targets for the power production and industry 
sectors.  
We propose two options for the level of stringency based on the assessment of what amount 
of reductions is necessary by 2020 to bring global emissions on a 2°C trajectory (see section 
11): 
The target could either be set at a stringent level correlated to the ambitious mitigation 
potential but implementation would have to be made contingent on the provision of financial 
and non-financial support from Annex I countries. The total target for both sectors would in 
this case amount to about 191 MtCO2eq annual emissions in 2020, about 36% below the 
BAU level. 
Alternatively, the targets could be set at a lower level, for instance correlated to the co-
benefit mitigation potential. The total target for both sectors would in this case amount to 
about 256 MtCO2eq, about 14% below BAU levels. South Africa could then nevertheless 
implement ambitious policies and measures to overachieve the target and sell the resulting 
surplus on the carbon market. This alternative would require less direct financial and non-
financial support from Annex I countries but more support through the carbon market and 
hence more stringent emission reduction targets for Annex I countries of 45% compared 
1990 as opposed to 30% as assumed for the option above. 
If targets are not politically feasible, a second-best option could be to implement sectoral or 
policy-based CDM projects in the power production and industry sectors. Sectoral CDM 
would probably be politically more acceptable for developing countries. However, the 
technical implementation of sectoral CDM and sectoral no-lose targets would probably be 
very similar and no-lose targets have a twofold advantage: first, there would be no need to 
assess the additionality of emission reductions, and second, no-lose targets open the 
opportunity to achieve net reductions, namely the difference between BAU and the target. 
Under the CDM, everything below BAU would be credited.  
In addition, South Africa could commit to implementing a set of SD PAMs for the sectors not 
covered by the sectoral no-lose targets or sectoral CDM. South Africa would quantify the 
effect of the package of SD PAMs in advance. The total package of sectoral no-lose targets 
and SD PAMs should aim at mobilising the full ambitious mitigation potential. However, the 
implementation of these policies and measures would be conditional on additional 
international funding to cover the higher costs compared to business-as-usual development.  
Due to missing capacity in these sectors, the emission reductions achieved through PAMs 
could probably only be roughly estimated. Therefore, no direct link is assumed between 
policies and the international carbon markets. Practical measures related to investment 
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needs could be linked to international funding, e.g. through the GEF or other international 
funds, but also to private sector CDM projects. 
9. South Korea 
9.1 South Korea in comparison to other countries 
Table 26 provides different energy and emission indicators. The right column shows how 
South Korea performs compared to other countries. The figures illustrate that South Korea 
ranks very high among developing countries with respect to its state of development. Its GDP 
per capita and emissions per capita are well above that of most developing countries and 
above world average.  
Table 26. Energy and emission indicators for South Korea 
 Indicator Value Meter 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 
Cumulative emissions 1900 to 2004 
per capita per year 2.3 tCO2eq/cap./y  
    
GDP per capita (2004) 19,400 US $ PPP 2000/cap. 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 
Human development index 2002 0.888 (high) 
    
Past emission trend from 1990 to 
2004 +73% 
 
Emissions per capita (2003) 10.8 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions per GDP (2004) 558 tCO2eq/MUS$ (2000)
Emissions per kWh electricity (2003) 437 gCO2/kWh 
Energy efficiency in industry High  
Emissions in transport per capita 
(2003) 2.19 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in households and services 
per capita (2003) 1.42 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in agriculture per capita 
(2000) 0.25 tCO2eq/cap. 
Emissions in waste per capita (2000) 0.14 tCO2eq/cap. 
P
ot
en
tia
l 
Emissions in land use change and 
forestry per capita (1990) -0.56 tCO2eq/cap. 
For detailed explanation of the meters and data sources see Appendix A. 
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South Korea’s is in its state of development very close or even similar to some Annex I 
countries: Its population was almost stable in the last decade. Its electricity system is largely 
based on nuclear power, making emissions per kWh very low. Its industrial sector makes up 
a large share of its emissions, but it is one of the most efficient in the world. Transport and 
household emissions are high, agricultural emissions are not relevant.  
South Korea is classified as country with a high human development index. Its GDP per 
capita lies well above world average and middle income countries average. It is in the range 
of the Czech Republic, Greece and Cyprus. After the establishment of the UNFCCC South 
Korea became member of the OECD and is therefore, similar to Mexico, a non-Annex I but 
OECD country.  
Figure 19 shows the shares of South Korea’s energy sources up to the year 2003. Oil is by 
far the most important energy source (49% in 2003). Coal (23%), nuclear (17%) also 
contribute considerably to total primary energy supply. Gas, renewables and waste only play 
a minor role. 
South Korea’s carbon intensity fell by 1.2% to 0.614 t carbon/toe per year between 1990 and 
2001. A major reason for this was the shift from coal use to a higher share of natural gas and 
nuclear power. Methane emissions from fuel combustion were comparatively high in 1990 
(715,700 t carbon) and declined by 65% by 2001 (Government South Korea 2003). 
Primary energy supply
Share in 2003
Biomass/waste 0.4%
Solar/wind/other 0.0%
Geothermal 0.0%
Hydro 0.2%
Nuclear 16.5%
Gas 10.7%
Oil 49.3%
Coal 22.9%0
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Figure 19. South Korea’s primary energy supply between 1990 and 2003 (IEA 2005b) 
 
9.2 Reference emissions and mitigation potential  
Figure 20 below shows South Korea’s greenhouse gas emissions under the business-as-
usual scenario and all three reduction scenarios. Major sources for future data in South 
Korea are trend extrapolation of national and IEA statistics (IEA 2005a). 
As illustrated in Figure 20, the reduction potential for South Korea is 13% (no-regret), 19% 
(co-benefit) and 42% (ambitious potential) below BAU. The three sectors with the highest 
GHG emissions reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the 
(1) industrial, (2) power and (3) transport sector. In the industrial sector, there exists an 
ambitious potential of 212 MtCO2eq in the year 2020. The ambitious potential in the power 
sector is estimated at 112 MtCO2eq. In the transport sector, there is an ambitious potential of 
about 80 MtCO2eq. The total ambitious potential in Korea is estimated at 443 MtCO2eq in the 
year 2020. A detailed overview of the potential per sector and scenario can be found in 
Appendix B. 
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Figure 20. Scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions in South Korea between 1990 and 2020. 
 
Figure 21 shows South Korea’s total reduction potential on the sector level under the 
ambitious potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual scenario and the remaining 
emissions according to sectors. 
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Figure 21. South Korea’s emissions under the business-as-usual and the ambitious potential 
scenario on a sector basis between 1990 and 2020. Striped areas show the sectoral emission 
reduction potential under the ambitious potential scenario compared to the business-as-usual 
scenario. (Emissions from LUCF kept constant after 2003 due to data availability) 
 
Most important findings for South Korea: 
- South Korea’s emissions are projected to increase by about 3% per year between 
2000 and 2020 under the business-as-usual scenario. 
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- In 2000 most emissions result from industry (33%), power production (27%) and 
transport (22%) Under the business-as-usual scenario, the share is projected to be 
more or less constant although the importance of power production will decrease, 
while the share of industry will increase. 
- South Korea has a high share of nuclear energy in the electricity mix, high efficiency, 
some use of combined heat and power generation and low distribution losses. Major 
reduction option is to move to renewable energy sources.  
- South Korea’s industry is already very efficient but is growing very fast. Moving to 
more use of renewable energy could compensate for the growth.  
- In the transport sector reduction options are considerable. A shift to more natural gas 
and biomass use is one emission reduction option. Another element is to increase 
efficiency, especially in aviation and road transport, and a shift to increase the 
absolute amount of rail transport.  
- Under the no-regret potential scenario reductions of 13% below BAU (38% above 
2005 emissions) might be possible. Under the co-benefit potential scenario 
reductions of 19% below BAU (28% above 2005 emissions) could be feasible. Under 
the ambitious potential scenario, overall emission reductions of 42% below BAU (9% 
below 2005 emissions) might be possible. 
 
9.3 Existing and possible further national climate policies 
9.3.1 Overview of existing climate policies and measures 
This section gives a general overview of existing climate policies and measures in the 
Republic of Korea. For this purpose, we distinguish between policies and measures targeting 
energy efficiency improvements, energy supply and other relevant sources of GHG 
emissions. 
If not stated otherwise, the source for this section is the latest National Communication to the 
UNFCCC (Government South Korea 2003). 
Korean climate policy has a strong focus on electric appliance energy-efficiency and the 
transport sector. The framework is set by the second comprehensive action plan, which 
consists of three parts. The first part includes the promotion of GHG reduction technologies 
and environmentally friendly technologies, the second part a strengthening of climate policies 
and measures and the third part increased public participation and cooperation. Furthermore, 
there are programmes promoting highly efficient products or energy-efficient appliances (e.g. 
energy labels and standards limiting stand-by power consumption to below 1 W). 
A number of policies and measures targeting energy efficiency and energy conservation 
have been implemented in Korea. For the industrial sector, they include energy audits and 
voluntary agreements on reducing GHG emissions. Standards on building insulation and 
design, building certificates or energy labels target energy consumption in the residential and 
commercial sector. In the transport sector, a number of instruments aiming at reducing fuel 
consumption of vehicles have been implemented. They include e.g. the promotion of hybrid 
and compact cars, traffic and logistic management systems or a promotion of public 
transport. Furthermore, there is financial support for the expansion of energy service 
companies. 
Policy instruments aiming at the energy supply in Korea include a programme targeting 
renewable energy by strengthening supply and demand, financial support for the expansion 
of district heating and cooling and regulation on increasing the share of gas and nuclear 
power in the energy mix.  
A number of climate policies and measures targeting other relevant sources of GHG 
emissions have been implemented in Korea. Climate policy instruments targeting the waste 
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sector include a programme aiming at waste minimisation and recycling, the improvement of 
landfills, financial support for the utilisation of landfill gas, waste incineration or improved 
sewage and waste water treatment. For targeting GHG emissions in the agricultural sector, a 
programme on methane management and best farming practices as well as livestock 
management have been implemented.  
 
9.3.2 Suggestions for additional climate policy instruments and 
measures 
The following section analyses the existing climate policies and measures for sectors with 
the highest GHG emissions reduction potential in the Republic of Korea. Based on the 
sourcebook, we give suggestions for improving the existing mix of climate policy instruments 
and measures with additional policies and measures in order to exploit the full reduction 
GHG emissions reduction potential. The three sectors with the highest GHG emissions 
reduction potential between 2005 and 2020 (ambitious potential) are the (1) industrial, (2) 
power and (3) transport sector.  
Climate policy measures and instruments where the country potentially needs assistance 
from Annex I countries are highlighted in italic in the following tables. Such instruments are 
mainly investment support or RD&D schemes. Chapter 2.3 presents more generally which 
category of policy instruments is considered appropriate for addressing the no-regret, co-
benefits, and ambitious potential, respectively. 
 
9.3.2.1 Industry 
This section gives suggestions for improving the climate policy mix in the industrial.  
Table 27: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the industrial sector (Climate policy measures and instruments for 
which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • 3 year plan for energy audits of the 
energy intensive industry 
 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Gradual phase-out of direct and 
indirect energy subsidies and price 
control backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-
efficiency and RES 
• Ecological finance reform 
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Low interest policy funds for energy 
efficient technologies linked to 
energy audits 
• Financial support for the 
optimisation and installation of 
energy efficient technologies linked 
to energy audits and management 
systems 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Voluntary agreements • Minimum energy efficiency 
standards (for energy using 
equipment as well as building 
permits for new industrial 
production facilities) 
Information and know-
how transfer 
• Energy audits • Energy management systems 
• Information and training of relevant 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
actors 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • RD&D scheme for energy efficient 
production technologies and 
methods 
 
Climate policy in the industrial sector in Korea focuses on energy audits and low interest 
policy funds for implementing the options for energy efficiency detected during the energy 
audit. Furthermore, there are voluntary agreements with energy intensive companies on 
reducing GHG emissions 
For exploiting the ambitious potential of 212 MtCO2eq in 2020 in the industrial sector, the 
following additional climate policies and measures are suggested. 
Cross-cutting issues for realising the ambitious potential in the industrial sector are the 
gradual phase out of subsidies for energy from fossil fuels, an ecological finance reform and 
the potential introduction of a domestic emissions trading scheme. 
The recent mix of policy instruments could be supplemented by direct financial support for 
introducing energy efficient technologies and production methods. Such an instrument 
should also be linked to other policy instruments such as the participation in energy audits or 
the introduction of energy management systems in companies. Furthermore, additional 
policy instruments include MEPS for energy using equipment and building permits for new 
industrial production facilities, information and training of relevant actors or a RD&D scheme 
for energy efficient production technologies and methods. 
 
9.3.2.2 Power 
This section outlines existing climate policies and measures in the Korean power sector. 
Suggestions for improving the existing climate policy mix are given in order to exploit the 
GHG emissions reduction potential.  
Table 28: Overview of existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the power and heat sector (Climate policy measures and instruments 
for which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy • Renewable energy programme 
aiming at the supply and demand 
side 
• Renewable energy targets for heat 
and cold supply 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Ecological finance reform 
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
• Gradual phase-out of energy 
subsidies backed by financial and 
technical support for energy-
efficiency and RES 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Financial support for renewable 
energy targeting demand (e.g. cost 
reduction measures, preserving 
margin from electricity transaction 
costs)  
• Financial support for renewable 
energy targeting supply (test 
• Feed-in tariffs or electricity quota 
(green certificates) for RES and 
CHP 
• Financial support for the installation 
of RES technologies for cold and 
heat 
• Investment support for 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
villages) 
• Financial support for district heating 
and cooling 
• Financial support for energy 
service companies 
improvements in the conversion 
efficiency of fossil fuel power plants 
(linked to MEPS, see below) 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Supply of gas and nuclear power 
 
• Favourable regulations on grid 
access and power purchase 
agreements for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Create target for energy savings 
from DSM by utilities to 1% per 
year (compared against the 
baseline)  
• Accelerated building permission 
procedures for RES and CHP 
plants 
• Building codes with a mandatory 
share of RES for heat and cold 
• Dynamic minimum conversion 
efficiency standards, regularly 
updated 
• “CCS-ready” obligation for new 
built power plants 
Information and know-
how transfer 
 • Network of local actors 
• Demonstration and training on RES 
and CHP technologies targeting 
contractors, retails sales staff, 
architects and engineers 
Research and technology 
transfer  
 • RD&D schemes for accelerated 
development, technical 
improvement and market 
introduction of RES and CHP 
technologies for electricity, heat 
and cold, efficient fossil fuel power 
plants and for analysis of CCS 
• Public and co-operative 
procurement of RES technologies 
 
A number of additional climate policies and measures are suggested for strengthening the 
existing mix in the power sector in order to exploit the ambitious potential of 112 MtCO2eq in 
the year 2020. 
The framework for realising further emission reduction potential in the power sector could be 
set by an ecological finance reform, a domestic emissions trading scheme and a gradual 
phase out of fossil fuel subsidies backed by technical and financial support for RES 
technologies and energy efficiency. This would contribute to levelling the playing field for 
RES and energy efficiency technologies. Saved subsidies for coal and other fossil fuels could 
be used for financing energy-efficiency and RES. In turn, improved energy-efficiency would 
contribute to lowering the energy costs for consumers and outweigh the higher costs of 
energy due to the phase-out of subsidies.  
RES and CHP technologies for electricity could be supported by favourable feed-in tariffs, 
regulations on power purchasing and grid access, accelerated building permission 
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procedures, training of local actors, public or co-operative procurement as well as RD&D 
activities. 
RES and CHP technologies for heat and cold could contribute to reducing fossil fuel and 
electricity consumption for these fields of application. Based on a target for heat and cold 
from RES, additional policy instruments like direct investment support, building codes with a 
mandatory share of RES for heating and cooling or training activities for relevant actors help 
to realise emission reduction potential in this field. 
Additional policies and measures for promoting efficient fossil fuel power plants could be 
targeted financial policies such as investment support for power plants with a high 
conversion efficiency, regulation such as minimum standards for the conversion efficiency of 
new built plants or a RD&D scheme. 
Requiring newly built fossil fuel power plants to be designed “capture ready” could bring CCS 
forward. This would also have indirect implications on energy prices and make energy from 
fossil fuels more expensive. Support and co-operation with Annex I countries will be needed 
in this field. 
GHG emissions stemming from the power production sector can also be indirectly targeted. 
Climate policy instruments and measures aiming at improving energy end-use efficiency and 
energy conservation in households or the industry have an effect on the country’s energy 
demand. Especially for the household sector, a number of climate policies and measures 
have already been implemented. They include building codes and certificates, financial 
support for energy efficient buildings, MEPS for electric domestic appliances and energy 
labelling. A more detailed discussion of additional policy instruments for improving energy 
end-use efficiency in the household and service sector can be found in the sourcebook. 
 
9.3.2.3 Transport 
This section gives suggestions for improving the mix of climate policy instruments in the 
transport sector.  
Table 29: Overview over existing climate policies and measures and suggestions for improving 
the existing policy mix in the transport sector (Climate policy measures and instruments for 
which the country needs predominantly financial assistance from Annex I countries are 
highlighted in italics) 
Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
Framework policy  • Targets/quotas for biofuels 
General economic and 
fiscal policy 
 • Tax exemptions for sustainable 
biofuels 
• Energy taxation on fuels 
• Phase-out of subsidies and tax 
exemptions for vehicle fuels 
• Domestic emissions trading 
scheme 
Targeted economic and 
fiscal policy 
• Financial support for low polluting, 
energy efficient vehicles 
• Promotion of compact and hybrid 
cars 
• Promotion of diesel engines 
• Road fees, congestion charges 
• CO2 differentiated vehicle taxation 
• Depreciation rules favouring 
energy efficient vehicles 
Regulations and 
voluntary agreements 
• Air quality preservation act 
• Idle running vehicles 
• Expansion of public transport 
• Average specific emissions target 
for new vehicles 
• Dynamic MEPS for vehicles 
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Category of the policy 
instrument 
Existing climate policies and 
measures  
Suggestions for additional climate 
policies and measures 
• Transport system efficiency act components 
• Tighter speed limits 
• Spatial planning favouring non-
motorised and public transport 
• Integrated transport planning 
Information and know-
how transfer 
• Logistic information network 
• Traffic demand management 
systems 
• Information campaigns targeting 
idle running vehicles 
• Vehicle labelling 
• Driver training programmes 
• Promotion of public transport 
Research and technology 
transfer  
• RD&D on compact and hybrid cars 
as well as diesel engines 
• Research on sustainable 
transportation systems 
 
The ambitious potential of about 80 MtCO2eq in 2020 in the transport sector can be realised 
by introducing a number of additional climate policies and measures.  
The existing mix of climate policy instruments and measures in the Korean transportation 
sector consists of a number of promising instruments. They include mainly targeted 
economic and fiscal policies (e.g. financial support for efficient and low polluting vehicles), 
regulations (e.g. emission standards) and information measures (e.g. traffic demand 
management systems). 
Cross-cutting policy instruments are a phase out of subsidies and energy taxation on fuels as 
well as a domestic emissions trading scheme in the transport sector (connected to an 
average specific emission target).  
Aiming at different fields of application (biofuels, individual motor car transport, air transport, 
public transport and freight transport), additional policy instruments could support the 
realisation of the ambitious potential. Policy instruments for targeting biofuels include a quota 
and tax exemptions. For targeting vehicles, a number of different policy instruments are 
available. Such policy instruments could be targeted economic and fiscal policies and 
measures such as road charges, CO2-differentiated vehicle taxation or favourable 
depreciation rules for efficient vehicles. Standards could consist of average specific emission 
targets for new vehicles, dynamic MEPS for vehicle components, speed limits or integrated 
transport planning. Additional climate policy instruments of the category information and 
know how transfer could be vehicle labelling, driver training programmes or promotion of 
public transport. A shift from road-based to rail- or waterway-based transport can be induced 
by direct financial support such as tax reductions or subsidies. 
 
9.4 Options for a stronger involvement of South Korea in the 
international regime 
South Korea belongs not only to the G77/China but also to the Environmental Integrity 
Group. As South Korea is an OECD member and its GDP exceeds those of some countries 
with economies in transition, it is one of the first candidates for graduating from the group of 
non-Annex I countries and taking a comparable level of commitments as industrialised 
countries. South Korea has substantial capacities not only in economic terms but also in 
technical terms, as evidenced in its second National Communication. South Korea has not 
yet clearly presented its position on the future of the climate regime. 
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9.4.1 Analysis 
South Korea’s scores on the indicators responsibility, capability and potential are therefore 
among the highest of developing countries: 
• Responsibility: South Korea’s responsibility for climate change due to its emissions 
excluding LULUCF is at world average.  
• Capability: South Korea’s per capita income is well above world average and closer 
to Annex I average. Its human development index is at Annex I average.  
• Potential: Despite the high efficiency of the South Korean economy and the large 
share of nuclear power in electricity production, the mitigation potential is substantial. 
According to the figures from Phase II of the project, the no-regret potential to reduce 
2020 emissions below BAU levels amounts to 133 Mt, the co-benefit potential to 
200 Mt and the ambitious mitigation potential to 443 MtCO2eq. These would be equal 
to a 13%, 19% or 42% reduction compared to BAU levels respectively, and a +38%, 
+28% or -9% change compared to 1990 emissions levels. 
Earlier analyses put South Korea also at a high level compared to other developing 
countries. Ott et al. (2004) classify South Korea as “newly industrialised country” implying an 
absolute limitation or reduction target with some funding provided from Annex II countries. 
Others find that South Korea would have to accede to Annex I very soon if emissions/capita 
or GDP/capita thresholds are applied (Höhne et al. 2005). 
In addition, South Korea disposes of all the technical capacity necessary to quantify 
emissions and reductions. South Korea is at a very high level of development compared to 
the other countries considered in this report. Its policy-making is advanced. In the National 
Communication detailed data are available for all gases and sectors from 1990 to 2001 
(Government South Korea 2003). 
 
9.4.2 Suggestions for a potential contribution 
Given the need for mobilising almost the full ambitious mitigation potential and based on the 
above analysis, we suggest that it would be equitable and feasible for South Korea to join 
Annex I and commit to an absolute and binding national emission limitation target. South 
Korea’s target could be set at about a level correlated to the ambitious emission reduction 
potential, i.e. at about 604 MtCO2eq annual emissions in 2020. This would be equal to a 42% 
reduction compared to 2020 BAU levels and a 9% decrease compared to 2005 levels. 
South Korea would be able to participate fully in international emissions trading under Article 
17 of the Kyoto Protocol. Hosting JI projects but not CDM projects would be possible. No 
direct transfers of resources would be made to South Korea. 
10. Resulting overall framework 
In the previous chapters we have described the national circumstances of the six countries, 
the mitigation potential and a possible contribution to the international climate regime.  
Table 30 includes a summary of the suggested contributions from the countries covered 
above ordered by decreasing overall stringency. Based on their respectively high and low 
levels of economic development, we propose that it would be equitable for South Korea to 
join Annex I and for India to commit to implementing Sustainable Development Policies and 
Measures. We present two options for Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and China.  
In option A, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and China would commit to national or sectoral no-
lose targets to be set at the “ambitious level” but subject to financial support by Annex I 
countries outside of the carbon market. Together with a 30% reduction below 1990 levels for 
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Annex I countries, these contributions would allow to bring global emissions on a 2°C 
trajectory (see section 11). 
An alternative framing (option B) could be envisaged that is equally stringent but is relying 
more on the carbon market as financing instrument and not on additional financial 
assistance. In this alternative framing Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and China would commit 
to no-lose targets in the same sectors at their co-benefit potential. To bring global emissions 
on a 2°C trajectory, the target for Annex I countries would then need to be 45% below 1990 
in 2020, not 30%. The additional 15 percentage points could be met through further domestic 
reductions in Annex I and/or provide additional financial resources to developing countries 
through demand for credits from the no-lose targets. In this alternative, Annex I countries 
would provide technical assistance to remove non-market barriers, but not substantial 
additional resources outside of the carbon market to developing countries to directly reduce 
emissions. 
Table 30. Summary of illustrative example contributions for 2020 ordered by decreasing overall 
stringency 
Option A Option B Country Type Scope 
Emission 
level 
Financing Emission 
level 
Financing 
South 
Korea 
Absolute and 
binding 
national 
emission 
limitation 
target 
All sectors Well below 
BAU (e.g. 
40%) 
No additional 
financing 
Well below 
BAU (e.g. 
40%) 
No additional 
financing 
Mexico Absolute no-
lose emission 
target 
All sectors Well below 
BAU (e.g. 
40%) 
Conditional 
on financial 
support 
Below BAU 
(co-benefit 
potential, e.g. 
15%) 
Technical 
assistance to 
reach co-
benefit 
potential 
Brazil Absolute no-
lose emission 
target 
All sectors Well below 
BAU (e.g. 
15%) 
Conditional 
on financial 
support 
Below BAU 
(co-benefit 
potential, e.g. 
6%) 
Technical 
assistance to 
reach co-
benefit 
potential 
Sectoral no-
lose targets 
Power 
production 
and industry 
sector 
Well below 
BAU (e.g. 
35%) 
Below BAU 
(co-benefit 
potential, e.g. 
18%) 
South 
Africa 
Sustainable 
development 
policies and 
measures 
Remaining 
sectors 
Not 
quantified 
Conditional 
on financial 
support 
Not 
quantified 
Technical 
assistance to 
reach co 
benefit 
potential 
Sectoral no-
lose targets 
Power 
production, 
iron/steel 
and cement 
sectors 
Well below 
BAU  
(e.g. 30%) 
Below BAU 
(co-benefit 
potential, e.g. 
14%) 
China 
Sustainable 
development 
policies and 
measures  
Remaining 
sectors 
Not 
quantified 
Conditional 
on financial 
support Not 
quantified 
Technical 
assistance to 
reach co 
benefit 
potential 
India Sustainable 
development 
policies and 
measures 
All sectors Well below 
BAU  
Conditional 
on financial 
support 
Well below 
BAU  
Conditional 
on financial 
support 
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We observe from the table a differentiation between the countries ranging from Annex I like 
commitments to moderate supported emission reductions. We also observe that the 
proposed reduction level varies between countries based on our analysis of mitigation 
potential.  
11. Consistency with 2°C limit 
The IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report specifies the requirements of global emissions to 
be in line with global average temperature increase of 2°C: global emissions need to peak by 
2015 and decline to 50 to 85% below 2000 levels by 2050 (IPCC 2007a). In this section we 
test whether the ambition level provided in this report is consistent with the 2°C limit. 
Taken together, the reduction potential of all the considered countries, Brazil, China, India, 
Mexico, South Korea, South Africa, would amount to 9% (no-regret) 15% (co-benefit), and 
31% (ambitious potential) compared to the BAU of these countries (excluding LUCF). 
Assuming a reduction of 30% below 1990 emissions by 2020 by Annex I countries, this 
would lead to global emissions of +41% above 1990 emissions (no-regret), +37% above 
1990 emissions (co-benefit) and +27% above 1990 emissions (ambitious potential). 
Figure 22 below on the left hand side shows global greenhouse gas emissions up to 2020 
under the business-as-usual scenario split into Annex I and non-Annex I countries. The 
reduction potential identified here as “non-Annex I” includes only the potential identified in 
this report for the six countries for the ambitious scenario. Additional mitigation potential in 
non-Annex I countries other than the six analysed here would be available in addition. It will, 
however, be lower as the six countries cover more than 50% of the emissions of non-Annex I 
countries in 2020. Annex I countries are assumed to reduce emissions 30% below the 1990 
level. 
The right hand side of the picture shows possible emission paths that aim at limiting global 
average temperature increase to 2°C. To asses this we have made the following 
assumptions (for a detailed description of the methodology see Höhne and Blok 2006): 
• In all cases it is assumed that anthropogenic CO2 emissions from deforestation and 
afforestation are constant from 1990 to 2020 at 1 GtC. (Estimates for these emissions 
vary significantly between 0.5 and 2 GtC. Reference emissions are usually assumed to 
decline during the middle of the century.)  
• After 2020 global CO2 emissions (all sources and countries together) are assumed to 
decline so that CO2 concentration in 2100 is below 400 ppmv: In a first phase after 2020, 
the trend in global CO2 emissions is assumed to decline by 0.5 percentage points per 
year. In a second phase (as of 2030 to 2045) global CO2 emissions decline by a 
constant percentage. In all cases, CO2 concentration in 2020 is already at 400 to 
415ppmv, rises further (430 to 455 ppmv in around 2040) and finally declines to reach 
400 ppmv in 2100. 
• The calculations are performed on the basis of CO2 only. All other greenhouse gases 
are assumed to be reduced at the same rate. The CO2 equivalent concentration in 2100 
would be roughly 450 ppmv CO2eq.   
We present these global pathways for 5 cases: 
• Starting from the BAU case in 2020, emissions would need to decline by about 10% per 
year after 2020 to keep the CO2 concentration below 400 ppmv, making it virtually 
impossible to reach the 2° goal.  
 129
• In case Annex I countries reduced emissions by 30% by 2020 and the six considered 
non-Annex I countries followed their BAU, global CO2 emissions would need to decline by 
4.9% per year over several decades, still a very demanding task.  
• If Annex I reduced by 30% and those six non-Annex I countries met their whole co-
benefit potential, global emissions would need to decline by 4.3% per year. 
• If Annex I reduced by 30% and those six non-Annex I were able to reduce emissions 
according to their ambitious potential as calculated here, global emissions would need to 
decline by 3.5 % per year.  
Keeping in mind the uncertainties of the calculations, we still conclude from the figure the 
encouraging finding that global emission growth from 2010 to 2020 can be halted by 
implementing the ambitious scenario in the six non-Annex I countries. But after 2020, 
substantial further global reductions are necessary to stay below the 2°C limit.  
We assumed here implicitly that emissions from land-use change and forestry would follow 
the same path as all other emissions after 2020. Including the specific mitigation potential of 
the LUCF sector, the reductions after 2020 for the other sectors could be relaxed a little. The 
reason is that most business-as-usual scenarios already describe a decline in LUCF 
emissions in the early half of the century.  
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Figure 22. Global greenhouse gas emissions including reduction scenarios for Annex I (-30% 
domestic reductions compared to 1990 by 2020) and non-Annex I (ambitious potential 
reductions for Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea between 1990 and 
2020). On the right hand side possible global reduction paths under all scenarios between 2020 
and 2050 are provided to stay below the 2° limit in the long term.  
 
It is difficult to compare these findings to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 2007b, 
figure SPM 6) as the IPCC referrers to 2030 and does not distinguish among countries. 
However, the report identifies an average reduction potential of about 13 GtCO2eq for the 
group of non-OECD countries (including Brazil, China, India, and South Africa) and of about 
6 GtCO2eq for the group of OECD countries (including Mexico and South Korea) at costs 
below 100 USD per tCO2eq These figures exclude transport and forestry. Transport would 
add another 2.5 GtCO2eq reduction potential on the global level. The ranges between 
minimum and maximum figures are huge and could add or subtract about 50% of the overall 
potential. Nevertheless, the results show that our estimates are roughly in line with the IPCC 
findings.  
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A study commissioned by Vattenfall assumes that the 2° limit can be met with emission 
reduction measures up to 40€/GtCO2eq on the global level (Vattenfall 2007). In the Vattenfall 
study this leads to about 11GtCO2eq emission reduction by 2020. This includes forestry and 
a high share of negative costs in the building sector. Country details are only available for 
China and therefore difficult to compare to our estimates. We assume at least a global 
reduction by 15 GtCO2eq related to higher financial efforts. We excluded LUCF and did not 
make assumptions on the building stock due to insufficient data in the considered countries. 
Other crucial assumptions are discount rates, future technology development, future 
development of emissions and conversion of 2° temperature increase into a global emission 
stabilisation level. 
12. Support for enhanced mitigation action 
The previous sections highlighted the need for financial support for enhanced mitigation 
action in the six developing countries. Substantial financial resources are necessary to make 
the required changes. This chapter further examines the potential role of existing 
mechanisms to provide the necessary resources to enhance the efforts to limit and reduce 
emissions and to take on the proposed commitment. 
 
12.1 Financial support for non-Annex I countries 
Financial support for a switch to low- and no-carbon technologies is a key element to 
enhance the participation of non-Annex I countries in the climate regime. This sub-section 
presents an overview of policies and measures that require financial support, based on Work 
Package III of this project. It analyses the pros and cons of existing instruments to provide 
financial support under the climate regime, and examines ways to provide the level of 
support necessary to enhance the participation of all six Parties. The analysis is, however, 
not confined to these countries but also largely applicable to other developing countries. 
Originally, this section was intended to devise a strategy for mobilising financial resources to 
realise the no-regret, co-benefit, and ambitious potential identified in Parts II and III. Due to 
the limited information available, however, this section can to a large extent only provide 
general suggestions that touch upon the role of international financial support to realise the 
mitigation potential. 
 
12.1.1 Policies and measures that require financial support (by 
country and by sector) 
Based on Part II, Part III identified additional domestic policies and measures in the three 
sectors with the highest emission reduction potential of each country. It also suggested that 
the following policies and measures could strengthen the existing policies and measures but 
require financial support for realisation (see Table 31). Providing adequate financial support 
for the policies and measures will greatly enhance the chances of participation by the six 
countries in a future mitigation regime. It should be noted that some of the measures 
identified in Part III under the heading of “non-financial support”, such as capacity building, 
research and development etc., also require financial resources. 
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Table 31. Additional policies and measures that require financial support for realisation  
 Sector Financial support 
Power Phase-out of direct and indirect energy subsidies or energy price control backed 
by financial support for improving energy end-use efficiency 
Installation of RES technologies 
Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants  
Brazil 
Transportation Switching from road-based to rail-or waterway based transportation in the 
transportation sector connected to an improved regulatory and financial 
framework which reduces risks and fosters investments 
Power 
 
Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants 
Installation of RES technologies  
China 
Industry Optimisation and installation of energy efficient technologies linked to energy 
audits and management systems 
Power Phase-out of direct and indirect energy subsidies or energy price control backed 
by financial support for improving energy end-use efficiency 
Installation of RES technologies  
Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants  
India 
Industry Optimisation and installation of energy efficiency technologies linked to energy 
audits and management systems  
Power  Phase-out of direct and indirect energy subsidies or energy price control backed 
by financial support for improving energy end-use efficiency 
Installation of RES technologies 
Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants 
Mexico 
Industry  Optimisation and installation of energy efficiency technologies linked to energy 
audits and management systems 
Power  Phase-out of direct and indirect energy subsidies or energy price control backed 
by financial support for improving energy end-use efficiency 
Installation of RES technologies 
Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants 
South Africa 
Industry  Optimisation and installation of energy efficiency technologies linked to energy 
audits and management systems 
Power Installation of RES technologies  South Korea 
Industry  Investment support for improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel 
power plants 
 
12.1.2 Existing instruments in the international climate regime to 
provide financial support  
Under the international climate regime there are two main instruments, namely financial 
mechanisms and the CDM, to provide financial support for projects to limit and reduce GHG 
emissions in non-Annex I parties. In order to examine the potential role of the two 
instruments and the way to improve the current instruments for realising the potential 
identified in Parts II and III, we compare the instruments in terms of the size of the funds, the 
donors, funded activities, requirements, procedure and timing of payments. The results are 
summarised in Table 32.  
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The size of the funds: While 1 billion USD will be provided through the financial 
mechanisms under the climate change convention in the framework of the GEF’s fourth 
replenishment (2006-2010) (GEF 2006, p. 3), the CDM may mobilise more than 24 billion 
USD by 2012, given that 2.4 Gt of emissions will be reduced through the current pipeline of 
CDM projects that have been registered or are at the validation stage and assuming a CER 
price of 10 USD. Both GEF and CDM financing usually leverage total investments or co-
financing that are 4-6 times higher (UNFCCC 2007, pp. 140, 164). 
Donors: While the resources for the financial mechanisms are in general public money 
provided by the governments of Annex II parties, in the case of the CDM they are provided 
non only by government but also by the private sector in Annex I parties where companies 
can use CERs to comply with national climate policy obligations. 
Funded activities: While the CDM provides resources only for projects to directly reduce 
GHG emissions (hard-type projects), the financial mechanisms provide also resources for 
infrastructure development necessary to implement the climate convention (soft-type 
projects), including the development of National Communications.  
Requirements: Both the CDM and the financial mechanisms require baseline setting: The 
CDM requires that projects are “additional” and the financial mechanisms only pay for the 
“incremental costs”. The two instruments are thus not different in terms of providing financial 
support for hard-type projects that were identified in Phase III. The financial mechanisms, 
however, cover the full costs of establishing infrastructure necessary to implement the 
climate convention because they are incremental. 
Procedure: CDM projects follow a rather complex procedure from the approvals by host and 
investment Parties over validation by independent experts to registration by the CDM 
Executive Board. The procedure of the financial mechanisms is less complex than that of the 
CDM. However, in the case of the financial mechanisms the responsibility to submit project 
proposals and acquire GEF approval lies with the non-Annex I Parties, while the 
responsibility to proceed the CDM projects lies with project developers. 
Timing of payments: Under the financial mechanisms, parts of the resources are provided 
upfront and the rest is provided during the implementation of projects. Under the CDM, some 
economic actors are willing to provide part of the carbon finance upfront, but the dominant 
business model is payment on delivery. Since projects typically require upfront financing for 
implementation, this feature of the CDM market seriously inhibits project development. 
 
Table 32. Comparison of existing instruments in the international climate regime to provide 
financial support 
 Financial Mechanisms CDM 
The size of the funds 1 billion USD through the GEF’s fourth 
replenishment (2006-2010), in total 15 
billion USD since it started. 
more than 24 billion 
by 2012 
(2.4 Gt of emission reductions (pipeline of 
CDM projects) ＊ 10 USD 
Donors Governments of Annex II Parties Governments + the private sector in Annex 
I parties 
Funded activities Directly reduce GHG emissions (Hard-
type) + infrastructure development 
necessary to implement the climate 
convention, e.g. NATCOM (soft-type)  
Projects to directly reduce GHG emissions 
(hard-type projects)  
Requirements “Incremental costs” “Additionality” 
Procedure Less complex than that of the CDM but the 
responsibility to submit project proposals 
and acquire GEF approval lies with the 
non-Annex I Parties.  
A rather complex procedure from the 
approvals by host and investor Parties 
over validation by independent experts to 
registration by the CDM Executive Board.  
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Timing of payments Part of the resources is provided upfront 
and the rest is provided during the 
implementation of projects 
The dominant business model is payment 
on delivery 
 
 
The above comparison illustrates the following points. 
First, resources currently provided by the financial mechanisms are too small compared to 
the secretariat’s estimate that additional investment and financial flows of 200-210 billion 
USD will be required in 2030 for mitigation (UNFCCC 2007, pp. 100-102). The CDM has 
potential to make up for the gap. It should be noted, however, that the resources provided 
through the CDM highly depends on Annex I reductions. Bringing global emissions on a 2°C 
trajectory on the one hand and creating the necessary demand for carbon credits on the 
other would necessitate Annex I reduction targets in the range of minus 45%.  
Second, the CDM also has other limits due to its tendency to focus on projects with large 
reduction potential as only those provide incentives for private project developers. The 
financial mechanisms are thus – at least for the time being – more appropriate to address the 
needs of many non-Annex I Parties to provide financial resources for smaller projects. 
Third, the financial mechanisms are perhaps better equipped to mobilise resources for 
realising the co-benefit potential. This is because the GEF promotes activities in other 
defined areas of global environmental concern, i.e. international waters and ozone depletion 
(Matz 2002, p. 504). Moreover, UNEP, one of the implementing agencies of the GEF, takes 
the responsibility for project consistency with existing environmental treaties. Of course, 
projects to realise co-benefit potential can be funded also through the CDM. The co-benefit 
does, however, not increase the attractiveness of the CDM for private project developers.  
Fourth, the implementation of non-financial support needs financial resources. The financial 
mechanisms have their merits in this regard because they mobilise resources for establishing 
the infrastructure necessary to implement the obligations stipulated in the climate change 
convention in a relatively easy manner. Therefore, they may be utilised to provide financial 
resources for non-financial support measures. A particularly good example of how to provide 
financial resources for policies to promote renewable energy in developing countries is 
presented in Box 1 on support for feed-in tariffs. 
And last, both the CDM and the financial mechanisms have one deficiency because in 
principle they do not provide resources to projects that realise no-regret potential – due to the 
requirements of additionality and incremental costs. While it is possible in principle under the 
CDM to demonstrate additionality by proving that non-economic barriers would prevent 
project implementation under business-as-usual, the low number of energy efficiency 
projects highlights the problems encountered in practice with this approach. 
Based on the above analysis, we suggest to first restructure the financial mechanisms as 
explained in 12.3. Second, it is recommended to enhance bi-national, regional, and multi-
national cooperation in order to provide more public funds for no-regret potential and for non-
financial support and, third, to mobilise more private funds in order to realise no-regret and 
co-benefit potential.  
In order to devise a specific proposal for restructuring the financial mechanisms, for 
mobilising public and private funds, and for tabling a specific proposal on the best mix of 
tools for realising mitigation potential, more in-depth research in the following areas is 
required:  
• First, a more detailed analysis on reduction potential realised by each policy and cost 
analysis for introducing and implementing each policy in the six countries; 
• Second, consideration of other multi-lateral funds and ODA for having a comprehensive 
view of financing scheme as this study focussed its analysis on the financing scheme 
embedded in the UNFCCC; 
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• Third, a detailed analysis on the problems that existing public and private funds 
encounter in order to clarify the areas that the financial mechanisms, the CDM, and the 
other financing scheme can best target. 
 
Box 1: Feed-in tariffs 
Feed-in tariffs have proven to be the most successful instrument to promote renewable 
energy. First introduced in Denmark and Germany, the instrument has found its way into 
many countries’ legislation. Even Uganda has successfully implemented a modified feed-in 
system, where the difference between the market price and the stipulated tariff is not passed 
on to the consumer but paid by the state. In the case of North-South cooperation, Annex II 
countries would not pay the difference to the market price, but the difference between the 
feed-in tariff and the long-run marginal production costs of fossil fuel power plants that would 
be the alternative in the grid area that is served. This would avoid funding national energy 
subsidies. 
There have already been studies on the transferability of the German experience to China 
(Beschberger and Reiche 2006). More in-depth studies would be advisable. It should be 
pointed out, however, that the national framework and playing field for renewables must be 
well prepared before any financial instrument like CDM or Annex II country payments can be 
successfully applied (Sterk et al. 2007a). 
The promotion of feed-in laws in non-Annex I countries would contribute to the economic and 
social development, also in terms of employment, of the region or country concerned, thus 
contributing to sustainable development. Supporting a feed-in system in non-Annex I 
countries could thus prove to be one of the most promising ways to promote low-carbon or 
no-carbon development. This measure could be implemented bilaterally as well as 
multilaterally. It would also allow easy monitoring and control, since only the power actually 
fed into the grid by renewable energy sources would be eligible for funding by Annex II 
countries. 
 
12.2 Additional support options for enhanced mitigation action: non-
financial support  
Financial support is a vital element for any comprehensive climate strategy, but its efficiency 
and effectiveness is greatly enhanced if it is supported by other means of cooperation and 
support. 
Non-Annex I countries could benefit greatly from enhanced non-financial support. Exchange 
of knowledge and cooperation in research and development are potentially effective 
instruments of introducing and disseminating new technologies and political instruments (de 
Coninck et al. 2007). This form of technology cooperation has been employed outside of the 
climate regime, e.g. in the “Methane to Markets Partnership” (M2M), the ”Carbon 
Sequestration Leadership Forum” (CSLF) and the ”International Partnership for the 
Hydrogen Economy” (IPHE). It has, however, not yet played an adequate role in the context 
of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
It is important that the cooperation in RD&D activities starts at an early stage in the 
development of a technology because at a later stage the thorny issue of Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPRs) often prevents common approaches. If, however, cooperation starts 
early, new technologies can become common goods. These efforts should therefore be part 
of the larger technology deal between Annex I and non-Annex I countries (12.3). 
In general and for all countries, RD&D schemes are recommended for the accelerated 
development, technical improvement and market introduction of RES and CHP technologies 
for electricity, heat and cold, efficient fossil fuel power plants and in most countries for the 
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analysis of CCS technologies. Other promising joint RD&D activities are schemes for energy 
efficient production technologies and methods and on sustainable transportation systems. 
In addition to these general recommendations, there are special recommendations for each 
country: 
- Many RD&D activities in Brazil have taken place in order to foster the switch from gas to 
bioethanol, especially in the context of the national alcohol programme for the transport 
sector (Proalcool). Cooperation in this field would probably benefit Germany/Europe as 
much as vice versa. 
- China has shown immense interest in joint activities regarding RD&D and has even 
proposed the establishment of a ”Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund” (MTAF) that 
could buy IPRs for low- and no-carbon technologies. On the other hand, China herself 
has put in place restrictions on importing wind power equipment. Joint schemes for 
cooperation in RD&D regarding wind power therefore appear to be particularly promising. 
In view of the heavy reliance on coal in the power sector, the analysis of CCS 
technologies is particularly important. 
- India has not yet shown a similar interest in technology cooperation as has China. 
Nevertheless there is considerable potential for mutually beneficial exchanges of ideas 
and concepts. This concerns the development and deployment of RES technologies 
(especially wind, solar and biomass) and especially the outdated energy infrastructure. 
Considering India’s heavy reliance on coal, there is great potential for cooperation in 
efficient power generation technology and CCS. 
- Mexico is an advanced developing country, in some respects comparable to Annex I 
countries and technology cooperation can be of mutual benefit. It has a long tradition of 
advanced energy efficiency standards, which could provide a basis for joint research in 
this area. Due to the heavy reliance of Mexico on oil and gas in the power sector, there is 
considerable potential in RD&D cooperation concerning efficient oil and gas fuelled 
power plants. 
- South Africa is an advanced developing country with a heavy reliance on coal in 
electricity generation. Therefore, joint RD&D in coal technology (support for 
improvements in the conversion efficiency of fossil fuel power plants) and CCS appear to 
be a particular attractive option. There is considerable potential for RES technologies, 
therefore RD&D schemes for accelerated development, technical improvement and 
market introduction of RES technologies for electricity, heat and cold should be 
considered. 
- In terms of economic development and GHG emissions, South Korea resembles an 
Annex I country. Cooperation on RD&D thus also takes the form of industrialised country 
cooperation, e.g. in the context of the OECD and the IEA. Recommended are RD&D 
schemes for accelerated development, technical improvement and market introduction of 
RES and CHP technologies for electricity, heat and cold, efficient fossil fuel power plants 
and for the analysis of CCS technologies. 
All six countries analysed in this report would furthermore benefit from cooperation in 
standard setting and the creation of technology mandates. This form of international 
technology cooperation comprises the agreement of energy efficiency standards, mandates 
for technologies like renewable energy or the introduction of economic incentives for the 
deployment of certain technologies (e.g. subsidies for RES or tax incentives). There is 
furthermore substantial benefit in sharing the experiences of the EU and Germany in the 
establishment of an ETS or an ecological finance reform. 
 
12.3 A technology alliance with the emerging economies 
The negotiations in Bali have impressively confirmed the analysis that technology 
cooperation with financial support between Annex I and non-Annex I countries will assume a 
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prominent role in the negotiations on a post-2012 agreement. Technology cooperation was 
pushed centre stage by non-Annex I countries very early and remained there until the end. 
Developing countries, especially the emerging economies, expect considerable support for 
choosing a low-carbon and no-carbon economic development. Articles 4.3 and 4.5 of the 
UNFCCC represent the legal justification for this demand. A substantial offer for cooperation 
in technology development and deployment could thus play a vital role for effective 
negotiations towards COP15/CMP5 to be held in 2009 in Copenhagen (Ott 2007a; 2007b). 
The challenge and at the same time the opportunity for an enhanced participation of non-
Annex I countries, lies in developing an integrated system for the development and 
deployment of innovative technologies. This should combine high efficiency with the capacity 
to gradually develop and improve because it should be designed in such a way as to allow 
the future integration of non-Annex I countries in a GHG control regime. 
The negotiations on a new mandate for the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) 
provide some important insights for potential building blocks of such a strategy. One 
indication for the direction is the substitution of the term “technology transfer” by the term 
“technology development and deployment”. Whereas the former term connotes a one-
directional flow of knowledge and technologies from North to South, the latter expression 
carries a notion of a mutually beneficial exchange and cooperation. 
The pressure for enhanced cooperation on technology comes first and foremost from China, 
which already in 2000 recommended the establishment of a “Mechanism for Technology 
Transfer“ (FCCC/SBSTA/2000/MISC.4). Recently, China recommended the establishment of 
a “Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund” (MTAF). This fund should provide the financial 
resources to buy intellectual property rights (IPRs) and thus allow a more rapid deployment 
of environmentally sound technologies in non-Annex I countries.  
In Bali it quickly became apparent that technology cooperation is one of the most important 
conditions for developing countries to take on substantial commitments in any future post-
2012 framework. Through the longest negotiations in the COP history, Parties finally reached 
an agreement on the Bali Action Plan which mentions that “mitigation actions by developing 
country Parties supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a 
measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.“ (Ott et al. 2008) 
In view of these developments, Annex I countries should take a positive and proactive stance 
on the future role of technology and financing. This is because, first, the results of the IPCC-
AR4 command rapid and decisive reductions on a global scale if the global mean 
temperature rise is to stay below 2°C. Second, this urgency has provided non-Annex I 
countries – and especially the largest and most advanced of them – with quite enhanced 
negotiation power: Integrating these countries in the global climate regime has moved from 
being desirable to being an absolute necessity. 
A close collaboration between Europe and the larger non-Annex I countries is essential for 
effective negotiations (Oberthür and Ott 1999). However, this presupposes an agreement on 
the basic terms of cooperation. And it cannot be expected that the first step towards such a 
deal will come from non-Annex I countries – this must come from the European Union (Ott 
2007b; 2007a). An offer of integrated technology cooperation in the context of a new climate 
alliance could present such a first step. It can combine the interest of the EU in integrating 
the larger economies of the non-Annex I countries in a control regime with the interest of the 
emerging economies in new and cleaner technologies.  
Such an offer should comprise cooperation in the research, development and deployment 
(RD&D) of low- and no-carbon technologies, the elaboration of common standards and – 
as its core – a substantial commitment to financing the switch to low- and no-carbon 
technologies.  
It has become apparent that the switch to low- and no-carbon technologies will require much 
higher financial volumes – estimates of the finances required range from Euro 20-30 billion in 
the Stern Review (Stern 2006) to US$ 200-210 billion in 2030 according to the UNFCCC 
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Secretariat (2007). In the long term, innovative ways will have to be found to generate 
financial means of this magnitude – like the taxation of air traffic or issuing special drawing 
rights, which could both generate about US$ 10-15 billion. In the short and medium term, 
however, such a fund will probably have to be financed with public money of Annex II 
countries (Ott 2007a). Taking part of the means generated by auctioning the emission rights 
under the European Emissions Trading system would already provide a considerable part of 
the means required. 
Such a fund should therefore be the central element of such an offer, which should be 
modelled on the Montreal Protocol Fund. The Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987), established in 1990, 
is one of the reasons for the astounding success of the Montreal Protocol in protecting the 
ozone layer. Operational from 1991, the Multilateral Fund has received contributions totalling 
US$ 2.2 billion and supported about 5.500 projects in 144 developing countries resulting in 
the phase-out of several hundred thousand tonnes of ozone depleting substances 
(http://www.multilateralfund.org). An important element in the success of this fund is the 
Executive Committee, which consists of seven developing and seven industrialised countries 
with a voting structure designed to ensure that neither donors nor recipients are able to 
dominate the body (double majority voting). This fund therefore provides a useful blueprint 
for financing technology alternatives to fossil fuels as well. If this fund was supposed to be 
established under the GEF, it’s institutional set-up should nevertheless be modelled on the 
Montreal Protocol’s fund – the decisions taken in Nairobi 2006 relating to the governing 
structure of the Adaptation Fund already point into this direction (Sterk et al. 2007). Parties 
agreed at CMP3 in Bali that the newly established Adaptation Fund Board shall consist of 16 
members, with two representatives from each of the five UN regional groups, one from SIDS, 
one from the LDCs, two others from Annex I parties as well as two representatives of non-
Annex I parties. Decisions of the Board shall be taken by consensus; if no consensus can be 
reached, a two-thirds majority applies. This design for the Adaptation Fund provides a 
workable model for a post-2012 mitigation fund. 
In addition to the fund, the Montreal Protocol employed a second innovative feature in order 
to replace outdated technology – the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP). 
These panels were established by the Meeting of the Parties in order to provide and 
exchange the latest information on new technologies. The members were chosen according 
to their expertise and were supposed to act in their personal capacity, most of them came 
from industry and they were engineers rather than managers. With these design features the 
TEAP managed to incite the spirit of competition among the members from industry in order 
to come up with the latest technology (Ott 1998). 
 
Box 2: Elements of a proposal for a technology alliance 
Elements of a proposal for a technology alliance: 
- cooperation in the research, development and deployment (RD&D) of low- and no-carbon 
technologies 
- elaboration of common standards 
- substantial commitment to financing the switch to low- and no-carbon technologies 
o governance modelled after Montreal Protocol Fund 
o Technology and Economic Assessment Panels 
- commitment for financing adaptation to climate change 
o focus on technologies that have co-benefits in terms of mitigation 
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This new technology cooperation must be placed within the context of the carbon markets 
because these emerging markets are providing the background for all activities in the fight 
against climate change. In the North-South context the CDM is of particular importance. 
Certainly, the CDM cannot substitute the specialised means of cooperation in technology 
development and deployment and non-Annex I countries are emphasising that the CDM 
cannot be seen as an implementation of Article 4.5 (SBSTA 2000). It can, however, 
considerably improve the conditions for technological innovation and the deployment of 
innovative technologies in developing countries. 
The offer of such a new technology alliance could provide a vital push for the post-2012 
negotiations. Greatly enhanced cooperation in technology development and deployment 
could easily be expanded to include technologies for adaptation to the inevitable 
consequences of climate change. This would provide a positive incentive for the poorer 
developing countries (not considered otherwise in this report) that are not expected to 
undertake mitigation activities but are looking for ways to improve their resilience to climate 
impacts.  
Even if all emissions were stopped today, global warming would continue well into the future 
– the atmosphere is already “loaded” with an additional 0.7°C that will materialise in the 
course of the next 20-30 years. Already today some negative consequences of climate 
change are observed in many regions of the world. According to preliminary estimates by the 
World Bank the yearly cost to “climate-proof” development in low-income countries would be 
in the range of US$ 10-40 billion. This estimate was made before the last IPCC report and 
might have to be revised upwards. Although only an estimate, the World Bank figure 
indicates the magnitude of the problem and the urgent need for additional resources to be 
mobilised. 
In the face of these challenges the efforts so far are inadequate. All in all, the financial means 
designated for adaptation under the GEF amount to less than one percent of the sum 
required. It is thus imperative to make an adequate offer for funding adaptation measures 
and capacity building. The interdependency of mitigation and adaptation will require some 
form of streamlining in any case: On the one hand, mitigation activities will have to be 
checked against possible impacts of climate change (like changing rainfall patterns). On the 
other hand, adaptation technologies should be “climate proof” as well, thus supporting not 
only the resilience of a country against climate change but also contributing to foster 
increased independence from fossil fuels and the accompanying emissions. 
Such an integrated offer of financing mitigation and adaptation activities by the EU would be 
an expression of the openness for new and creative ways to counteract the climate crisis. 
This challenge requires giving up traditional forms of diplomacy that are based on narrow 
notions of national interest (Sachs and Ott 2007). A true partnership with the new actors from 
non-Annex I countries must be part of this new approach.  
For the European Union, this would open up new horizons in the global arena. First, this 
strategy would confirm the EU as being the global leader on climate policy. Second, this 
would support the Lisbon strategy of turning the Union into a highly creative and competitive 
area. Third, this would greatly improve relations with developing countries, especially the 
emerging economies, thereby strengthening the geopolitical weight of the Union. And fourth, 
this would counteract the strategy of the US to deflect from the multilateral process by 
offering technology cooperation. Offering concrete and substantial support by creating a 
technology alliance with the South will ensure that the initiative lies again with the EU and will 
keep the emerging economies firmly in the multilateral UNFCCC climate regime.  
13. Synthesis and conclusions 
This report provides a detailed overview of the national circumstances, emission levels, 
mitigation potential and policies and measures for the major developing countries Brazil, 
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China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea. These countries account for more than 
50% of non-Annex I parties’ emissions. The report further proposes enhanced mitigation 
activities for these countries and elements of international financial and non-financial support 
for realising these contributions. 
Participation by these developing countries in a future international climate regime is often 
called for, but it is usually unclear how and how much these countries should participate, 
what kind of support they need and in which sectors. This project aim to provide a more 
detailed view on these six countries to understand how they could best make a contribution 
to the regime and how they could best be supported in limiting their greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
The project was completed in 4 phases: 
• In the first phase, we provided a literature review of the issues at hand: An overview 
of which types of commitments have been proposed for emerging developing 
countries in the literature, a first overview of policies implemented by Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea that have an effect on greenhouse gas 
emissions, and an overview of the literature that calculates emission reduction 
potential and reduction costs. 
• In a second phase, we developed a bottom-up spreadsheet calculation model to 
describe past and possible future emission trends and reduction options in a 
consistent format for Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea.   
• In the third phase, we outlined and analysed the existing mix of climate policy 
instruments and measures (based on phase I and a review by experts from the 
different countries) in the sectors with the highest GHG emission reduction potential 
of the respective country (based on the findings from phase II). 
• In the fourth phase, we transferred the findings of phases II and III into the 
international arena. To this end, we suggested potential contributions to the mitigation 
of climate change by the six countries and outlined financial and non-financial support 
necessary to enhance the efforts of the emerging economies in limiting and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, based on the options and potential identified in phase II 
and the measures identified in phase III. We concluded with the proposal for a 
technology alliance with the emerging economies. The analysis concentrates on 
support in the context of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. It was based on the 
principles of ecological adequacy (keeping global temperature increase below 2°C) 
and differentiation between the countries based on their national circumstances. 
The tool developed in this project allows comparing mitigation potential across major 
developing countries in a comparable manner for individual sectors, which is currently not 
available. As in any model, the results depend on the input assumptions. However, this tool 
allows using the same input assumptions for all countries to compare the results.  
The no-regret and co-benefit mitigation potential in the six developing countries is substantial 
according to our analysis. It is in the interest of these countries to achieve the reductions that 
are possible at no net costs (9% below reference) and reductions with a co-benefit other than 
climate (together 17% below reference). International support may be necessary to remove 
the barriers that currently prevent these reductions to occur. 
Additional reduction potential is available that allows to put these countries on a path that is 
consistent with 2°C. Most countries, except South Korea, would need financial assistance to 
realise this mitigation potential. 
In all six countries there are already significant policies and measures in place that lead to 
mitigation of GHG emissions. Examples are binding targets and financial support for 
expanding the use of renewable energy, demand-side management, energy audits and 
voluntary agreements on increasing energy efficiency, promoting public transport and 
consumption or emission standards for vehicles.  
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The existing policy packages in the six countries can be individually supplemented by 
additional policies to realise the mitigation potential. The type and design of the policies 
largely depend on the current circumstances and emission profile of the country. Major 
components are reducing energy subsidies and taxing fossil fuels while at the same time 
compensating consumers by supporting them in saving energy, feed-in tariffs for electricity 
from renewable sources, direct financial support for cool and heat from renewable sources 
as well as energy efficiency measures, demand-side management by utilities, efficiency 
standards for buildings and equipment, stronger support for public transport and integrated 
transport planning. 
The proposals for the international climate regime were based on an assessment of what 
level of effort is needed to reach the 2°C target. It emerges that if Annex I countries reduce 
their domestic emissions by 2020 by 30% below 1990 levels (i.e. without purchases from the 
carbon market), which is ambitious, still almost the full ambitious potential in the six countries 
considered here needs to be mobilised to stop emission growth within the next decade. 
Based on this finding, we developed two options:  
• Domestic reductions of 30% for Annex I countries as well as ambitious net 
contributions from non-Annex I countries. These contributions would be made possible 
by substantial direct financial and technical assistance from Annex I to cover the higher 
costs compared to the BAU scenario. 
• Less ambitious contributions from non-Annex I countries at the level of their co-benefit 
potential. To bring global emissions on a 2°C trajectory, the target for Annex I countries 
would then need to be 45% below 1990 in 2020, not 30%. The additional 15 
percentage points could be met through further domestic reductions in Annex I and/or 
be used to mobilise the ambitious potential in non-Annex I through the carbon market. 
Based on their respective levels of economic development, the proposals for the 
contributions from the individual countries range from Annex I-like commitments to moderate 
supported emission reductions.  
As once again confirmed by the most recent climate summit in Bali, commensurate levels of 
financial and technical support from industrialised countries are the conditio sine qua non for 
increased mitigation action by developing countries. As the Bali Action Plan illustrates, 
technology cooperation and financing are prerequisites for developing countries to consider 
mitigation commitments in the negotiations for the post 2012 regime. 
Hence, industrialised countries should take a positive and proactive stance on the future role 
of technology. This is because, first, the results of the fourth assessment report of the IPCC 
command rapid and decisive reductions on a global scale if the global mean temperature rise 
is to stay below 2°C. Second, this urgency has provided developing countries – and 
especially the largest and most advanced of them – with quite enhanced negotiation power: 
Integrating these countries in the global climate regime has moved from being desirable to 
being an absolute necessity. 
An offer of integrated technology cooperation with substantial financial support in the context 
of a new technology alliance could present a first step. Greatly enhanced cooperation in 
technology development and deployment could also easily be expanded to include 
technologies for adaptation to the inevitable consequences of climate change, another key 
priority for developing countries. Such an offer would be an expression of the openness for 
new and creative ways to counteract the climate crisis. This challenge requires giving up 
traditional forms of diplomacy that are based on narrow notions of national interest. A true 
partnership with the newly emerging actors from non-Annex I countries must be part of this 
new approach. 
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Appendix A Description of performance meters 
The country studies include tables with country specific indicators and related performance 
meters. These meters compare the country’s performance to that of other countries for each 
of the four indicators. In general, the borders between the colours represent the non-Annex I 
average, world average and Annex I average (see Figure 23). As there are always small 
countries that are outliers at the top or bottom 
of the range (e.g. per capita emissions of 
Trinidad and Tobago are extremely high) we 
selected the upper boundary of the meter to 
exclude the top 2.5% of the population. 
Similarly the lower boundary excluded the 
bottom 2.5% of population. Hence, the full 
range of the meter includes 95% of the 
population. The indicators are out of this range 
for some countries (5% of the population). 
Values for the meters are given in Table 33. 
 
Table 33. Calibration of the meters 
Indicator Unit Minimum 
excl. 2.5% 
lowest 
population 
Non-Annex I 
average 
World 
average 
Annex I 
average 
Maximum 
excl. 2.5% 
highest 
population
GHG emissions/cap tCO2eq/cap. 0.48 3.10 5.38 14.62 24.65 
GDP PPP/cap Ths US$/cap. 0.85 4.61 8.58 24.82 37.27 
Human development Index 
(HDI)  0.365 0.647 0.690 0.899 0.941 
GHG emissions/GDP kgCO2eq/US$ 0.28 0.67 0.63 0.59 1.74 
Cumulative emissions 1900 
to 2004 per capita per year tCO2eq/cap./y  0.21 1.09 2.61 8.93 17.73 
Emissions per kWh kgCO2eq per kWh 0.01 0.92 0.71 0.61 1.37 
Emissions from transport per 
capita tCO2eq 0.03 0.34 0.89 3.13 6.51 
Emissions from households 
and services per capita tCO2eq 0.01 0.25 0.57 1.85 2.98 
Emissions from agriculture 
per capita tCO2eq 0.22 0.84 0.88 1.10 3.22 
Emissions from waste per 
capita tCO2eq 0.02 0.15 0.21 0.43 0.69 
Emissions from land use 
change and forestry per 
capita 
tCO2eq -2.69 0.62 0.31 -0.96 8.92 
 
Data sources: GDP according to World Bank (2005), Emissions from various sources including submissions to 
the UNFCCC, IEA (2005a) and USEPA (2006a), population according to the UN (2004), HDI according to UNDP 
(2004), own calculations as compiled in Höhne et al. 2006. Cumulative emissions from are cumulative GWP 
weighted. CO2 emissions are taken from Marland et al. 2003 and exclude land-use change and forestry. CH4 and 
N2O emissions are derived from national emissions for 1990 extended backward using the regional growth rates 
of Van Aardenne et al. 2001. The cumulative emissions are divided by the current population. Emissions/kWh are 
from IEA 2005a. 
Usually the Annex I average is above the world average and the non-Annex I average is below the world average. 
When this is not the case, values are shown here in italics and the order of Annex I and non-Annex I averages 
(and the corresponding colours) in the meters are swapped. 
Min
Non-Annex I
average
World
average
Annex I
average
Max
Country
 
Figure 23. Calibration of performance meters  
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Appendix B Overview of scenario results 
Table 34. Overview of scenario results per country 
1990 2005
BAU 
[Mt]
BAU 
[Mt]
BAU
[Mt]
No-
regret 
[Mt]
Reduction 
below 
BAU [Mt]
Reduction 
below 
BAU [%]
Co-
benefit 
[Mt]
Reduction 
below 
BAU [Mt]
Reduction 
below 
BAU [%]
Ambitious 
potential 
[Mt]
Reduction 
below 
BAU [Mt]
Reduction 
below 
BAU [%]
Brazil
Power production 19 39 160 123 37 23% 123 37 23% 40 120 75%
Other energy industry 9 12 20 17 3 13% 14 6 29% 11 9 44%
Industry 84 140 250 239 11 4% 239 11 4% 190 59 24%
Iron & Steel (CO2) 12 22 38 33 5 14% 33 5 14% 30 8 21%
Cement (CO2) 17 23 38 33 5 13% 33 5 13% 31 7 18%
Pulp & Paper (CO2) 2 4 7 7 0 0% 7 0 0% 4 3 40%
Rest (CO2) 43 78 139 139 0 0% 139 0 0% 121 18 13%
Households 14 18 25 25 0 0% 25 0 0% 25 0 0%
Commercial + Services 2 4 6 6 0 0% 6 0 0% 6 0 0%
Transport 101 169 320 285 35 11% 208 112 35% 156 164 51%
Agriculture 436 607 755 741 14 2% 741 14 2% 703 52 7%
Waste 35 43 72 68 4 6% 68 4 6% 50 22 30%
Non specified others 1 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0%
LUCF 1957 1373 1373 1373 0 0% 1373 0 0% 1373 0 0%
Total 2660 2408 2983 2879 104 3% 2796 187 6% 2555 429 14%
China
Power production 778 2013 3037 2897 140 5% 2562 474 16% 1715 1322 44%
Other energy industry 176 472 857 762 95 11% 676 181 21% 593 264 31%
Industry 1017 1621 2015 1600 415 21% 1600 415 21% 1245 770 38%
Iron & Steel (CO2) 173 346 471 364 107 23% 364 107 23% 342 129 27%
Cement (CO2) 182 782 1011 751 259 26% 751 259 26% 697 314 31%
Pulp & Paper (CO2) 31 28 54 40 14 26% 40 14 26% 17 37 69%
Rest (CO2) 602 334 294 264 30 10% 264 30 10% 177 117 40%
Households 349 251 328 328 0 0% 328 0 0% 328 0 0%
Commercial + Services 38 66 162 162 0 0% 162 0 0% 162 0 0%
Transport 132 369 986 861 125 13% 726 260 26% 591 395 40%
Agriculture 984 1209 1507 1509 -2 0% 1509 -2 0% 1412 95 6%
Waste 152 174 260 260 0 0% 260 0 0% 202 59 23%
Non specified others 40 18 20 20 0 0% 20 0 0% 20 0 0%
LUCF 224 -47 -47 -47 0 0% -47 0 0% -47 0 0%
Total 3910 6171 9153 8376 777 8% 7811 1342 15% 6223 2930 32%
India
Power production 305 670 1068 960 109 10% 714 355 33% 422 647 61%
Other energy industry 26 41 93 86 8 8% 75 18 20% 63 30 32%
Industry 208 376 958 811 147 15% 811 147 15% 713 245 26%
Iron & Steel (CO2) 52 115 408 338 70 17% 338 70 17% 314 94 23%
Cement (CO2) 44 85 263 190 73 28% 190 73 28% 190 73 28%
Pulp & Paper (CO2) 7 8 21 18 4 18% 18 4 18% 11 10 47%
Rest (CO2) 100 152 248 248 0 0% 248 0 0% 192 56 23%
Households 61 99 139 139 0 0% 139 0 0% 139 0 0%
Commercial + Services 15 12 18 18 0 0% 18 0 0% 18 0 0%
Transport 102 144 496 445 50 10% 349 147 30% 265 231 47%
Agriculture 330 403 579 478 101 17% 478 101 17% 435 144 25%
Waste 94 124 199 199 0 0% 199 0 0% 165 34 17%
Non specified others 0 1 1 1 0 0% 1 0 0% 1 0 0%
LUCF -34 -40 -40 -40 0 0% -40 0 0% -40 0 0%
Total 1110 1835 3518 3102 416 12% 2742 775 22% 2182 1336 38%
Mexico
Power production 112 203 295 265 30 10% 234 61 21% 109 186 63%
Other energy industry 19 27 38 30 8 20% 25 13 33% 15 23 61%
Industry 92 81 104 87 17 16% 87 17 16% 62 41 40%
Iron & Steel (CO2) 12 9 9 7 2 24% 7 2 24% 6 3 32%
Cement (CO2) 15 23 42 28 14 33% 28 14 33% 28 14 34%
Pulp & Paper (CO2) 3 1 2 2 0 9% 2 0 9% 1 1 38%
Rest (CO2) 59 39 34 34 0 1% 34 0 1% 25 10 28%
Households 19 24 32 32 0 0% 32 0 0% 32 0 0%
Commercial + Services 3 4 4 4 0 0% 4 0 0% 4 0 0%
Transport 111 160 255 236 19 7% 187 68 27% 144 111 43%
Agriculture 72 84 108 99 9 8% 99 9 8% 87 21 19%
Waste 37 48 80 80 0 0% 80 0 0% 48 31 39%
Non specified others 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0%
LUCF 136 136 136 136 0 0% 136 0 0% 136 0 0%
Total 605 770 1055 973 82 8% 882 173 16% 638 417 39%
South Africa
Power production 153 187 202 194 8 4% 172 30 15% 135 67 33%
Other energy industry 58 49 70 61 10 14% 50 21 29% 41 29 41%
Industry 76 71 97 84 13 13% 84 13 13% 56 41 42%
Iron & Steel (CO2) 29 14 15 11 3 23% 11 3 23% 8 7 48%
Cement (CO2) 7 12 24 14 9 39% 14 9 39% 14 10 42%
Pulp & Paper (CO2) 0 0 0 0 0 13% 0 0 13% 0 0 13%
Rest (CO2) 37 36 39 39 0 0% 39 0 0% 31 8 20%
Households 8 12 15 15 0 0% 15 0 0% 15 0 0%
Commercial + Services 4 7 9 9 0 0% 9 0 0% 9 0 0%
Transport 37 59 93 84 9 10% 67 26 28% 51 42 45%
Agriculture 47 46 71 54 17 24% 54 17 24% 57 14 20%
Waste 18 22 41 41 0 0% 41 0 0% 23 17 43%
Non specified others 1 0 0 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0%
LUCF 1 2 2 2 0 0% 2 0 0% 2 0 0%
Total 404 458 602 545 57 9% 492 110 18% 389 212 35%
South Korea
Power production 60 170 223 203 20 9% 168 55 25% 111 112 50%
Other energy industry 24 17 29 24 5 17% 22 6 23% 17 12 41%
Industry 88 235 420 338 82 20% 338 82 20% 209 212 50%
Iron & Steel (CO2) 3 16 13 11 1 11% 11 1 11% 9 4 30%
Cement (CO2) 25 36 35 22 12 36% 22 12 36% 22 13 36%
Pulp & Paper (CO2) 3 4 4 4 0 9% 4 0 9% 2 2 51%
Rest (CO2) 49 151 316 250 66 21% 250 66 21% 168 147 47%
Households 41 34 41 41 0 0% 41 0 0% 41 0 0%
Commercial + Services 22 36 40 40 0 0% 40 0 0% 36 4 9%
Transport 55 0 242 221 21 9% 194 48 20% 162 80 33%
Agriculture 23 27 31 30 1 3% 30 1 3% 30 1 2%
Waste 29 16 42 42 0 0% 42 0 0% 24 18 43%
Non specified others 3 4 4 0 4 100% 0 4 100% 0 4 100%
LUCF -26 -26 -26 -26 0 0% -26 0 0% -26 0 0%
Total 320 660 1047 914 133 13% 846 200 19% 604 443 42%
Total 9009 12301 18358 16790 1568 9% 15570 2788 15% 12591 5767 31%
2020
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Appendix C Overview of good practice policy packages 
 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Objectives of this paper 
The objective of work package (WP) 3 (section X.3. of each country chapter) is to develop 
packages of policies, measures, and instruments able to realise the GHG mitigation potential 
identified in WP 2 (section X.2 of each country chapter) of the project for six emerging 
economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea). 
The analysis in work package 3 is grouped into three steps: 
• In the first step, a sourcebook for policy packages for several GHG emitting sectors 
(and sub sectors if appropriate) is being developed. This sectoral sourcebook is 
based on an analysis of most recent policy proposals e.g. by the IPCC, IEA and 
others on current state-of-the-art policies and measures for the respective sector. It is 
presented in a systematic way that reflects the different groups of policies as well as 
the different potential categories.  
• The second step (country by country analysis) reflects for the sectors with the highest 
GHG mitigation potential (top-three sectors) in each of the six countries the policies 
already in place, those that would need to be improved or strengthened, and those 
policies that are missing in order to harness the full potential identified in WP 2. The 
sourcebook serves as background for this analysis.  
• The third step analyses for each policy group, sector and country, which policies can 
be pursued on a national basis, and for which potential international support or 
international cooperation might be necessary. It serves thus as an input to work 
package 4. 
This paper presents the results of the first step, i.e., the sourcebook for policy packages. 
 
1.2 Sectors analysed 
A Sourcebook is being developed based on most recent policy proposals for the following 
sectors: 
• Cross-sectoral climate and energy policy instruments 
• Power plants and heat production 
• Industry 
• Residential and commercial sector 
• Transport sector 
• Waste 
• Agriculture 
 
1.3 Categories of policies and measures 
To be effective, climate policy strategies must take into account the complex interplay of 
barriers, which usually requires a package of well-designed and mutually supportive policy 
instruments. It will be necessary to package different policies and measures into target 
group- and sector-specific market transformation programmes adequately addressing the 
different actors in a certain sector or sub-sector on a specific field of action (e.g. renewable 
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energy for electricity production, energy end-use efficiency in buildings, …). These packages 
together will strengthen incentives and overcome barriers for all actors in the particular field5. 
For the sectoral policy sourcebook, the policies and measures are grouped into a number of 
categories in order to provide a more systematic overview of the range of instruments. 
In general, we distinguish between five groups of policies and measures. These policy 
instruments target different types of GHG reduction potential such as the no-regret potential 
(individual benefits outweigh individual costs of GHG reduction options), the co-benefits 
potential (societal benefits approximately equal societal costs) and the ambitious potential 
(societal costs are bigger than societal benefits). The following policies can significantly 
contribute to exploiting the achievable GHG reduction potential by addressing various 
barriers through giving economic incentives, reducing transaction efforts for market actors, or 
setting standards: 
• A) General economic and fiscal policies and measures are having an impact on GHG 
emission reductions by providing for the right price signals in the markets and economic 
sectors by altering price ratios: energy/CO2 taxation, emissions trading, sustainable 
subsidy reform. 
Through internalising external costs or benefits and making them visible to the different 
actors, the no-regret and co-benefits potential for GHG reductions are targeted. In 
particular, the gap between both targets will be reduced, because the no-regret potential 
will be increased in size: better price signals are leading to higher individual benefits. 
Only if market actors expect further increases in energy or GHG (certificate) prices, such 
policies may also lead to early adoption of parts of the ambitious potential.  
These policies and measures are often cross-cutting to the sectoral approach but 
sometimes also sector-specific.  
• B) Targeted economic and fiscal policies and measures support the search for, or 
implementation of the sector- and technology-specific potential, such as subsidies for 
energy analyses (energy audits) or investment, feed-in tariffs for electricity from 
renewable energy sources or from cogeneration of heat and power, or certificate 
schemes for energy savings or electricity from renewable energy sources. Besides the 
no-regret potential, these policy instruments aim at the co-benefits and ambitious 
potential for GHG reduction options, since they directly aim at specific fields of 
application, sectors or technologies.  
They either overcome barriers related to lack of information that impede the utilisation 
even of the cost-effective no-regret potential, or (partly) compensate investors for costs 
resulting from the GHG reduction activity. Such costs can be search costs (in the cases 
of the no-regret and co-benefits potential) or investment costs. The latter can be too high 
from the individual perspective but attractive from the societal perspective, i.e. in cases of 
a co-benefits potential; the justification for targeted financial support in such cases is to 
make it attractive for individuals to pursue the co-benefits potential that have a net benefit 
for society. However, experience shows that financial support for investments often has 
the biggest effect through creating awareness of the existence and the (net) benefits of 
GHG mitigation options, rather than through investors making a detailed calculation of 
their costs and benefits.  
In a case of an ambitious potential, investment costs would even be too high from the 
societal perspective in the short run. In such cases, targeted investment support may still 
be justified to address the ambitious potential, if in the long run the potential is expected 
to become cost-effective due to technology learning curves.  
• C) Standards and voluntary agreements make specific technologies or measures 
mandatory or the default for actors and transform markets by the non-availability of 
certain products. Depending on their strength, these policies bear the potential for a full 
                                                
5  This study, however, only provides the framework for this. Concrete tailoring of policy packages 
and including their evaluation and if necessary adaptation is the task of the respective countries. 
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exploitation of the co-benefits and ambitious potential. In many cases, however, 
considerations regarding the ability of suppliers to adapt their product ranges or the cost-
effectiveness for investors limit these policies to the no-regret or co-benefits potential. 
They reduce transaction costs and information barriers. However, such policies can only 
be introduced for technologies that are easy to standardise.   
Standards and voluntary agreements can also create obligations to improve or exchange 
existing production processes or technologies, apart from the market-based incentives or 
disincentives provided by the economic and fiscal measures. Regulations on the use of 
planning procedures, e.g. in the transport sector, are also included here. Such obligations 
and regulations intend to widen the technology focus of public and market actors and, 
thereby, both to overcome information barriers and to create a level playing field. They, 
too, are instruments to improve the utilisation of the no-regret and co-benefits potential. 
Voluntary agreements are best to use when the number of market actors is relatively 
small, while legal standards are more widely applicable. 
The following policies are more of a supportive character and should be combined with 
targeted policies and measures (i.e., categories B) and C) ) in order to realise significant 
GHG reductions: 
• D) Information, know-how transfer and education improve the knowledge basis of 
actors, thereby reducing transaction costs and increasing availability and uptake of 
climate-friendly technologies and solutions. This category also includes the necessary 
institutions for the know-how transfer as well as specific services that are provided for 
emission reduction, such as energy analyses (audits) and specialised consultancy, which 
can play an important role in increasing knowledge and capacity of actors and sectors.  
All in all, this category of policies and measures is mainly targeting a better exploitation of 
no-regrets and, partly, co-benefits potential. Reduced transaction costs may also 
increase the size of both types of potential relative to the overall (ambitious mitigation) 
potential. 
• E) Research and technology transfer in order to develop new technologies for GHG 
mitigation and to make these technologies available. This can also be supported by 
demand pull through public or private targeted procurement, or through co-operative 
procurement.  
These types of policies will thus increase the size of the overall GHG mitigation potential, 
and will convert part of the ambitious potential into co-benefits or even no-regret 
potential. 
For each of the sectors analysed, first of all, technology areas or subsectors with a significant 
potential for reduction of GHG emissions have been identified based on WP 2 results and 
existing literature (e.g. IPCC 2007; Deutscher Bundestag 2002). For each of these areas and 
subsectors, a package of policies and measures from the above five categories that can be 
considered good practice was identified. This is based, again, on the literature as well as on 
the Wuppertal Institute’s expertise. Usually, one to three policy instruments in the package 
are considered to be principal instruments. These are often targeted policies and measures 
from categories B) or C) that have shown to be effective in practice either in OECD countries 
or in emerging economies, but also often includes a sustainable reform of energy subsidies 
that still exist in some emerging economies.  
 
1.4 Introduction to the presentation of the results 
In the following, the sourcebook is presented in the form of tables organised by sector and by 
the five groups of policies and measures. The principal instruments in each package are 
highlighted in bold. 
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2 Good practice policy instruments 
2.1 Cross-sectoral climate policy instruments 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The cross-sectoral climate policy instruments include policies and measures, which set the 
framework for sector specific instruments aiming at a reduction of GHG emissions 
stemming from fossil fuels and other sources, efficient use of energy and the 
application of renewable energy sources. For this purpose, the selected policy 
instruments target different sectors, technologies and fields of application. 
 
2.1.2 Sourcebook overview 
The following table provides an overview of cross-sectoral climate policies and measures. 
Table 35. Packages of cross-sectoral climate policies and measures 
Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
Reduction of 
fossil-fuel 
and other 
GHG 
emissions  
Emissions 
trading scheme  
Joint 
implementation(JI), 
Clean 
Development 
Mechanism 
(CDM), Green 
Investment 
Schemes(GIS) 
Gradual phase-
out of energy 
subsidies/ 
Ecological 
finance reform 
Low carbon fund 
Investment 
support for 
specific GHG 
emissions 
reduction projects 
Overall GHG 
emissions 
reduction 
targets (e.g.  
minus 20% 
compared to 
baseline by 
2020) 
Framework for 
sectoral 
voluntary 
agreements 
Framework for 
technology 
specific 
voluntary 
agreements 
Framework for 
a fuel switch to 
non- or lower 
carbon fuel 
(e.g. Swedish 
strategy to 
substitute oil by 
2020) 
Framework for 
capacity 
building 
RD&D on non 
or low carbon 
technologies, 
processes and 
methods 
Framework for 
eco-efficient 
public 
procurement 
and co-
operative 
procurement 
schemes 
 
Efficient use 
of energy  
Emissions 
trading scheme 
Gradual phase-
out of energy 
subsidies/ 
Ecological 
finance reform: 
Energy taxation on 
fossil fuels and 
electricity  
Reduction of tax 
exemptions, 
subsidies and 
other support of 
Energy 
efficiency fund 
Alternatively or 
complementary: 
Obligations for 
energy suppliers 
or grid operators 
to save energy, 
with or without a 
White certificates 
scheme 
Overall 
quantitative 
energy 
efficiency 
targets (at least 
1 % per year 
vs. baseline in 
end-use 
efficiency; 1.5 
% per year vs. 
baseline in 
primary energy) 
Framework for 
requirements 
on energy end-
Framework for 
energy labelling 
of appliances, 
buildings, 
vehicles, etc. 
Framework for 
energy auditing 
Framework for 
energy 
efficiency 
benchmarks 
Framework for 
capacity 
building 
RD&D on 
energy 
efficiency 
technologies 
Framework for 
energy-efficient 
public 
procurement 
and co-
operative 
procurement 
schemes 
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Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
fossil fuels 
Efficient 
organisation of 
electricity and gas 
markets 
Incentive-based 
regulation of 
electricity and gas 
transmission grids 
use efficiency 
and energy 
services 
Framework for 
Eco design 
requirements/ 
MEPS for 
energy using 
products 
Framework for 
energy 
performance 
requirements of 
new and 
refurbished 
buildings 
Use of 
renewable 
energy 
sources 
Gradual phase-
out of energy 
subsidies 
Framework for 
feed-in tariffs 
Alternatively: 
green certificates 
scheme 
Overall 
quantitative 
renewable 
energy sources 
targets 
Framework for 
the use of 
renewable 
energy in 
transport and 
for the supply of 
electricity and 
heat 
Framework for 
capacity 
building 
RD&D on RES 
technologies 
Framework for 
public 
procurement 
and co-
operative 
procurement 
schemes 
 
2.1.3 Explanation for the choice of the policy instruments and packages 
Principal cross-sectoral policy instruments for the reduction of GHG emissions stemming 
from fossil fuels and other sources are: 
• overall quantitative emission reduction targets which are setting the framework for further 
action and allow monitoring the achievement of the targets; such targets should aim at 
the achievement of the no-regret and co-benefits potential, i.e. a reduction of about -30% 
by 2020 compared to the baseline; depending on external financial assistance, the 
targets could also include a part of the ambitious potential; 
• policies to make the co-benefits potential financially attractive for market actors, i.e., 
increase the size of the no-regret potential. These policies include an emissions trading 
scheme as well as the gradual phase-out of energy subsidies, where these exist, and an 
ecological finance reform internalising the external costs connected to GHG emissions.  
• These principal instruments should be supported by, e.g. frameworks for other targeted 
activities aiming at reducing GHG emissions.  
Reducing other taxes (e.g. on labour or the general VAT) can compensate the poor and 
small businesses for the gradual phase-out of energy subsidies. However, financial and other 
assistance for reducing consumption of purchased energy through energy end-use efficiency 
and renewable energy are even more effective in such compensation, since they further 
increase the no-regret potential. 
Important cross-sectoral policy instruments targeting the efficient use of energy include an 
energy efficiency fund financing general and targeted information, such as energy analyses 
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(energy audits), and supporting investments in energy efficiency technologies and activities. 
It may be funded from the government money saved through the gradual phase-out of 
energy subsidies. Both policy instruments therefore serve to move the size of the no-regret 
potential closer to that of the co-benefits potential, while the energy efficiency fund is also a 
general framework for organising and funding packages of targeted policies and measures 
that tackle all barriers simultaneously. After energy subsidies have been removed, an 
emissions trading scheme (for industry sectors) and an ecological finance reform 
internalising the external costs connected to the consumption of energy are important 
policies for fully tapping the co-benefits potential of energy efficiency.  
Supporting cross-sectoral policy instruments for energy efficiency could be, e.g. overall 
quantitative energy efficiency targets (at least 1 % per year vs. baseline in end-use 
efficiency; 1.5 % per year vs. baseline in primary energy, justified by the large but 
underutilised ambitious potential of energy efficiency) as well as legal frameworks for, e.g. 
labelling of energy consuming technologies, information campaigns, energy audits, energy 
performance requirements, or RD&D on energy efficiency technologies. Where the latter are 
appropriate will be discussed in the respective chapters of this paper. 
A framework for feed-in tariffs for renewable energy sources is considered the main policy 
instrument in this sector leading to an accelerated market penetration of renewable energy 
technologies for generating electricity. Experience from many countries, including, e.g. India, 
has proven the effectiveness of adequate feed-in tariffs. For heat and cold from renewable 
energy sources, the main instrument is the gradual phase-out of energy subsidies. Only if 
subsidies for fossil fuels or electricity no longer distort the market, it will be possible to use 
the potential of renewable energy that is already economic for society. These principal 
instruments can be supported be e.g. overall quantitative renewable energy sources targets, 
RD&D on renewable energy technologies, or favourable planning regulations.  
 
2.2 Power plants and heat production 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The sector power plants and heat production includes combined heat and power 
production (CHP) at different scales (small-scale, medium-sized and large-scale), 
renewable energy sources for electricity as well as heat and cold production, efficient 
fossil fuel power plants and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Policy instruments 
targeting the different sub sectors aim at bringing technologies with low or no GHG 
emissions on the market, using fuel in a more efficient manner and inducing a fuel switch. 
 
2.2.2 Sourcebook overview 
In the following table, an overview of climate policy instruments targeting power plants and 
heat production is given. 
Table 36. Packages of climate policy instruments in the sector heat and power production  
Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic 
and fiscal 
PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
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Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic 
and fiscal 
PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
Small-scale 
CHP              
(< 2 MW el) 
 Financially 
attractive feed-in 
tariffs defined by 
legislation, 
alternatively: 
bonus system 
Investment 
support, e.g. 
grants, soft loans 
Subsidies for 
decentralised 
district heating 
networks 
Favourable 
regulations on 
technical and 
market 
conditions for 
the purchasing 
of CHP 
electricity by 
grid companies 
Favourable 
planning 
regulations for 
CHP and 
district heating  
Demonstration 
and training on 
small-scale CHP 
technologies and 
their application 
for installation 
contractors, retail 
sales staff, 
architects and 
engineers 
Network of local 
actors 
RD&D scheme 
for accelerated 
development, 
technical 
improvement 
and market 
introduction 
Public 
procurement and 
co-operative 
procurement 
Medium-sized 
CHP 
 Financially 
attractive feed-in 
tariffs defined by 
legislation, 
alternatively: 
bonus system 
Financial 
incentives for the 
construction of 
new CHP plants 
and early 
replacement of 
inefficient plants 
Subsidies for 
district heating 
networks and 
linking industrial 
cogeneration 
facilities with 
neighbouring 
heat consumers 
Favourable 
planning and 
grid 
connection 
regulations for 
CHP and 
district heating 
Demonstration 
and Training on 
medium-sized 
CHP technologies 
and their 
application for 
installation 
contractors, retail 
sales staff, 
architects and 
engineers 
Network of local 
actors 
RD&D scheme 
for accelerated 
development, 
technical 
improvement 
and market 
introduction 
Large-scale 
CHP (> 100 
MW el) 
Domestic 
emissions 
trading, JI, 
CDM, GIS 
 
Financial 
incentives for the 
construction of 
new CHP plants 
and early 
replacement of 
inefficient plants 
Subsidies for 
district heating 
networks, linking 
industrial 
cogeneration 
facilities with 
neighbouring 
heat consumers 
Quantitative 
targets for 
power from 
large-scale 
CHP (CHP 
quota) 
Favourable 
planning and 
grid 
connection 
regulations for 
CHP and 
district heating 
 RD&D scheme 
for accelerated 
development, 
technical 
improvement 
and market 
introduction 
Renewable 
energy 
sources (RES) 
for electricity 
JI, CDM, GIS Favourable feed-
in tariffs defined 
by legislation 
Alternatively: 
Renewable 
electricity quota 
for electricity 
suppliers and 
Favourable 
regulations on 
grid access and 
power purchase 
agreements 
Accelerated 
building 
permission 
procedures for 
Demonstration 
and Training on 
RES technologies 
and their 
application for 
installation 
contractors, retail 
sales staff, 
architects and 
RD&D scheme 
for accelerated 
development, 
technical 
improvement 
and market 
introduction 
Public 
procurement and 
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Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic 
and fiscal 
PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
green certificates RES plants engineers 
Network of local 
actors 
co-operative 
procurement 
Renewable 
energy 
sources for 
heat and cold 
Gradual 
phase-out of 
energy 
subsidies  
JI, CDM, GIS 
Financial 
support for 
installation of 
RES 
technologies, 
e.g. soft loans or 
direct investment 
grants 
Building codes 
with a 
mandatory 
share of RES 
for heating and 
cooling 
Demonstration 
and Training on 
RES technologies 
and their 
application for 
installation 
contractors, retail 
sales staff, 
architects and 
engineers 
Network of local 
actors 
RD&D scheme 
for accelerated 
development, 
technical 
improvement 
and market 
introduction 
Public 
procurement and 
co-operative 
procurement 
Efficient fossil 
fuel power 
plants 
Domestic 
emissions 
trading 
JI, CDM, GIS 
Energy 
taxation of 
fuels 
Investment 
support (e.g. soft 
loans or direct 
investment 
grants) linked to 
MEPS 
Dynamic 
minimum 
conversion 
efficiency 
standards, 
regularly 
updated 
 RD&D scheme 
for accelerated 
development, 
technical 
improvement 
and market 
introduction 
CCS Domestic 
emissions 
trading 
Energy 
taxation of 
fuels 
 Obligation for 
CCS 
technology in 
new built power 
plants 
 RD&D scheme 
for accelerated 
development, 
technical 
improvement 
and market 
introduction 
 
2.2.3 Explanation for the choice of the policy instruments and packages 
Combined heat and power production (CHP) should be targeted by principally with feed-in 
tariffs for electricity, because they are providing economic planning reliability for investors, 
and by favourable regulations on planning issues, grid connection as well as technical and 
market conditions such as the purchasing of electricity from such plants by grid companies. 
Such issues regarding regulation ease the installation of CHP plants. For large-scale CHP 
plants, a well-designed domestic emissions trading scheme is also an important instrument 
since it encourages the efficient use of energy. Supporting instruments could be networks of 
regional actors (especially for small and medium-sized plants), demonstration and training on 
small- and medium-sized CHP technologies, financial support for the refurbishment or early 
replacement of old, and installation of new CHP plants, as well as favourable planning 
conditions and subsidies for district heating networks linking CHP plants with heat sinks. It 
will depend on the level of the feed-in tariffs or other targeted economic instruments, to which 
extend the no-regret, co-benefits, or even ambitious potential of CHP can be exploited. 
The principal policy instrument supporting renewable energy sources for electricity are 
feed-in tariffs defined by legislation, providing economic planning reliability to investors. 
Again, it will depend on the level of the feed-in tariffs or other targeted economic instruments, 
to which extend the no-regret, co-benefits, or even ambitious potential of CHP can be 
exploited. This instrument should be complemented by favourable regulations regarding 
planning issues, connection to the grid, or obligations for grid companies to purchase that 
electricity. Further instruments strengthening the effect of feed-in tariffs are RD&D on 
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renewable energy sources for electricity, networks of local actors or accelerated building 
permission procedures. 
Renewable energy sources for heat and cold should be targeted with building codes 
which request a mandatory share of heat and/or cold from renewable sources, as well as a 
combination of financial support for the installation of such technologies which awards going 
beyond the mandatory share of renewables, and the gradual phase-out of energy subsidies. 
The latter two instruments lift the no-regret potential towards the level of the co-benefits 
potential or maybe beyond, depending on the level of financial support. The mandatory share 
of heat and/or cold from renewable sources may usually be used to tap the co-benefits 
potential but might in principle also go into the ambitious potential. These principal policy 
instruments could be supported by e.g. RD&D activities, networks of local actors, or public 
and co-operative procurement to accelerate market introduction and technology learning. 
Domestic emissions trading is seen as the principal policy instrument for targeting efficient 
fossil fuel power plants by giving GHG emissions from fossil fuels a price. This assumes a 
smaller number of large economic actors basing their investment decisions on rational 
economic choices. Supporting policy instruments in this sector could be energy taxation of 
fuels, dynamic minimum conversion standards, which are regularly updated, investment 
support, or RD&D activities. 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is still an emerging and costly technology and has not 
been demonstrated on a large scale yet. The principal policy instrument for bringing this 
technology forward is a domestic emissions trading since it gives GHG emissions from fossil 
fuels a price and, thus, makes investments in CCS profitable. However, this technology 
should be supported by RD&D activities in order to further develop the technology and 
reduce the GHG abatement costs.   
 
2.3 Industry 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Policy instruments for the industry sector include cross-cutting instruments as well as policy 
instruments targeting different fields of application such as process heat, process drives, 
specific production processes, cross-sectoral energy use and building shell including heating, 
ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC). 
 
2.3.2 Sourcebook overview 
In the following, an overview of climate policies and measures in the industry sector is given. 
Table 37. Packages of climate policy instruments in the industry sector 
Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic 
and fiscal 
PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
Cross-cutting  Package 
implementation 
and financing 
framework: 
government or 
energy efficiency 
funds or obligation 
for energy 
companies/WC 
Framework for 
individual 
voluntary 
agreements 
  
Process heat  Emissions 
trading 
scheme 
Financial support 
for the installation 
and optimisation of 
energy-efficient 
Individual 
voluntary 
agreements on 
reducing energy 
Energy audits 
Benchmarking 
Regional 
Public 
procurement, 
co-operative 
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Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic 
and fiscal 
PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
provision of 
process heat or a 
fuel switch to non- 
or low carbon 
fossil fuels, e.g. 
soft loans, grants; 
particularly for 
measures covered 
by the voluntary 
agreements and 
developed as 
results of energy 
audits 
consumption or 
GHG emissions 
networks of 
actors 
procurement 
Process drives Energy 
taxation on 
electricity 
Financial support 
for the installation 
and optimisation of 
energy-efficient 
drives, e.g. soft 
loans, grants 
Dynamic MEPS, 
regularly updated 
Individual 
voluntary 
agreements on 
reducing energy 
consumption 
Energy audits 
Benchmarking 
Regional 
networks of 
actors 
Public 
procurement 
and co-
operative 
procurement 
Specific 
production 
processes 
Emissions 
trading 
scheme 
 Obligations to 
implement the 
best available 
technology 
(BAT) 
Alternatively: 
Individual 
voluntary 
agreements on 
reducing GHG 
emissions 
Integration of 
GHG emission 
issues into 
permits for plant 
operation 
Energy audits 
Benchmarking 
Information and 
training on 
benefits of new 
technology/ 
solutions 
Regional 
networks of 
actors 
RD&D on 
energy-efficient 
production 
processes 
Cross-sectoral 
electricity uses 
(compressed 
air, cooling, 
lighting, some 
pumping) 
 Financial support 
for the installation 
and optimisation of 
specific energy-
efficient cross-
cutting 
technologies 
Dynamic MEPS 
regularly updated 
Individual 
voluntary 
agreements on 
reducing energy 
consumption 
Energy audits 
and 
management 
Information and 
training on 
benefits of new 
technology/ 
solutions 
Regional 
networks of 
actors 
Public 
procurement 
and co-
operative 
procurement 
Building shell 
and heating, 
ventialtion and 
air-
conditioning 
(HVAC) 
Gradual 
phase-out of 
energy 
subsidies/ 
Energy 
taxation on 
heating fuels 
and electricity 
 
Financial support 
for refurbishment 
towards low 
energy (or even 
passive) buildings 
and HVAC/lighting 
system 
optimisation to 
accelerate market 
penetration 
Dynamic MEPS, 
regularly updated 
and with 
implementation 
control 
Energy audits/ 
analyses 
Building 
certificates 
Information and 
training on 
benefits of new 
technology/ 
solutions 
Regional 
RD&D on low 
energy/passive/ 
bioclimatic 
refurbishment 
concepts in 
existing 
buildings 
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Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic 
and fiscal 
PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
 networks of 
actors 
 
2.3.3 Explanation for the choice of policy instruments and packages 
The principal cross-cutting policy instrument in the industry sector is the financing 
framework for GHG reduction measures in the different fields of application. Financing 
support for measures facilitating individual action is essential for realising the GHG reduction 
potential and could come from government, an energy efficiency fund or white certificates. It 
should be complemented by a framework for voluntary agreements on concrete action with 
individual companies. 
GHG emissions from process heat should mainly be targeted through a mix of instruments 
for (1) detection of possibilities for energy saving opportunities (energy audits), (2) creation of 
internal commitment and structures for implementation by industry companies through 
individual voluntary agreements on reducing GHG emissions, (3) targeted financial 
incentives through investment support for low GHG emissions technologies, and (4) general 
economic incentives through a domestic emissions trading scheme. The financial incentives 
are considered necessary to achieve the commitment and the actual implementation of the 
potential energy efficiency actions. Instruments (1) through (3) mainly target the no-regret 
potential, while instrument (4) also targets the co-benefits potential. However, depending on 
the size of the financial support, instrument (3) could also target the co-benefits and 
ambitious potential. 
These policy instruments could be supported by benchmarks for GHG emissions making a 
comparison with other companies possible and easing compliance with voluntary 
agreements, regional networks of actors bundling knowledge regarding GHG emissions 
reduction opportunities and stimulating action through peers leading by good example, and 
public/co-operative procurement. The latter is assisting market introduction and break-
through of innovative technologies, and can thus convert some of the ambitious potential into 
a co-benefits or no-regret potential. The other two are mainly assisting in tapping the no-
regret potential. 
Process drives should be targeted through the principal instruments of (1) energy audits 
showing saving potential, (2) networks of local actors bundling knowledge and expertise, (3) 
individual voluntary agreements for reducing energy consumption of motor drives, and (4) 
financial support for installing energy efficient process drives. The intervention logic for these 
policies and measures and their role in targeting the different types of potential have been 
described in the section on process heat. 
Regarding specific production processes, principal policy instruments include (1) a 
domestic emissions trading scheme giving price signals, (2) obligations to implement the 
best available technology (alternatively: voluntary agreements), and (3) energy audits 
showing saving options. These policy instruments could e.g. be supported by RD&D on 
production processes with low GHG emissions, benchmarks for ranking a company’s 
production process as well as information and training on new technologies and networks of 
local actors in order to spread knowledge on how to realise GHG reduction options. In this 
area, it is possible to work with obligations instead of targeted financial incentives, since the 
number of sites and companies is quite small and therefore possible to control. An example 
is the Best Available Technology (BAT) as part of the Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control (IPPC) regulation in the EU. 
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Principle policy instruments for targeting cross-sectoral electricity uses (including 
compressed air, cooling, lightning, some pumping) include financial support for energy-
efficient cross-cutting technologies, energy audits and management for detecting and 
realising saving options, and a network of local actors bundling knowledge on energy 
efficiency. The intervention logic for these policies and measures and their role in targeting 
the different types of potential have been described in the section on process heat. Dynamic 
minimum energy efficiency standards or voluntary agreements for standard equipment as 
well as public/co-operative procurement could support these policy instruments. 
Building shell and HVAC could be addressed by the principal policy instruments of (1) 
financial support for refurbishment towards a lower heating demand and for energy efficient 
building technologies in order to accelerate the market penetration of low energy buildings, 
combined with (2) energy audits/analyses of buildings for detecting saving options, (3) the 
gradual phase-out of energy subsidies where these exist, and (4) networks of local actors. 
This again provides for a combination of information (2) and targeted incentive (1) 
instruments with a general instrument to provide a level economic playing field (3). It is 
complemented by an instrument to strengthen knowledge on the supply-side of energy-
efficient technology (4). The potential targeted by instruments (1) to (3) have been mentioned 
elsewhere; the networks of local actors also mainly target no-regret options. 
Energy taxation on heating fuels and electricity, dynamic minimum energy efficiency 
standards for buildings, information measures such as building certificates or information and 
training on energy efficient technologies as well as RD&D on energy efficient buildings could 
support the principal policy instruments in this subsector.   
 
2.4 Residential and commercial sector 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Policy instruments for the residential and commercial sector aim at reducing GHG emissions 
connected to new and existing buildings (shell, HVAC and lightning), white goods as well as 
ICT and home electronics. Changing the behaviour and increasing the penetration of the 
market with energy efficient technologies are the targets of such policy instruments. 
 
2.4.2 Sourcebook overview 
In the following table, an overview of climate policy instruments in the household sector is 
given.  
Table 38. Packages of climate policy instruments in the household and commercial sector 
Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic 
and fiscal 
PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
New 
buildings – 
Shell, HVAC 
and lighting 
Gradual 
phase-out of 
energy 
subsidies/ 
Energy 
taxation on 
heating fuels 
and electricity 
Financial support 
for new-built low 
energy/passive/ 
bioclimatic buildings 
to accelerate 
market introduction 
Package 
implementation and 
financing 
framework: 
government or 
energy efficiency 
funds or obligation 
for energy 
companies/WC 
Dynamic MEPS, 
regularly updated 
and with 
implementation 
control: 
Residential: shell 
and heating; 
Commercial: 
shell, HVAC and 
lighting 
Building 
certificates 
Information and 
training on 
benefits of new 
technology/ 
solutions 
Regional 
networks of 
actors 
RD&D on low 
energy/passive/ 
bioclimatic 
building 
concepts 
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Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic 
and fiscal 
PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
Existing 
buildings – 
Shell, HVAC 
and lighting 
Gradual 
phase-out of 
energy 
subsidies/ 
Energy 
taxation on 
heating fuels 
and electricity 
Financial support 
for refurbishment 
towards low energy 
(or even passive) 
buildings and 
HVAC/lighting 
system optimisation 
to accelerate 
market penetration 
Package 
implementation 
and financing 
framework: 
government or 
energy efficiency 
funds or obligation 
for energy 
companies/WC 
Dynamic MEPS, 
regularly updated 
and with 
implementation 
control: 
Residential: shell 
and heating; 
Commercial: 
shell, HVAC and 
lighting 
Energy audits/ 
analyses 
Building 
certificates 
Information and 
training on 
benefits of new 
technology/ 
solutions 
Regional 
networks of 
actors 
RD&D on low 
energy/passive/ 
bioclimatic 
refurbishment 
concepts in 
existing 
buildings 
White goods Gradual 
phase-out of 
energy 
subsidies/ 
Energy 
taxation on 
electricity 
Temporary 
financial support 
for energy-efficient 
cold appliances to 
accelerate market 
introduction 
Package 
implementation and 
financing 
framework: 
government or 
energy efficiency 
funds or obligation 
for energy 
companies/White 
certificates scheme 
Dynamic MEPS, 
regularly updated 
Energy 
labelling with 
energy 
efficiency 
classes 
Targeted 
information 
campaigns 
Public 
procurement 
and co-
operative 
procurement 
ICT and home 
electronics 
Gradual 
phase-out of 
energy 
subsidies/ 
Energy 
taxation on 
electricity 
 Dynamic MEPS, 
regularly updated, 
for limiting both 
standby (to below 
1 Watt) and on-
mode 
consumption 
Alternatively: 
Voluntary 
agreements on 
stand-by losses 
and minimum 
standards 
Energy labelling 
for on-mode 
consumption if 
possible (e.g. 
TVs) 
Targeted 
information 
campaigns 
Public 
procurement 
and co-
operative 
procurement 
 
2.4.3 Explanation for the choice of the policy instruments and packages 
New buildings including building shell, HVAC and commercial lighting should be 
targeted with dynamic minimum energy efficiency standards (MEPS), which are regularly 
updated (hence dynamic) and for which compliance is controlled. Such MEPS reduce the 
search and transaction costs for market actors, prescribe a cost-effective level of energy 
efficiency, and come at a relatively low cost for the government. Supporting policy 
instruments could be (1) the gradual phase-out of energy subsidies or energy taxation on 
heating fuels and electricity where these exist, giving appropriate price signals and bringing 
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the no-regret potential to their fair level, (2) financial support for innovative low energy 
buildings using much less energy than required by the MEPS, to accelerate market 
introduction (financed through government from the saved energy subsidies, energy 
efficiency fund or white certificates) and thereby to assist in making the MEPS and the no-
regret potential dynamic, (3) information measures such as building certificates, information 
and training of planners, architects or installation contractors in order to spread knowledge 
on low energy building technologies and solutions, and (4) RD&D on most innovative low 
energy building concepts to increase the ambitious potential. 
The principal policy instruments for targeting existing buildings including building shell, 
HVAC and commercial lighting are (1) financial support in order to increase the number of 
refurbishments and accelerate the market penetration of energy-efficient HVAC and lighting 
systems, in combination with (2) the gradual phase-out of energy subsidies where these 
exist, (3) energy audits for detecting the energy saving potential as well as (4) networks of 
local actors. The intervention logic for these policies and measures and their role in targeting 
the different types of potential have been described in the section on industrial building shell 
and HVAC in chapter 1.4. Similar to the case of new buildings, these instruments should be 
supported by energy taxation, building certificates, information and training of different 
actors, RD&D on refurbishment concepts and energy efficiency technologies for buildings, as 
well as minimum energy efficiency standards for refurbishments that are done anyway. Since 
it is not possible in practice to force building owners to take action and refurbish their existing 
buildings, the combination of the information instruments (energy audits and building 
certificates) with the targeted financial support is paramount here. 
White goods should be targeted with a package including (1) energy labelling, which is 
providing information to the consumer and setting the framework for other policy instruments 
by setting up energy efficiency classes, (2) dynamic minimum energy performance standards 
(MEPS) for appliances in order to take the worst performing appliances out of the market, (3) 
the gradual phase-out of energy subsidies where these exist, and (4) temporary financial 
support for the most energy-efficient cold appliances in order to accelerate market 
introduction (financed through government from the saved energy subsidies, or an energy 
efficiency fund, or obligations for energy companies, or a white certificates scheme). 
Supporting instruments could be energy taxation of electricity, targeted information 
campaigns in order to inform different actors about energy saving options, benefits, and 
labels, and public/co-operative procurement accelerating the market introduction of the most 
energy-efficient appliances. The intervention logic behind this package has been described, 
e.g. by ECU (1997) and Michelsen (2005). Energy Labelling and MEPS have been 
introduced not only in many OECD countries but also in many emerging economies and 
developing countries. Thailand was one of the first emerging economy countries to introduce 
such an energy label.  
ICT and home electronics should be addressed by the principal policy instruments of 
dynamic minimum energy efficiency standards targeting stand-by and on-mode consumption, 
which are regularly updated in order to take the worst performing appliances out of the 
market, as well as public/co-operative procurement in order to accelerate the market 
penetration of the most energy efficient appliances. These policy instruments could be 
supported by the gradual phase-out of energy subsidies or energy taxation on electricity, 
energy labelling for on-mode consumption, and targeted information campaigns informing 
about e.g. stand-by losses in order to raise the awareness of the different actors. Since the 
cost of saving energy in ICT technology is usually quite low, all of these instruments mainly 
target the no-regrets potential. Since the savings on energy costs that can be made on single 
appliances are quite small, it is not useful to work with financial incentives and in most cases 
also not with labelling, but simply to require progress in energy efficiency through the 
dynamic MEPS. 
 
 162
2.5 Transport sector 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Climate policy instruments for reducing GHG emissions in the transportation sector target at 
sustainable biofuels, individual motor car traffic, air traffic, public transport and freight 
transportation. These policy instruments aim at reducing GHG emissions from 
transportation through bringing energy-efficient technologies and low-carbon fuels on the 
market, inducing a modal shift, and changing the behaviour of travellers.  
 
2.5.2 Sourcebook overview 
This table presents policy instruments in the transportation sector. 
Table 39. Packages of climate policy instruments in the transportation sector 
Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
Sustainable 
biofuels 
Tax 
exemptions for 
sustainable 
biofuels 
 Alternative to tax 
exemptions: 
biofuel quotas 
Environmental 
and social 
production 
standards 
 RD&D on new 
biofuels  
Individual 
motor car 
transport 
Energy 
taxation on 
fuels 
Alternatively: 
emission 
trading scheme 
Phase-out of 
subsidies and 
tax exemptions 
for petrol, diesel 
and other 
vehicle fuels 
except 
sustainable 
biofuels 
 
Road fees, 
congestion 
charges, etc. 
CO2 
differentiated 
vehicle taxation 
(reduced levels 
for most energy-
efficient cars) 
and 
depreciation 
rules (reduced 
or nor 
depreciation for 
less energy-
efficient cars) 
Financial 
incentives to 
make use of car-
sharing/car-
pooling and 
public transport 
(modal shift) 
Average specific 
emission target 
(fleet target) for 
new cars 
Alternatively: 
Voluntary 
agreements with 
manufactures on 
an average 
emission target 
for new and old 
cars 
Dynamic MEPS 
for car 
components (e.g. 
air conditioning, 
tyres), regularly 
updated  
Speed limits 
Regulations on 
spatial planning 
favouring non-
motorised and 
public transport 
Restrictions on 
car use in city 
centres or on 
specific car free 
days  
Vehicle labelling 
Traffic 
management 
systems 
Driver training 
programmes 
Information and 
motivation for 
car-sharing/car-
pooling and 
public transport 
(modal shift) 
Promotion 
campaigns for 
efficient travel 
planning 
Promotion of 
intermodal 
transit (park and 
ride) 
RD&D on 
efficient and 
low emission 
technologies 
Public 
procurement of 
energy-efficient 
cars 
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Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
Air transport Emissions 
trading 
scheme in the 
aviation sector 
Energy taxation 
on kerosene 
Alternatively: 
increased 
landing fees or 
ticket taxes 
Phase-out of 
subsidies and 
tax exemptions 
for kerosene 
Value-added tax 
for international 
travel 
Route pricing 
Average specific 
emission target 
(fleet target) 
Air traffic 
management 
systems 
RD&D on 
efficient and 
low emission 
technologies 
Public 
transport 
 Financial 
support of 
public transport 
(reduced user 
fees, public 
investments in 
infrastructure) 
Restrictions on 
individual 
transport (e.g. 
parking 
restrictions, road 
pricing, 
congestion 
charges) 
Integrated 
transport planning 
Promotion of 
public transport 
RD&D on 
innovative 
public transport 
systems 
Freight 
transport 
Energy 
taxation on 
petrol 
Alternatively: 
emission 
trading scheme 
Phase-out of 
subsidies and 
tax exemptions 
for truck fuels 
 
Financial 
incentives to 
shift freight 
transport from 
road to rail 
Road fees for 
heavy vehicles 
Average specific 
emission target 
(fleet target) for 
new and old 
lorries 
Alternatively: 
Voluntary 
agreements with 
manufactures on 
an average 
emission target 
for new and old 
lorries 
Dynamic MEPS 
for lorry 
components, 
regularly updated  
Speed limits 
Promotion of 
improving the 
logistic 
management 
Vehicle labelling 
Traffic 
management 
systems 
Driver training 
programmes 
Promotion of 
intermodal 
transport 
(combined 
transport on 
road, rail and/or 
waterways) 
RD&D on 
efficient 
technologies 
 
2.5.3 Explanation for the choice of the policy instruments and packages 
An increased market penetration of biofuels can be reached through the principal policy 
instrument of tax exemptions for biofuels (or introducing taxation on fossil fuels for the first 
time) in order to make them competitive. The boom for biofuel production in countries such 
as Brazil can be explained by tax exemptions for ethanol in Brazil, Germany, or the USA 
have proven the effectiveness of such a policy. However, this policy instrument must be 
coupled with environmental and social production standards in order to secure that biofuels 
are produced in a sustainable way. RD&D on new biofuels could support an accelerated 
market penetration. 
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Individual motor car transport should be targeted in three ways: (A) improving fuel 
efficiency of new and existing cars, (B) improved use of existing cars, and (C) encouraging 
modal shifts. Route (A) is best addressed by the principal climate policy instruments of (1) a 
mandatory fleet average specific emission target for new cars in order to accelerate the 
introduction of energy-efficient vehicles on the market, (2) an energy taxation on fuels, which 
will also have an impact on the behaviour of car users (B), and (3) depreciation rules for 
vehicles differentiated according to GHG emissions – with the highest depreciation allowed 
for the most fuel-efficient vehicles and no depreciation for vehicles consuming more than a 
threshold (e.g. 170 g/km for cars).  
There are a number of supporting policy instruments available in order to strengthen the 
principal instruments outlined above. These instruments include financial incentives such as 
the phase-out of subsidies and tax exemptions for fuels, road fees, vehicle taxation 
differentiated according to GHG emissions, financial support to make use of car-sharing or 
car-pooling, legislative instruments such as dynamic minimum energy efficiency standards 
for car components, speed limits (B) or restrictions on car use in cities (C). Supporting 
information measures could be vehicle labelling in order to categorise vehicles according to 
energy efficiency classes (A) or information measures aiming at altering the behaviour of 
drivers like traffic management systems (B), driver training programs (B) or promotion of 
modal shifts (C). Finally, RD&D measures on efficient and low emissions technologies or 
public/co-operative procurement of energy efficient cars could accelerate the market 
transition. 
Most of these instruments, again, tackle the no-regret potential, while energy taxation aims to 
bring the no-regret potential closer to the co-benefits potential, and RD&D is intended to 
increase the ambitious potential. Public/co-operative procurement can also use a part of the 
ambitious potential and partly turn it into a co-benefits or no-regret potential, if market break-
through can be accelerated. 
Principle climate policy instruments for targeting air transport could be an emissions trading 
scheme in the aviation sector for internalising the external costs of air transport, and an 
average specific emission target for new planes in order to take the worst performing planes 
out of the market. These instruments appear appropriate since the number of actors, both on 
the side of carriers and on the side of airplane producers, is relatively small. They could be 
supported by energy taxation on kerosene, a phase out of subsidies for kerosene, a value-
added tax for international travel, route pricing, air traffic management systems in order to 
reduce unnecessary air traffic, and RD&D on efficient and low emission technologies.  
Public transport should be targeted through the principal policy instrument of financial 
support (e.g. reduced user fees and public investments in an improved infrastructure) in 
order to set incentives for an increased use of this mode of transportation. Supporting 
instruments could be restrictions on individual transport (e.g. parking restrictions or 
congestion charge), integrated transport planning, promotion of public transport as well as 
RD&D on innovative public transport systems. 
Freight transportation should be targeted through the principal policy instruments of fuel 
taxation, which could lead to a more efficient use of lorries and a shift towards transportation 
on rail or waterways as well as an average specific emission target for new lorries, which 
could result in a higher penetration of the market with low GHG emission lorries. A number of 
supporting instruments are available, which are aiming at reducing GHG emissions in the 
freight sector. Financial instruments aiming at changing the behaviour include a phase-out of 
subsidies and tax exemptions for truck fuels, financial support to switch from road to rail 
based transport, and road fees for heavy vehicles. Legislative instruments include dynamic 
minimum energy efficiency standards for lorry components and speed limits. Various 
information measures such as vehicle labelling, information campaigns, traffic management 
systems or driver training programs could support the principal policy instruments. Finally, 
RD&D on efficient freight transportation technologies and solutions is also important. The 
roles of all these policies and measures are similar to those presented for individual car 
transport. 
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2.6 Waste 
2.6.1 Introduction 
Policy instruments in the waste sector could be divided into instruments targeting household 
waste on the one side and industrial waste on the other side. Waste prevention, reuse, 
recycling and minimising GHG gases from land-filled waste are the main targets of these 
policy instruments. 
 
2.6.2 Sourcebook overview 
Policy instruments in the waste sector are presented in the following table. 
Table 40. Packages of climate policy instruments in the waste sector 
Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
Household 
waste 
 Deposit system 
for reusable 
packaging 
Favourable 
feed-in tariffs 
for electricity 
from landfill gas 
and/or waste 
incineration 
 
Quotas for 
reusable 
packaging  
Recycling 
quotas for 
packaging 
waste 
Extended 
producer 
responsibility 
scheme for 
packaging (e.g. 
green dot) 
Mandatory 
waste 
treatment 
(mechanical, 
biological and/or 
thermal) 
Mandatory 
source 
separation 
Obligations to 
capture landfill 
gas  
Information and 
motivation on 
waste 
prevention, 
minimisation and 
reuse 
Information on 
kerbside 
recycling 
RD&D on waste 
preventing and 
minimising 
packaging 
Industrial 
waste 
Waste tax based 
on 
environmental 
impact 
Deposit 
systems for 
reusable 
packaging 
Favourable 
feed-in tariffs 
for electricity 
from landfill gas 
and/or waste 
incineration 
 
 
Quotas for 
reusable 
packaging 
Recycling 
quotas 
Alternatively: 
Voluntary 
agreements to 
prevent, 
minimise and 
re-use waste 
Extended 
producer 
responsibility 
scheme for 
Information and 
motivation on 
waste prevention 
and minimisation 
Benchmarks on 
waste from 
specific 
production 
processes 
Waste audits 
Environmental 
management 
systems 
RD&D on waste 
preventing and 
minimising 
technologies 
and production 
processes 
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Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
packaging (e.g. 
green dot) 
Mandatory 
waste 
treatment 
(mechanical, 
biological and/or 
thermal) 
Obligations to 
capture landfill 
gas 
 
2.6.3 Explanation for the choice of the policy instruments and packages 
Principle climate policy instruments for targeting household waste include quotas for 
reusable packaging in order to prevent or minimise the occurrence of waste, mandatory 
waste treatment for further minimising the amount of waste as well as obligations to capture 
landfill gas in order to deal with GHG emissions. Supporting instruments could be a deposit 
system for reusable packaging, favourable feed-in tariffs for electricity from landfill gas and/or 
waste incineration, recycling quotas for packaging waste, an extended producer 
responsibility scheme for packaging or mandatory source separation. Supporting information 
measures include information and motivation for waste prevention, minimisation and reuse 
as well as information on kerbside collection. Finally, RD&D on e.g. waste minimising 
packaging could also support the principal policy instruments. 
Industrial waste is targeted by principal climate policy instruments like a waste tax based on 
environmental impact in order to give financial incentives for waste prevention or minimising 
the amount of waste, quotas for reusable packaging and recycling as well as mandatory 
waste treatment and obligations to capture landfill gas. Supporting policy instruments include 
– besides the policy instruments, which are also targeting household waste – waste audits, 
environmental management systems, benchmarking as well as RD&D on waste preventing 
and minimising production processes. 
 
2.7 Agriculture 
2.7.1 Introduction 
Climate policy instruments targeting the agricultural sector could be divided into instruments 
targeting soil, nutrients and livestock. These policy instruments mainly aim at reducing 
GHG emissions through changing land use patterns, farming techniques and the political 
framework. 
 
2.7.2 Sourcebook overview 
An overview over climate policy instruments for the agricultural sector is given in the 
following table. 
Table 41. Packages of climate policy instruments for the agricultural sector 
Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
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Object of 
PAMs 
General 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Targeted 
economic and 
fiscal PAMs 
Standards and 
voluntary 
agreements 
Information, 
know-how 
transfer and 
education 
Research and 
technology 
transfer 
Soil  Financial support 
for removing 
environmentally 
sensitive land from 
agricultural 
production 
Requirements for 
conservation of 
agricultural land 
(e.g. protection 
from erosion) 
Requirements for 
wetland 
protection 
Information and 
technical 
assistance for 
conservation 
measures (e.g. 
soil or wetland 
conservation) 
RD&D on 
sustainable 
land-use 
Nutrients Ecological 
finance and 
subsidy reform 
in the 
agricultural 
sector (e.g. 
shift from 
production 
based support 
measures to 
direct area 
payments in 
arable 
production)  
Financial support 
for sustainable 
agricultural 
production 
methods (e.g. 
organic farming, 
improvement of 
nutrient 
management) 
Standards on 
fertiliser 
application 
 
Information and 
training on good 
practice 
sustainable 
agricultural 
production 
methods 
Information and 
training on 
efficient fertiliser 
application (e.g. 
database 
supporting the 
development of 
nutrient 
management 
plans or crop 
nutrient budgets) 
GPS supported 
agricultural 
production 
methods 
 
RD&D on 
sustainable 
agricultural 
production 
methods  
RD&D on 
fertilisers with 
low N2O 
emissions 
Livestock    Financial support 
for manure 
handling  
Favourable feed-in 
tariffs for electricity 
from biogas 
produced from 
manure 
Standards for 
livestock feeding 
and manure 
handling 
Information and 
training on good 
practices in 
livestock feeding 
and manure 
handling 
RD&D on 
options to 
decrease CH4 
emissions from 
livestock 
 
2.7.3 Explanation for the choice of the policy instruments and packages 
Climate policy instruments targeting GHG emissions from soil include financial incentives for 
protecting sensitive soil, requirements for soil and wetland conservation, information and 
assistance on soil protection as well as RD&D on sustainable land use. 
The efficient use of nutrients could be targeted through an ecological finance and subsidy 
reform in the agricultural sector, financial support for sustainable farming techniques, 
standards on fertiliser application or information on efficient fertiliser use. 
GHG emissions from livestock should be targeted by policy instruments such as financial 
support for manure handling, favourable feed-in tariffs for electricity from biogas produced 
from manure, standards for livestock feeding and manure handling, information on such 
issues as well as RD&D on options to decrease GHG emissions from livestock.  
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Appendix D Abbreviations 
AF Adaptation Fund 
AI Annex I 
AR4 Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC 
Art. Article (Artikel) 
AWG Ad-hoc Working Group (on further commitments for Annex I parties) 
BAU Business-as-usual (scenario) 
BIP Gross domestic product (Bruttoinlansprodukt) 
BRZ Brazil 
C Carbon 
CCS Carbon capture and storage 
CDM Clean development mechanism 
CH4  Methane 
CHN China 
CHP Combined heat and power production 
CO2  Carbon dioxide 
CONPET Brazil’s National Programme for the Rational Use of Natural Gas and Oil 
Products (Programa Nacional da Racionalização do Uso dos Derivados 
do Petróleo e do Gás Natural) 
COP Conference of the parties 
DSM Demand side management 
EEI Energy Efficiency Index 
EGTT Expert Group on Technology Transfer 
ETS Emissions Trading System 
EU European Union 
FCCC Framework Convention on Climate Change 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GEF Global Environment Facility 
GHG Greenhouse gas 
GIS Green investment scheme 
Gt Giga tonnes, 109 tonnes 
GWh Giga watt hours, 109 watt hours 
HDI Human development index (developed by the United Nations) 
HVAC Heating, ventilation and air conditioning 
ICT Information and communication technology 
IND India 
IPCC International Panel on Climate Change 
IPR Intellectual property rights 
JI Joint implementation 
KOR South Korea 
KP Kyoto Protocol 
KWK Combined heat and power, CHP (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung) 
LDCF Least Developing Countries Fund 
LUCF Land-use change and forestry 
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LULUCF Land-use, land-use change and forestry 
MEPS Minimum energy performance standards 
Mrd.  Billion (Milliarde(n)), 109 
Mt Mega tonnes, 106 tonnes 
CO2äquiv, CO2eq Carbon dioxide equivalents (Kohlenstoffdioxidäquivalente) 
N2O Nitrous oxide 
NAI Non-Annex I 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAMs Policies and measures 
ppm, ppmv parts per million, parts per million by volume 
PPP Purchasing power parity 
PROÁLCOOL Brazil’s National Alcohol Programme (Programa Nacional do Àlcool) 
PROCEL Brazil’s National Electrical Conservation Programme (Programa Nacional 
de Conservação de Energia Eléctrica) 
PROINFA Brazil’s Programme for Alternative Sources of Energy (Progorama de 
Incentivo às Fontes Alternatives de Energiea Elétrica) 
PRONAR Brazil’s National Air Quality Control Programme (Programa Nacional de 
Controle da Qualidade do Ar) 
RD&D Research, development and demonstration 
RES Renewable energy sources 
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
SCCF Special Climate Change Fund 
SD PAMs Sustainable development policies and measures 
THG Greenhouse gas (Treibhausgas) 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
USD US Dollar, US$ 
WC White certificates scheme 
WP Work package 
ZAF South Africa 
 
 
